Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL

MERCHANT NAVY MEMORIAL BILL

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

Helicopters

Mr. Norman Dodds: asked the Minister of Supply what progress has been made in the experiments with the twin-engined helicopter, the Bristol type 173; and what encouragement is being given by his Department to expedite the time when it will be a practical proposition in our transport system.

The Minister of Supply (Mr. Duncan Sandys): The first prototype flew for the first time on 3rd January last. The Ministry of Supply is giving all possible assistance to the company.

Mr. Dodds: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that people who are close to these trials are of the opinion that the 13-seater will be a practical proposition in 1954?

Mr. Sandys: I think that that is about correct.

Jet Aircraft

Mr. F. Beswick: asked the Minister of Supply if he will give the types of jet engines now being developed under the auspices of his Department; and if he is satisfied with the progress being made.

Mr. Sandys: No, Sir. It would not be in the national interest to publish particulars of the different types of aero engines which are now under development. I am satisfied that good progress is being made.

Mr. Beswick: Is the Minister aware that there is a feeling that the lead we have established in that field is not so clear as it was? Would he say whether he thinks that at this time we can afford to lose the services and advice of Sir Frank Whittle?

Mr. Sandys: I answered a Question about Sir Frank Whittle the other day, to which I refer the hon. Member. On the general issue, I think British achievement in the field of jet engines is sufficiently proved by the number of licences which have been taken out by Americans and others to produce these engines.

Mr. Beswick: asked the Minister of Supply what heavy jet transport aircraft are now being developed to follow the Viscount and Comet II machines; and what projects are now in hand for a 30–40-seat helicopter.

Mr. Sandys: Preliminary work is proceeding on several projects, but it is too early to make any detailed statement.

Mr. Beswick: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that unless we have a bigger and, if possible faster machine by 1956–57 we shall have lost our lead in this field? Will he give an assurance that, if possible, extra priority will be given not only to the jet transport aircraft now in production but also to the development of their successors?

Mr. Sandys: I agree particularly with the last part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question. It seems to me that what we have to do is to make good the lead that we have already established, which means accelerating in every possible way the production of the Comet and other new aircraft which are either in production or just going into production.

Iron Foundries (Supplies)

Mr. Gerald Nabarro: asked the Minister of Supply (1) what arrangements he is making to assure continuity of supply of raw materials to the iron-founders for production of approved domestic solid-fuel burning appliances, both in respect of the new housing construction programme and in respect of replacements for old-type open domestic grates;
(2) whether, in view of the controversy between ironfounders and steelmakers upon allocation of available resources of scrap and pig-iron, he will state


what steps he is taking to assure continuity of the flow of iron-castings to the engineering and allied industries;
(3) whether he is aware that 25 per cent., approximately, of the output of iron foundries is devoted to the provision of gutters, drain and soil pipes, baths and cookers for the housing programme; and what steps he is taking to assure adequate supplies of scrap and pig-iron for iron foundries to meet this requirement.

Mr. Sandys: I am examining with the industry the whole question of the division of available raw materials between iron founding and steelmaking. Every effort is being made to meet the requirements for housing and other essential purposes.

Mr. Nabarro: In view of the fact that these three Questions are not entirely related to one another, may I ask my right hon. Friend two supplementary questions? First, in connection with Question No. 2, is he satisfied that all steps will be taken to ensure full conservation of our coal resources by making sufficient cast iron available for a million solid-fuel burning appliances during 1952? Second, in view of the importance of the high conversion value of iron castings for the engineering industries, will he pay special attention to the conversion value aspect of the problem?

—
1950
1951


Total Working Days
Number of Working Days Lost
Total Working Days
Number of Working Days Lost


June
…
608,000
33,777
921,325
45,860


July
…
746,625
36,079
746,500
33,281


August
…
592,840
23,862
756,620
30,597


September
…
748,325
37,348
946,950
46,301


October
…
603,780
33,767
768,440
44,091


November
…
608,700
36,053
776,960
45,524


December
…
765,200
43,941
985,275
46,364

Captain L. P. S. Orr: asked the Minister of Supply the number of Royal Ordnance factories in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, respectively.

Mr. Sandys: There are 17 in England, three in Scotland, three in Wales and none in Northern Ireland.

Captain Orr: Does not the Minister think it is a pity that there is none in Northern Ireland? Will he bear in mind

Mr. Sandys: As the first question is very detailed I should like to see it on the Order Paper. As regards the second, I certainly can give my hon. Friend the assurance he seeks.

Ordnance Factories

Major Guy Lloyd: asked the Minister of Supply what has been the total number of working days lost each month from June, 1951, through sickness in all Royal Ordnance factories, as compared with the corresponding months of the previous year.

Mr. Sandys: As the answer contains a table of figures I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Major Lloyd: As I am not yet able to see the figures, may I ask my right hon. Friend, in the meantime, whether he is satisfied with the situation that the figures portray, or whether he thinks some improvement is called for, and, if so, whether he will do anything about it?

Mr. Sandys: When my hon. and gallant Friend sees the figures, he will see that they do show some improvement.

Following is the answer:

The following table shows the total number of working days lost through sickness each month from June, 1951, in all Royal Ordnance factories, with the corresponding figures for the previous year:

that there is a large pool of unemployed labour—and very good labour—there which might well be used for this purpose?

Mr. Sandys: I share my hon. Friend's views. I have already had two meetings with the Minister of Commerce for Northern Ireland on this question, and we are to have further meetings in the very near future.

Hematite Pig-Iron

Mr. Stephen Swingler: asked the Minister of Supply when he proposes to introduce a scheme for the allocation of hematite pig-iron.

Mr. Sandys: I regret that I cannot yet say how soon it will be possible to introduce an allocation scheme for hematite pig-iron.

Mr. Swingler: Is the Minister aware of the great urgency of this question? Does he appreciate the very great difficulties confronting export firms such as the one about which I wrote to him about 10 days ago?

Mr. Sandys: Yes, Sir, I recognise those difficulties, and also the administrative difficulties that are involved in bringing in this scheme. We are working hard on it, but it will be at least two months before the scheme can be brought in.

Mr. A. Woodburn: Will the right hon. Gentleman resist the sometimes successful propaganda of steel-using industries that iron is not important in the cast iron trade, and ensure that the utmost investigation will be made before any iron is switched to steel?

Mr. Sandys: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the iron-using industries will not allow me to forget that.

Iron and Steel Prices (Mr. Hardie's Letter)

Mr. Victor Yates: asked the Minister of Supply if he will publish the letter of 24th January addressed to him by Mr. Steven Hardie in which he conveyed the unanimous decision of the Iron and Steel Corporation opposing any immediate increase in iron and steel prices.

Mr. Maurice Edelman: asked the Minister of Supply (1) whether he will publish the correspondence which has taken place since 1st January, 1952, between himself and the Iron and Steel Corporation in connection with the recent rise in iron and steel prices;
(2) what advice the Iron and Steel Corporation tendered to him in connection with the projected increase in iron and steel prices in the letter from the chairman dated 24th January, 1952.

Mr. Sandys: It is not the practice to publish confidential correspondence between the Government and the Board of a nationalised industry.
However, I can tell the House that the purpose of Mr. Hardie's letter of 24th January was to place on record certain arguments advanced by him in the course of a meeting on 23rd January between himself, the Deputy-Chairman of the Corporation, myself, the Parliamentary Secretary and senior officials of the Ministry of Supply, at the conclusion of which a schedule of increased steel prices had been agreed.
I must, however, add that Mr. Hardie subsequently denied that he had agreed to any such price increases and rejected the minutes of the meeting. In view of this apparent misunderstanding, I referred the matter back to the Corporation.
At a subsequent meeting, Mr. Hardie informed me that the Corporation by a majority confirmed their agreement with the price increases approved at the meeting of 23rd January, at the same time expressing, as before, their regret that the Government was unwilling to re-introduce a subsidy for imported steel.

Mr. Yates: In view of the fact that Mr. Hardie has publicly stated that he conveyed in the letter of 24th January the unanimous decision of the Corporation rejecting the immediate increased prices, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that his statement to the House that there had been no difference on policy whatsoever was very misleading? The right hon. Gentleman's refusal to publish this letter will be very much resented.

Mr. Sandys: Not at all. I have looked very carefully into what I said in the House the other day and I am perfectly satisfied that it was entirely correct.

Mr. Edelman: Will the right hon. Gentleman then say why, despite his long and detailed statement on 25th February, he suppressed the evidence, even of the existence of the letter of 24th January, in which Mr. Hardie, on behalf of the whole Corporation, opposed the proposed increase in steel prices?

Mr. Sandys: I do not know what the hon. Gentleman means by "suppressed" the letter. There is a thick bundle of correspondence between the Corporation and not only myself but also the right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. G. R. Strauss)


about increases in prices. Had I mentioned them all, the debate would have been much longer than it was.

Mr. G. R. Strauss: Does the right hon. Gentleman's answer mean that he denies the statement of Mr. Hardie that in the letter which he sent to the Minister on 24th January he expressed the view of the full Corporation that there should be no increase in prices whatsoever? Does he say that that is untrue?

Mr. Sandys: What I said was that the letter of 24th January placed on record a number of arguments made by Mr. Hardie in the course of a meeting on the 23rd, at which meeting it was agreed—or all present except Mr. Hardie thought it had been agreed—that a schedule of price increases was to be introduced. This was an argument in the course of a discussion.

Mr. Strauss: But the right hon. Gentleman does not answer my question. Mr. Hardie made a very definite statement. I have not seen the letter, but the right hon. Gentleman has it. What I am asking is this: does he deny that in that letter of 24th January, on behalf of the Corporation, Mr. Hardie expressed general disagreement with any increase in prices?

Mr. Sandys: It is very hard to answer that, since Mr. Hardie had himself agreed, only the night before, that there should be an increase in prices. I find it very difficult to answer this question. The whole correspondence is confused and, in places, contradictory.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the debate which took place, the House firmly gathered the impression that a freely-arrived-at decision of the Corporation was at variance with Mr. Hardie's view, whereas it is now alleged that the agreement of the Corporation with the Minister was reached after considerable pressure by the Minister on other members of the Corporation?

Mr. Sandys: I completely and flatly deny that any pressure was brought on the members. If hon. Members opposite press me too hard, I might change my view and publish this correspondence. I think it is most undesirable to publish confidential correspondence between a Government Department and a nationalised board, and if it is published I warn hon. Members opposite that they might find it somewhat of a mixed blessing.

Mr. E. Shinwell: There is some confusion about this correspondence. Would it not be in the interests of the right hon. Gentleman, in order to clear up the confusion, that the correspondence should be published? Since it has been asked for, those who have asked for it must, of course, accept the responsibility, which we do.

Mr. Sandys: I still think it is most undesirable to start a precedent of publishing confidential correspondence between a Government Department and the board of a nationalised industry. It would be bound to impair the frankness and freedom with which they exchange views and advice on these questions, and it is only for that reason that I resist this request.

Mr. Shinwell: What the right hon. Gentleman has just said is quite proper. We agree that confidential correspondence should ordinarily not be published, but if he gains the consent of Mr. Hardie to the publication of the correspondence, would he not then agree to disclose it?

Mr. Sandys: I have consulted the Corporation about it and they are strongly opposed to the publication of this correspondence.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: We cannot spend more time on this Question.

Mr. Edelman: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the right hon. Gentleman's reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter at the earliest possible opportunity.

Cotton Cloths (Contracts)

Mr. Ian Horobin: asked the Minister of Supple whether he is aware that cotton cloths are being offered for sale in this country by Continental mills supplying Her Majesty's Government; how many of these Government contracts have been placed by Her Majesty's present Government; and what steps will be taken to terminate them.

Mr. Sandys: Yes, Sir. Seven contracts for the supply of cotton cloths were signed by His Majesty's Government between 26th October and 7th December last. Since then no further contracts of this kind have been concluded. It is not our intention to terminate these contracts, which contain no break clause.

Factories, Coventry (Steel Supplies)

Miss Elaine Burton: asked the Minister of Supply if he is aware that the defence programme is being held up by shortage of steel in certain engineering shops in Coventry factories; and what steps he proposes to take to deal with the situation.

Mr. Sandys: If the hon. Member will let me have particulars about the factories to which she refers, I will look into the matter.

Miss Burton: I think the right hon. Gentleman knows that I have asked for this information. In the meantime, will he look into the position at Morris Engines and Armstrong Siddeley, where the men cannot understand, as they are on rearmament work, why they have been laid off? Further, is he aware that Coventry engineering firms are endeavouring to carry out a mutual aid scheme? Will he look into it and see if it is possible to help them along?

Mr. Sandys: Certainly.

Jet Fighter (Swiss Press Article)

Mr. Arthur Henderson: asked the Minister of Supply if he will inquire into and report to the House the circumstances in which information about the Super-marine Swift was made available for publication in Switzerland, in view of the fact that this jet fighter is still on the secret list in this country.

Mr. Sandys: I would refer the right hon. and learned Gentleman to the reply given to the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) on 27th February.

Mr. Henderson: I would not expect the right hon. Gentleman to be responsible for newspaper articles based on surmise, but would he not consider it desirable to have a further review of the procedure which governs the partial publication by his Department and the Air Ministry of information relating to types of aircraft still on the secret list?

Mr. Sandys: We are following the procedure which was agreed under the right hon. and learned Gentleman's administration. On the whole, I think it is satisfactory, but the problem is to decide how much and how little to give. If we give too little, then it is very difficult to restrain

the Press. If, on the other hand, we give too much, then obviously that is a danger. I do not think there has been any leakage whatsoever in the present case.

Mr. Henderson: Would the right hon. Gentleman look at the problem, having regard to the publication of this article? I must not make any criticism, but might it not be desirable to have a look at the procedure again?

Mr. Sandys: I do not think that this article raises any issue. The photographs were published in agreement with the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply, and the particulars contained in the article are extremely inaccurate and obviously based upon surmise.

U.S. Ore (U.K. Purchases)

Mr. G. R. Strauss: asked the Minister of Supply whether he will give particulars of the 750,000 tons of iron ore to be made available by the United States steel industry to the United Kingdom, according to the agreement between the Governments of the two countries, set out in Command Paper No. 8464.

Mr. Sandys: Whilst a considerable proportion of the purchases has now been made, negotiations by the United Kingdom steel industry are in progress for the rest, and they would be prejudiced if detailed particulars were given at the present time.

Mr. Strauss: I am obliged to the Minister, but I do not think that I am clear, or that anyone else is clear, as to what is meant by the 750,000 tons of ore to be made available. Does that mean that ore which had already been bought by America is being relinquished by them to us, that they are reducing their intended purchases this year by 750,000 tons, or are they selling us the ore? What exactly does it mean?

Mr. Sandys: It means that purchases which they had intended to make they are no longer going to make. They informed us what those purchases were to be, so that we might have the opportunity of making those purchases. It does not follow that we shall necessarily be able to obtain all of them in full, but we are doing our best.

Mr. Strauss: Does that mean that the total purchases by America of ore from


Sweden and elsewhere, including Africa, this year, will be 750,000 tons fewer than last year?

Mr. Sandys: Unless they make up for it in some other way.

Re-armament Contracts

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: asked the Minister of Supply what proportion of re-armament orders are at present being placed with the S.A.L. design and manufacturing unit at Prestwick Airport.

Mr. Sandys: It would be contrary to established practice to give information about the value of contracts placed with particular firms.

Sir T. Moore: Is my right hon. Friend aware that even if 1 per cent. of the Government's orders which are allotted to England were diverted to Prestwick, it would put that factory on a satisfactory basis? Surely he is not going to follow the precedent of the previous Government in pursuing a vendetta against Scotland.

Mr. Sandys: There is, of course, no question of any vendetta against Scotland. This firm is particularly suited to subcontract work. We have a recognised procedure for helping firms to obtain subcontracts, and we are doing what we can for that firm as well as for others in a similar position.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this was one of the smaller firms which suffered when the aircraft programme had to be cut down, and that there is a very valuable staff there, whose energy is not fully employed? Will he look into the possibility of making use of this factory in Prestwick, as there is a great deal of feeling that Scotland has never really had a proper share of our aircraft development work?

Mr. Sandys: We are well aware of this firm's facilities, to which the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore) has drawn the attention of successive Governments, and I assure the right hon. Gentleman that, in so far as we can, we will see that it gets its fair share.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall take an early opportunity of raising this matter.

Sir T. Moore: Mr. Speaker, have I no rights? May I not resist the claim put forward by the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes)?

Miss Irene Ward: asked the Minister of Supply whether he is aware of the dissatisfaction in the northern region about the allocation of contracts to the engineering firms in connection with the re-armament programme; and if he will give an assurance that this region will, in future, receive its fair share.

Mr. Frederick Willey: asked the Minister of Supply what steps he is taking by way of placing Government contracts to avoid redundancy in factories in the Sunderland area administered by the North Eastern Trading Estates Limited.

Mr. Sandys: Contracts are not allocated to any particular region and I am not aware that there is dissatisfaction in the North. Firms on the Ministry of Supply trades lists have an equal opportunity of tendering for contracts and any firm can apply to be included in the lists. Firms on these lists who occupy factories administered by the North Eastern Trading Estates Limited, receive the preferential treatment given to firms in all Development Areas.

Miss Ward: Is my right hon. Friend aware that by answering two Questions together he has completely omitted to answer my Question? Will he be kind enough to send for the report of the Northern Engineering Bureau, which exists to help the Government in its re-armament programme and to help the North of England, and see the dissatisfaction expressed in that report? Also, may I have an assurance that he will take some action about it when he has read it?

Mr. Willey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the past few months some 700 workpeople have been laid off in Sunderland factories and that the late Government gave preference to the Development Areas in the allocation of contracts?

Mr. Sandys: We are continuing to give exactly the same preference as the late Government to the Development Areas. I will certainly study the report to which the hon. Lady refers.

Miss Ward: May I put a question to my right hon. Friend in about a fortnight?

Mr. Thomas Price: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when he says that preference is given to firms in Development Areas, there is one such area in Lancashire, which I have the honour to represent—Westhoughton—which has received no preference whatever in the past seven years? They have not even had a new factory in that time.

Cars (Export and Home Sales)

Miss Burton: asked the Minister of Supply what export figure for motorcars was fixed for the 12 months ended September, 1951; and what steps he has taken to ensure that this figure has been adhered to.

Mr. Sandys: None, Sir.

Miss Burton: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen an advertisement, like the one I have here, which says:
Your new car problem solved.
Hire—a 1951 Austin A.40 or A.70 to drive yourself for as little as £1 a day"?
As the motor trade organisations have stated that these cars being used by overseas visitors come off the export quota, will he inform the House how many such cars are issued each year for that purpose, and, secondly, what restrictions are placed on their re-sale in this country?

Mr. Sandys: I think that is rather a different question.

Miss Burton: asked the Minister of Supply if, in view of the further evidence submitted to him by the hon. Member for Coventry, South, and taking into consideration the possibility that the measures suggested by the motor trade may prove inadequate to deal with various infringements arising from the distribution of new cars, he will keep before him for consideration the necessity for setting up a committee of inquiry to receive evidence and make recommendations on the admitted abuses now prevailing.

Mr. Sandys: I am not prepared to assume, in advance, that the new measures decided upon by the motor trade will prove inadequate. I shall, of course, continue to watch the situation closely and shall not hesitate to consider

any further action which may appear necessary.

Miss Burton: I have given the right hon. Gentleman further information. As, a week ago, he stated that deposits should be returned to people on request, what action does he propose to take against the Stanbourne Motor Company, Pokes-down Hill, Bournemouth; Westover Garage Limited, Bournemouth; and H. Saunders and Co., 140, Golders Green Road, N.W.?—

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is going beyond the limits of a supplementary question.

Miss Burton: On a point of order. The Minister gave that information last week, Sir, and I should like your guidance as to whether I am not in order in giving him examples of where that procedure has not been followed?

Mr. Speaker: That depends on the extent of the supplementary question. Supplementary questions could be indefinitely prolonged if every hon. Member claimed to give a large number of examples in support of his contentions.

Dr. Horace King: asked the Minister of Supply whether he will arrange some system of priorities in allocation of new motorcars which will enable taxi-cab owners to obtain a fair share of new cars available.

Mr. Sandys: I trust that the new arrangements decided upon by the motor trade will assure to taxi-cab owners a fair share of the cars available.

Dr. King: While thanking the Minister for his reply, may I ask him to realise that taxis have to conform to certain standards or be taken off the road, and that the supply of new cars to this industry is a matter of employment or unemployment to the taxi-men concerned?

Mr. Sandys: I am sure that this is well in the minds of the motor industry, but the hon. Member's Question will bring it to their notice once more.

Lead Supplies (Licensing)

Mr. W. T. Aitken: asked the Minister of Supply if, in view of the widespread and growing thefts of lead


from churches, private homes and buildings of historical interest, he will consider introducing a licensing system for all purchasers of lead.

Mr. Sandys: A licensing system has been in operation for some time under the Copper, Lead and Zinc Distribution Order, 1951. For administrative reasons the purchasers of small quantities of such metals were not included.

Mr. Aitken: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in Suffolk alone no fewer than 12 churches, and more in Norfolk, have suffered in this way? Although the amount of lead involved is small, it is essential that measures should be taken to stop these thefts. In the very nature of things, it is almost impossible to protect churches at night.

Mr. Sandys: To control all small purchases of lead would mean licensing every rag and bone merchant in the country, and that would be extremely difficult.

Factories, Scotland (Ingots and Scrap)

Mr. R. Brooman-White: asked the Minister of Supply if he is aware of the present short-time working in certain branches of Scottish steel production and of the particular difficulties arising from the Scottish industries' traditional dependence on charging a high proportion of scrap; and whether he will take particular account of these circumstances in considering the allocation of ingots and scrap obtained as a result of the recent agreements with the United States of America and Western Germany.

Mr. Sandys: Yes, Sir. These factors will certainly be taken into account by the steel industry in arranging the allocation of imported ingots and scrap.

Mr. Brooman-White: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in past economic crises the industries of Clydeside have taken rather more than their fair share of the beating and, in facing the new and unprecedented difficulties of today, will my right hon. Friend keep their special circumstances in mind and ensure that they do not again suffer disproportionately?

Mr. Sandys: Yes, Sir, I certainly will, but my hon. Friend will realise that scrap is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain

and that the only satisfactory long-term solution is the production of more pig-iron.

Mr. A. C. Manuel: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what proportion of the ingots he intends importing in the near future he is prepared to allocate to Scotland? Scotland is becoming very concerned about this. There will be short-time working and unemployment in a certain factory there unless it is given a fair share of the scrap which comes in.

Mr. Sandys: I could not go into figures without notice.

Reinforcing Steel

Mr. George Chetwynd: asked the Minister of Supply what action is being taken to increase the supply of reinforcing rods and wire; what is the present output; and what is the proposed output by the end of 1952.

Mr. Sandys: Present output of reinforcing steel is at the rate of about 260,000 tons a year. Steps are being taken to increase supply, both by the expansion of output and by imports from America.

Centurion Tank (Cost)

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Minister of Supply what steps he proposes to take to reduce the price of the Centurion tank.

Mr. Sandys: I shall be glad to consider any suggestions by the hon. Member.

Mr. Hughes: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Cromwell tank cost £10,000 in 1945 and that in 1950 the cost of the Centurion tank was £35,000 and that it has now risen to £38,000—enough to build 20 houses? Is he just awaiting suggestions from me before he does some-think about it?

Mr. Sandys: The weight and complexity of a tank, and the cost of living as a whole, have increased during that time.

Cloth Imports

Mr. Richard Fort: asked the Minister of Supply when delivery will start of cloth ordered abroad for re-armament; and what is the maximum rate of delivery per month or quarter called for by the contracts.

Mr. Sandys: Deliveries began early in 1951 and have continued since then at an increasing rate. The contracts stipulate a completion date and not a rate of deliveries.

Mr. Fort: Can my right hon. Friend tell us when the contracts will be completed? Can their completion be speeded up and the orders which his predecessor in the Socialist Government placed abroad now be given to Lancashire?

Mr. Sandys: The contracts end on different dates, but the bulk of them will be completed during the course of this year. The existence of these contracts is not in any way preventing our placing all the new orders that we can in Lancashire and elsewhere—which we are doing—in order to do what we can to help the industry at this difficult time.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL INSURANCE

Hernia (Disablement Benefit)

Dr. Barnett Stross: asked the Minister of National Insurance whether his attention has been drawn to the many cases where a workman suffers from hernia due to accident but is unable to obtain operative treatment within six months and is later penalised in any claim for loss of faculty unless it be appreciable and permanent; and what action he proposes to take in such cases.

The Minister of National Insurance (Mr. Osbert Peake): I am not aware of any cases in which a man has been deprived of disablement benefit in the circumstances described by the hon. Member, but if he has such a case in mind perhaps he will let me have details.

Dr. Stross: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that an alteration in the regulations is considered desirable so that a workman shall be able to claim that his date of disablement is the date of the operation rather than the date when the hernia was actually sustained? Would not that be a desirable way of getting over the difficulty which I have put to the Minister?

Mr. Peake: No, Sir. Both the policy and the practice of the medical boards and the medical appeal tribunals are to prevent the occurrence of what the hon. Member fears may happen, but I should

be obliged if he would send me the details if he has a case in which this has happened.

Industrial Dermatitis

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is aware that assessment of loss of faculty in cases of industrial dermatitis does not take into account the increased susceptibility of the worker's skin to a wide range of other irritants; that the worker is restricted in his choice of occupation, and that the assessments are too low; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy the position.

Mr. Peake: I am advised that such increased susceptibility is taken into account by medical boards and medical appeal tribunals. I would remind the hon. Member that special hardship allowance is available, in addition to the main disablement benefit, in appropriate cases.

Dr. Stross: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the advice given to him does not seem to tally with our experience in the field of work and that these assessments are considered by the workers as being ridiculously low in very many cases? Will the right hon. Gentleman have another look at this?

Mr. Peake: I can only say that I do not share all the hon. Gentleman's advantages in putting Questions on these technical subjects, but the medical boards and tribunals are composed of the best medical men that we can obtain to serve on them, and I am told that their assessments in these cases take into account all the matters mentioned in the Question.

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is aware that some of his insurance officers appeal against every case in which a worker is certified to be suffering from industrial dermatitis; that there is a considerable delay before the worker is examined by the medical tribunal, and that certifying surgeons serve no useful purpose while this practice continues; and whether he will give instructions that this practice should cease.

Mr. Peake: The great majority of claims for benefit for industrial dermatitis are decided by insurance officers on the


basis of the examining medical practitioner's report. But if the hon. Member has any particular office in mind, perhaps he will let me know.

Dr. Edith Summerskill: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the trouble which my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross), seeks to remedy is partly due to the fact that there is a shortage of dermatologists? Will he bring this to the attention of the deans of the medical schools?

Mr. Peake: I will certainly consider any suggestion which the right hon. Lady makes to me on this technical matter.

Mr. Michael Stewart: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that men who have suffered from this complaint afterwards often have the greatest difficulty in finding employment in which a recrudescence will not occur? Will he consult his colleagues in other Departments who may be interested in instituting a special inquiry into the causes of the disease and the selection of suitable employment for men who have suffered from it?

Mr. Peake: That is a very much wider question than the one on the Order Paper.

Old-age Pensions

Mrs. Barbara Castle: asked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is yet in a position to reply to the representations made to him by the Old-Age Pensioners' Association for an immediate increase in the old-age pension.

Mr. Peake: No, Sir.

Mrs. Castle: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, owing to a steady increase in the cost of living since this Government took office, the old-age pensioner is suffering acute hardship, and as official representations were made to him by the Old-age Pensioners' Association last December, is it not callous and discourteous not to reply to those representations?

Mr. Peake: In reply to the first part of the hon. Lady's supplementary question, I shall be giving the exact figures for which she asks in answer to the next Question on the Order Paper. With regard to the second part, the statement

which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made on 26th February, that he will make a statement about the review of pensions to the House in due course, still holds good.

Mrs. Castle: Will the right hon. Gentleman inform his right hon. Friend that any increase in old-age pensions which does not take account of the cost of living increase which has already taken place, and is merely in respect of any proposed increase in the cost of living which the Government are planning through a reduction in the food subsidies, would be quite inadequate?

Mr. Ralph Assheton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the position of old-age pensioners is the cause of just as much concern on this side of the House as it is on the other side?

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: asked the Minister of National Insurance by what amount the present scale of old-age pensions would have to be increased to compensate for the reduction since 1st November last of the purchasing power of the £; and what the cost of granting such an increase would be.

Mr. Peake: On the basis of the Official Index of Retail Prices introduced in June, 1947, the increase in retirement pensions that would be necessary to give them the same purchasing power as on 1st November, 1951, would be about 7d. on 26s., 8½d. on 30s. and 1s. 2d. on 50s., the pension for a married couple. The cost would be of the order of £7 million a year.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will the Minister bear in mind that he still has time to send these figures to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for appropriate action to be taken in tomorrow's Budget?

Weekly Contributions

Mr. Horobin: asked the Minister of National Insurance if he can give an estimate of the additional income, excluding the corresponding additional Government contribution, which would accrue to the National Insurance Fund if weekly contributions were increased by Is, for men with corresponding additions for other contributors.

Mr. Peake: About £50 million.

Mr. Horobin: Does the Minister agree that it is usually socially better that contributions to the national emergency by wage earners should come when they are at work rather than by cutting the benefits when they are most in need of them?

Retiring Pension Age

Mr. Horobin: asked the Minister of National Insurance if he will give an estimate of what would be the additional net income accruing in the current year and in the three following years to the National Insurance Fund if the retiring pension age was increased by two years.

Mr. Peake: This information is not available. To form an estimate one would have to make a number of assumptions about the details of a plan for raising the pension age, and I cannot undertake to go into all these points within the limits of a Parliamentary answer.

Mr. Horobin: Does not the Minister at least agree that the saving should be very considerable? If so, would it not be worth while making the savings and using part of them to improve the condition of those who have retired and are suffering because of the rise of prices?

Mr. Peake: I should like to take time to consider my hon. Friend's suggestion.

Unemployment Benefit (Nantlle Valley)

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: asked the Minister of National Insurance if he is aware that unemployed persons in the Nantlle Valley, Caernarvonshire, are being disallowed unemployment benefits if they refuse to accept work in Bristol or London or other distant towns; and if he will change this.

Mr. Peake: I am aware that certain claimants in this valley have been disqualified for unemployment benefit on the ground that they refused without good cause to accept employment which was offered them elsewhere. But I have no power to vary the decisions of the independent statutory authority in these cases.

Mr. Roberts: Is the Minister aware that these men were offered jobs which were so poorly paid as to make it impossible for them to maintain two homes;

that it was most unfair and that they had no alternative but to refuse these jobs? Is he further aware that the application of the regulations under his dispensation is far harsher than it ever was under the previous Government? Would he bear in mind that next month a new factory is due to open in this valley, and that it would be a pity to disperse the available labour force which is already there?

Mr. Peake: These offers of employment are, of course, made by the Ministry of Labour, and perhaps the hon. Gentleman would put any question on that aspect to my right hon. and learned Friend. So far as I am concerned, there are four cases of men who have been disqualified by the insurance officer. One appealed to the local appeal tribunal, which has upheld the decision of the insurance officer.

Retired Pensioners, Sunderland

Mr. R. Ewart: asked the Minister of National insurance the number of old-age pensioners who retired after 1st September, 1951, on a pension of 26s. for a single person and 42s. for a married couple, in Sunderland; and how many of these are in receipt of Assistance Board supplementary allowances.

Mr. Peake: I regret that this information is not available.

Mr. Ewart: When the information comes to his notice, will the right hon. Gentleman make representations to his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he has old-age pensions under review, to abolish the anomaly that exists between pensioners who retired before September last year and after September last year?

Mr. Peake: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that that point has been in my mind.

Personal Case

Mr. David Jones: asked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is now in a position to reply to the communication addressed to him by the hon. Member for The Hartlepools on 27th November, 1951, and to which he sent an interim reply on 10th December, under reference M.C. 54404.

Mr. Peake: The hon. Member will have received my further letter.

Mr. Jones: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for the reply which I have received, may I ask if, in view of the evidence revealed in this case, he will now review the administrative machinery in his local offices about references to local tribunals to avoid repetition of this type of case?

Mr. Peake: This particular case was one of special difficulty, but I have the whole question of principle under consideration.

Mr. Jones: Should not the administrative machinery in the local offices be reviewed to prevent this type of case arising in the future?

Local Appeal Tribunals

Mr. T. Price: asked the Minister of National Insurance if he can now make a statement on the working of local appeal tribunals, with particular reference to the avoidance wherever possible of purely formal or abortive hearings of matters within the jurisdiction of the Minister himself.

Mr. Peake: Arrangements are being made to meet the point which the hon. Member has in mind, and I hope to put them into operation shortly.

Mr. Price: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman, but will he bear in mind that my purpose in drawing attention to this matter was not to suggest any alteration in the machinery of justice, which is still far from perfect in the Department, but rather to draw attention to the loss of wages and time being sustained by the workers, the inconvenience to employers, and the loss of public money?

Blind Persons (Weekly Allowances)

Dr. King: asked the Minister of National Insurance what is the purchasing power, as compared with 1948, of the 15s. additional weekly allowance given to blind persons and those suffering from respiratory tuberculosis.

Mr. Peake: On the basis of the Official Index of Retail Prices the present purchasing power of this additional allowance is 12s. 3d.

Dr. King: Will the right hon. Gentleman convey to the National Assistance Board the views held by many Members on both sides of the House, and I hope himself, that the case for the raising of these scales is unanswerable?

Mr. Peake: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the initiative and the responsibility in this matter lie with the Assistance Board.

Sickness Benefit (Chronic Illness)

Mr. Barnett Janner: asked the Minister of National Insurance whether, in view of the fact that the cost of living has greatly risen, he will increase the sickness benefit, as the 26s. fixed weekly allowance is now insufficient for chronic sufferers.

Mr. Peake: I must ask the hon. Member to await the outcome of the Government's review of pensions, but I can assure him that I have been keeping the position of these people in mind.

Mr. Janner: In view of the fact that these people are in very serious difficulties because the amount they are receiving is too small to meet the increased cost of living, will the right hon. Gentleman propose that the amount should be increased?

Mr. Peake: I cannot add to the reply which I have already given to the hon. Gentleman.

Oral Answers to Questions — WORLD PEACE

Mr. Cyril Bence: asked the Prime Minister what steps he is taking to bring about conversations at the highest level in an effort to reduce world tension.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Winston Churchill): There has been no change in the situation since I replied to a similar Question put by the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Dodds) on 29th January.

Mr. Bence: Is the Prime Minister aware that, in view of the statements made during the Election that he would initiate conversations at the highest level, great disappointment has been caused by his failure to do so? There is great dissatisfaction in the country.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (CHAIRMANSHIP)

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Prime Minister whom he intends to recommend for appointment as the chairman of the Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income in place of Lord Waverley.

The Prime Minister: The hon. Member must wait and see.

Mr. Hughes: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the man needed for this post is a chartered accountant who has a knowledge of big business and who is not liable to accede to the pressure of vested interests? Would he not agree that Mr. Steven Hardie would be the ideal man for the job?

Oral Answers to Questions — OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICES (CUTS)

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the strong views expressed in all quarters of the House, he will now give instructions that the proposed cuts in the foreign services of the British Broadcasting Corporation and the British Council shall be abandoned.

The Prime Minister: The B.B.C's grant-in-aid is being mantained at the same level as last year, and the cuts result from rising costs. The economies are largely in overheads, and the actual output on our transmitters is being reduced by very little.
The British Council's expenditure should certainly be included in the economy measures to which many of our activities must be subject.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Since it was right during the war, when we suffered from shortages of every kind, to build up these foreign information services in order to help us to win the war, can it be right to cut that now when we want to use it to prevent war?

The Prime Minister: I think that that is a very argumentative manner of presenting a supplementary question.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Does the Prime Minister not agree that opinion is a major weapon in winning the cold war?

The Prime Minister: Opinion is very important indeed and, certainly, every

effort should be made to guide it, but I am not at all sure that all the activities of the British Council have a direct effect upon the movement of opinion for or against a peaceful solution of our difficulties. I think they require careful study and scrutiny. As for the rest, as I have mentioned in the first part of my answer, we are doing the best we can, having regard to the general need for keeping expenditure within reasonable bounds.

Mr. Ernest Davies: Since the cost of restoring the cuts proposed to be made is only something over £200,000, would not the Prime Minister consider restoring those cuts to avoid the cutting down of broadcasts to Europe and Latin America?

The Prime Minister: I must say that I think it is a pity to take such a very small view of the importance of an expenditure of £200,000.

Mr. John Taylor: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will secure an allocation from the defence funds to increase the external broadcasting service, in view of its importance to this country's efforts towards world peace.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting): No, Sir.

Mr. Taylor: May I repeat, in a different way, the argumentative supplementary which has just been asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Noel-Baker)? May I ask the Minister if he does not think that this is a time when the voice of Britain should not be heard less on the air but should be heard increasingly, and that it would be a fitting thing to allocate a sum from the defence funds for this necessary and valuable purpose?

Mr. Nutting: The hon. Gentleman will not expect me to add anything to the answer given by the Prime Minister. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Might I inform him that, in regard to the smaller number of hours that the B.B.C. voice is to be heard, the total cut in B.B.C. transmissions is only in the proportion of 5 per cent.?

Mr. Taylor: Does not the Minister think that even a reduction of 5 per cent. is extremely serious at this time, when the voice of Britain ought to be heard across the world?

Oral Answers to Questions — MR. EDGAR SANDERS (DETENTION, HUNGARY)

Mr. Martin Lindsay: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has considered all the possibilities of taking discriminatory action against the Hungarian Government, such as requiring them to close their Legation in London, pending the release of Mr. Edgar Sanders.

Mr. Nutting: As I informed my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr. H. Nicholls) on 20th February, Her Majesty's Government will not overlook any suitable means of putting further pressure on the Hungarian Government to release Mr. Sanders. But I am not satisfied that the action advocated in the Question would have the desired result.

Mr. Lindsay: Is my hon. Friend aware that that reply, which was perhaps not unexpected, is rather disappointing, in view of the success which crowned the efforts of the United States State Department in getting their man back? Will my hon. Friend ask his right hon. Friend to regard this matter as of very great importance?

Mr. Nutting: We certainly regard it as a matter of great importance, affecting our relations with Hungary. As to the success of the American State Department in getting Mr. Vogeler released, my hon. Friend will recall that I told my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough that this was done because the United States were in a position to offer certain concessions regarding the re-opening of the Hungarian consulates in America which would not apply in this country.

Oral Answers to Questions — EGYPT (DISMISSED BRITISH OFFICIALS)

Mr. Beswick: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what steps he has taken, and what further steps he proposes to take, to assist British nationals who have been removed from posts in Egypt finding employment in this country.

Mr. Nutting: As indicated in my answer on 20th February to the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Mr. Blackburn) these arrangements are under

the general control of my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Labour, who is collecting information about the service and qualifications of these officials. Approaches have already been made to a number of authorities, who have agreed to give particular consideration to helping them to obtain suitable employment. Some of the officials have already been interviewed at the Foreign Office and Ministry of Labour.

Mr. Beswick: In regard to the dismissal of British teaching staff in Egypt, could the Minister bring the matter to the notice of his colleague in the Ministry of Education to see whether assistance can be given in placing the teachers in positions in England?

Mr. Nutting: We have consulted the Ministry of Education, and to that extent we have anticipated the hon. Gentleman's supplementary. We are also in touch with the National Union of Teachers.

Oral Answers to Questions — GERMANY

Missing R.A.F. Men

Mr. A. Henderson: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any reply has yet been received to the request addressed to the higher Soviet authorities for an answer to the original inquiry whether the missing Royal Air Force men are in the Soviet zone of Germany.

Mr. Nutting: Yes, Sir. A reply has now been received from the Soviet military authorities at Potsdam stating that measures have been taken to search for the three British personnel mentioned and that they will inform us of the results of the investigations. The British authorities have been asked to provide full information about the men, and a full description has been sent to the Soviet authorities.

High Commission Employees (Maternity Grants)

Mr. R. W. Sorensen: asked the Minister of National Insurance, in view of the hardship of the refusal to pay maternity grants in respect of British subjects temporarily employed by the United Kingdom High Commission in Germany, whether he will take steps to remove this grievance and thus entitle contributors to secure the benefits for which they have contributed.

Mr. Peake: I am looking into this matter, in the light of the recommendations made by the National Insurance Advisory Committee in their recent report on maternity benefit, and hope to be able to make an announcement very shortly.

Mr. Sorensen: Are we to understand that the announcement will be in respect of this particular anomaly?

Mr. Peake: Yes, Sir.

Miss Ward: May I ask my right hon. Friend to bear in mind that, since we pay health benefits to foreigners, it is wrong that these people, our own nationals, should be in this position?

Mr. Peake: I fully appreciate that. There are a number of defects in the Regulations which we have inherited from our predecessors, and I hope that in due course we shall put them all right.

Oral Answers to Questions — N.A.T.O. SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Christopher Hollis: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the name of the new Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is likely to be announced; and whether he will exert the influence of Her Majesty's Government to make sure that there is no premature announcement of any candidate who has not yet accepted the offer.

Mr. Nutting: I hope it will be possible to make an announcement within the next few days. I will certainly do what I can to ensure that no premature announcement is made.

Mr. Hollis: While thanking my hon. Friend for that answer, may I ask him to bear in mind that it will be a handicap to whatever distinguished person accepts this post if the impression is given that the post has been hawked round the world before it was offered to him?

Mr. Nutting: I will bear it in mind. I would point out that the leakage which took place about Sir Oliver Franks was not from any British source.

Mr. Shinwell: Are we to understand that the announcement which the hon. Gentleman proposes to make will be final, that somebody has been actually appointed?

Mr. Nutting: That was the purpose of my answer.

Oral Answers to Questions — BURMA (CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES)

Mr. Noel-Baker: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government will propose to the Security Council of the United Nations that the Council shall invite the Chinese Nationalist authorities in Formosa to withdraw the Chinese Nationalist Forces at present in the Kengtung Province of Burma.

Mr. Nutting: No, Sir.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Have not the Burma Government a right under the Charter to demand the withdrawal of these troops? Are not the Siamese Government ready to allow them to cross Siam, and should we not, therefore, ask the Chinese Nationalist spokesman in the Security Council to give an assurance that orders have been given for their withdrawal?

Mr. Nutting: It is certainly the right of the Burma Government to ask for the withdrawal of these troops. We have made our proposal for dealing with this situation. As regards action in the Security Council, the Burma Government have themselves said that they do not think it would serve any useful purpose.

Sir T. Moore: Could we not also invite the Chinese to withdraw their forces from Korea?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Would the hon. Gentleman ensure by some means that the Chinese Nationalist authorities in Formosa do give the necessary orders to these men to come out of Kengtung?

Mr. Nutting: Naturally, we shall do everything we can in order to take the heat out of this potentially dangerous situation, but I would prefer that we should concentrate on the course of action proposed by my right hon. Friend in the foreign affairs debate.

Oral Answers to Questions — SOUTH-EASTERN GAS BOARD (OFFICES, CROYDON)

Sir Herbert Williams: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power what sum has been authorised by him for expenditure by the South-Eastern Gas Board in connection with the work to be carried out at their head office at Croydon.

The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd): As explained in my answer to my hon. Friend of 3rd December, the authorisations granted in connection with work in this office cover an estimated total cost of £37,707.

Sir H. Williams: Can my right hon. Friend say how much they actually spent?

Mr. Lloyd: Matters of some legal difficulty arise in this case, and in accordance with arrangements that I have made, following the Scarcroft inquiry, to refer matters of this kind to the Director of Public Prosecutions when they arise, I have done so in this case.

Oral Answers to Questions — ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY

N.W. Consultative Council

Lieut.-Colonel Wentworth Schofield: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power how many persons on the North-Western Electricity Consultative Council were appointed by him as representing industry; whether he is satisfied that this small proportion of industrial representatives on these consultative councils ensures that industrial interests as regards electricity are given the necessary priority in the present economic emergency; and if he will take steps at an early date to review the system of appointing these consultative committees with a view to its amendment.

Mr. Lloyd: The North-Western Electricity Consultative Council was constituted by my predecessor according to the provisions of Section 7 of the Electricity Act, 1947. It comprises among its 27 members a deputy chairman who was nominated by the National Union of Manufacturers, another member nominated by the Federation of British Industries, and a third member from the Association of the British Chambers of Commerce. In addition, it is known that other members have industrial interests. I will bear in mind the point raised by my hon. and gallant Friend, but any major change would require legislation.

Industrial Tariffs

Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he will make a statement as to the directions he

will give under Section 5 of the Electricity Act, 1947, to the British Electricity Authority to encourage to the utmost the employment of electricity for those industrial purposes for which it is most suitable; and in this connection to reconsider the recently-proposed increased charge for industrial electricity.

Mr. Lloyd: No, Sir, I do not think such a direction is necessary. The fixing of tariffs in an area is the responsibility of the area electricity board.

Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the new tariffs will mean an increase of 25–50 per cent. in power costs for cotton mills, thereby increasing substantially the costs of production of cotton goods at a time when the cotton trade is being exhorted to do its best to increase its export trade?

Mr. Lloyd: Yes, I appreciate the difficulties, but my hon. and gallant Friend will realise that it is difficult to discriminate between industries.

Oral Answers to Questions — LONDON TRANSPORT (INCREASED FARES)

Mr. C. W. Gibson: asked the Minister of Transport if he is aware of the discontent in London about the increase in fares on London Transport and, in particular, of the alteration of fare stages which has resulted in a large increase in the cost of travelling; and if he will exercise his powers under Section 80 of the Transport Act, 1947, to require the Transport Tribunal to review the operation of the relevant charges scheme at an early date.

Mr. Ernest Davies: asked the Minister of Transport (1) if he will refer to the Central Transport Consultative Committee the question of the recent rise in fares in the London Passenger Transport area and request them to review its effects upon the budgets of the travelling public of London; and to make recommendations;
(2) if he will request the Central Transport Consultative Committee to inquire into the manner in which the London Transport Executive and the Railways Executive have carried out the decisions of the Transport Tribunal on the Passenger Charges Scheme. 1951.

Mr. Henry Brooke: asked the Minister of Transport if, under Section 80 of the Transport Act, 1947, he will require the Transport Tribunal to review the recent increases in fares, brought into operation by the London Transport Executive a week ago, on the ground that they are an excessive burden to the travelling public of London.

Mr. Shinwell: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will refer the recently raised London Transport fares to the Central Transport Consultative Committee for their consideration, drawing their attention to the fact that not only have fares increased but shorter fare stages are now in operation, with a view to their recommending an adjustment in fares and stages to reduce the hardship; and if he realises the effect on travellers, who require to make long journeys to and from work and the burdens involved.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. John Maclay): Mr. Speaker, I should be glad to have your permission and that of the House to answer orally and together Questions Nos. 77, 78, 80, 81 and 82, which deal with London passenger fares—

Sir H. Williams: On a point of order. Last Monday, Sir, we were discussing this problem on the Second Reading of the British Transport Commission Bill and I sought to intervene on the subject of these increased fares. I was told that I was out of order and prevented from making my speech. Apparently we are denied the right of speech but, as the result of a variety of decisions that have been made over recent years, it is possible to ask Questions on a subject which we are denied the right to debate. Therefore, I want to know whether these Questions on the Order Paper are strictly admissible, having regard to the Ruling given in respect of my speech last Monday.

Mr. Speaker: I thank the hon. Member for giving me notice that he would ask me this question. In the debate last Monday on the British Transport Commission Bill, the subject of freight charges and fares was ruled by me to be out of order for the reason I then gave in c. 106 of the OFFICIAL REPORT. That was why the hon. Member was prevented from reading a letter he had received on the subject of the increased fares in London. However, the Questions addressed to the Minister of

Transport today are in order because he has power under Section 80 of the Transport Act, 1947, to require the Transport Tribunal to review the operation of any charges scheme and, under Section 6 (7), to refer any matter, including charges, to the Central Transport Consultative Committee for consideration. The two matters are really quite different and the one Ruling does not conflict with the other.

Sir H. Williams: I am grateful, Mr. Speaker, but may I make the further point that, if I had been permitted to speak, I should have asked the Minister to do what all these Questions ask him to do.

Mr. Speaker: I am sorry that we did not have the advantage of the hon. Member's speech.

Mr. T. Price: May I raise another point of order, Mr. Speaker, in connection with the point just raised by the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams)? May I, with great respect, draw your attention to the fact that today I tabled two Questions to the Minister of Transport. They have not been printed on the Order Paper, neither have I received any explanation as to why they are not on the Paper, although they both deal with matters of substantial public interest and not with the day-to-day administration of the British Transport authority.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member has not given me any notice of this. Therefore, I cannot possibly answer him now, but I assure him that I will make inquiries into his complaint and see him about it.

Mr. Maclay: I take it that I have your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House to proceed.
The increases in London Transport fares were made by the British Transport Commission under the authority of a scheme referred to the Transport Tribunal, an independent judicial body, in April, 1951, and recently confirmed by them after a public inquiry. I am advised that it would be inconsistent with the intentions of the Transport Act in regard to the control of the Commission's charges for the Consultative Committee to review the Tribunal's decisions, or for me to invoke Section 80 to require the


Tribunal to review the operation of a scheme which they have just confirmed.
The scheme, however laid down maxima within which the Commission have discretion to fix actual fares and this discretion covers alteration of fare stages which appears to be a main cause of complaint. Alterations of fare stages and fares in relation to them are matters which can properly be referred forthwith to the Consultative Committee and I am so referring them.
I must make it clear, that under the Transport Act, 1947, no action other than reference to the Consultative Committee is open to me.

Mr. Gibson: Is the Minister aware that there is considerable disturbance in London about the fact that the increase is in many cases not the 20 per cent., which the public thought was to be imposed, but as high as 100 per cent.? May I also ask whether the reference to the Consultative Committee can result in a recommendation being made to the Minister to use his powers to secure an alteration of some of the grievances which the public feel about these matters?

Mr. Shinwell: While not denying the right of the Transport Commission to refer this matter to the Tribunal, and the right of the Tribunal to revise charges, may I ask the hon. Gentleman whether they are entitled within the limitations of the Act to adjust fare stages about which, as is rightly said, much of the trouble has arisen?

Mr. Maclay: I am not clear whether the right hon. Gentleman is referring to the right of the Tribunal or of the Commission.

Mr. Shinwell: The Tribunal.

Mr. Maclay: The Tribunal is bound to consider a scheme put to it by the Transport Commission and, as far as I can understand it, under the Act the Transport Tribunal then produces its decisions.

Mr. Shinwell: On this point, which is one of real substance, am I not justified in believing that the reference to the Tribunal was on the matter of increased fares and that no reference was made on the matter of the revision of fare stages? Was this revision of fare stages decided upon arbitrarily by the London

Transport Board without any decision being reached by the Tribunal?

Mr. Maclay: No, the scheme put forward to the Transport Tribunal included certain intentions with regard to the charges and fare stages. They were considered by the Transport Board and there were certain discretions left to the Commission by the scheme finally approved by the Tribunal. It is that discretion which makes it possible for me to make the statement I have made. This is a procedure which the right hon. Gentleman and others on the opposite side of the House should understand, because it is under their Act that it happens.

Mr. Charles Doughty: Will the Minister also refer to the Tribunal the removal of facilities by the London Passenger Transport Board, particularly the right to travel to different stations in London and neighbouring stations at the other end within the transport area? These have been removed and represent a grave hardship to those season ticket holders who have been accustomed to use their tickets to different stations. Secondly, in view of the great hardship imposed on those who have to buy season tickets to travel from their place of residence to work, will the hon. Gentleman ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether a change could now be made so that this can be made a proper charge against Income Tax?

Mr. Maclay: I really think that my hon. Friend is going very wide of the statement I have made.

Mr. Ernest Davies: Would the Minister review the question of referring this matter to the Transport Tribunal in view of the fact that there have emerged some new facts? Following the decision of the Transport Tribunal, the way in which their findings have been carried out by the Transport Commission has caused this great dissatisfaction. Would he not consider that justification for referring this back to the Transport Tribunal to have another look at it?

Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member sat through the whole of the proceedings on the Act when it was passed by the previous Government. Therefore, he knows what is in the Act and I am assuming that he is asking me to change the Act—

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Davies: May I put it to the Minister this way? This is not a question of the Act; it is a question of the way in which the Transport Commission has carried out certain findings of the Transport Tribunal. The dissatisfaction is due to the way in which those findings are now being carried out in London. I am suggesting that, in view of that, he is competent to see that a review is made.

Mr. Maclay: My original statement was that it is within this latitude given by the Transport Tribunal to the Commission that there is a case for putting something to the Consultative Committee, and that is what I propose to do.

Mr. Brooke: As soon as opportunity arises to amend the Transport Act, will my hon. Friend consider rendering it more difficult for a nationalised undertaking to make these fresh impositions on the travelling public without reference to Parliament?

Mr. Maclay: My hon. Friend's remarks will be carefully noted.

Mr. John Hynd: When the—

Mr. Robert Boothby: On a point of order. May I ask, Mr. Speaker, what Motion is now before the House?

Mr. Speaker: There is no Motion before us. We are still on Questions. I gave permission, in view of the public interest in this matter, for certain Questions to be answered together.

Mr. Hynd: When the Minister constantly refers to the Act, is he suggesting that before the Act there were no greater safeguards for the public with regard to increased fares? Were they not also submitted to a Tribunal, and could they not be enforced without any protection to the public, such as Questions in the House and the Consultative Council?

Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member is going very wide of the Questions on the Order Paper.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: This is now becoming a debate.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[5TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Army Estimates, 1952–53, and Army Supplementary Estimate, 1951–52

MR. HEAD'S STATEMENT

Order for Committee read.

3.41 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The duty which confronts myself and the War Office, as I see it, is to develop to the maximum extent the strength of the active and the reserve Army by means of organising its manpower, equipment and training so that it can play its full part in the "cold" war. in our strategic commitments, and in making a full contribution in the event of a "hot" war.
To do this, I am asking the House for £491½million and 555,000 all ranks. No one is more aware than myself that that is an extremely large sum at a time when the nation is undergoing great economic difficulty and when that amount can ill be spared. It is my chief responsibility, and indeed, that of the House also, to see that in return for these two very considerable figures, the nation gets good value for money. I assure hon. Members that I shall have that aspect of the problem very much in mind during the remarks which I propose to address to the House.
I do not intend to go through the Memorandum which explains the Estimates. I am, rightly or wrongly, making the assumption that hon. Members will have read it, and I am only too aware of the tedium which would result from a repetition of that document. Nor do I propose to go through the Estimates page by page, for if I did so I do not think I could give any coherent explanation of the prospects and the problems that lie before the army. Nor do I intend to touch on the question of training, for that will be dealt with in the debate on the Amendment. I propose to confine my remarks this afternoon to the questions of manpower, the re-armament programme, and the Army's operational role.
Inevitably, I shall make many omissions and there are many points in which

hon. Members are interested which I shall omit; but I shall attempt, when I wind up the debate, to answer as fully as I can any points raised by hon. Members. At least, on this occasion hon. Members can have a reasonable assurance that they will be able to raise those points, because tonight, provided they have sufficient stamina, no hon. Members will go home to bed with that most frustrating companion: an ingrowing speech.
I come, first, to the problem of manpower. In my opinion, this is the central and most important problem which confronts the Army today. I apologise to the House in advance if I seem to dwell overlong on this problem, but I am encouraged to do so because it is that aspect of the Army's affairs which, I believe, most concerns hon. Members.
The manpower problem today stems really from the last war. During the war, there was little or no Regular enlistment in the Army, and at the end of the war there were very many Regulars in the Army who had completed their contract and left the service. Thus, in 1945 we found ourselves with a Regular Army which was under 100,000 in strength That situation of there being a very small Regular Army continued for some considerable time. In my opinion, it continued too long, but comparatively recently the size of the Army was rapidly increased by a number of urgent measures.
The first was the call-up of Regular Reservists. The second was to retain Regulars in the Army beyond their contractual time. The third was a substantial increase in pay, for which the late Government deserve full credit—but it is a tragedy that they did not do it earlier. [Interruption.] I say that in all honesty, not as a criticism. [Interruption.] I said it in all honesty. If the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) wants proof, I refer him to HANSARD. The substantial increases in pay stimulated Regular recruiting. The last step was the increase of National Service to two years. That had a stimulating effect on the size of the Regular Army.
But those steps are not lasting or long-term in their effect, and for this reason. Everybody will be agreed that the call-up of reservists and the retention of Regulars is an undesirable step which should be retained only for the minimum amount


of time. The stimulus which the substantial pay increases gave to recruiting has to some extent been diminishing, and the increase given to the Army by the extension of National Service to two years has automatically increased the proportion of National Service men to Regulars.
That question of the proportion of National Service men to Regulars is a most important factor in the Army because, if there is undue dilution and there are too few Regulars in comparison with the numbers of National Service men, inevitably there is a deterioration in the ability of the Regular to train and supervise the National Service man during his period of two years' service. That is not only a bad thing for the Army; it is a bad thing for the nation, because, hon. Members realise, I know, that the majority of the young men of this country between the years of 18 and 20 are spending their time in the Army, and those perhaps are two of the most impressionable years of a young man's life.
If that period of service is well supervised it can serve as a good introduction to life. If it is badly done, it can have a most unfortunate effect; and I suggest to hon. Members that the way in which that period is supervised is to a large extent dependent on the proportion and the ability of the Regular content of the Army. Therefore, I hope I have made it plain to hon. Members why I attach so much importance to ensuring that the proportion of the Regular Army to National Service men is adequate. Not only do we need an adequate number of Regulars in the Army, but we want to encourage them to stay in the Army.
Therefore, I propose initially to say something to the House about what we propose to do in order to ensure an adequate Regular content within the Army. We recently introduced a short service engagement into the Army whereby a man could join for three years and have four years with the Reserve. He can take on in this engagement before, during, or after his period of National Service. He receives, of course, Regular pay from the start. The response to this new offer has been encouraging. I do not want to weary the House with figures, but I think that for the last two months the figures are not without interest. In January, 1951, there were 1,999 recruits and in January, 1952, there were 2,632, a marked increase. In February, 1951,

there were 1,637 recruits and in February, 1952, there were 3,496—which is double. That is encouraging, but it is not enough because, as I said before, not only do we want men to join the Army but we want them to stay in the Army.
Therefore, we now propose to offer to any young man who considers joining the Army a career—a life career. For that reason, I shall shortly propose to the House, in the form of an Amendment to the Army Act, a term of enlistment whereby a man can join the Army for 22 years. This is something novel in the Army which men used to join either for five and seven, or for seven and five. To join for 22 years does give a man a security of career. Not only does he need that, but if we are to approximate the attractions of Army life to those of civilian life, he must also be offered an opportunity to leave the Army—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member has never joined the Army.

Mr. Hughes: Quite wrong.

Mr. Head: No doubt we shall have a long discussion on this matter later tonight. We are not only offering men an opportunity to join the Army for 22 years, but any man who wishes to do so can leave at three-yearly intervals throughout his service. Furthermore, provided his conduct is good and he can be employed—and I think in the majority of cases that will be so—he can remain in the Army until he is 55 years of age.
I stress to the House that under these conditions the Army really does offer a life career. A man can join at 18 and, if he shows any promise, he should be a corporal by the time he is 24 and a sergeant by the time he is 29. If he marries early, as many do, and if he gets promoted, as I have said, by the time he is 24 he will be earning £8 a week and by the time he is 29 he will be earning £10 a week. If he serves for 22 years—when, we can take it, he will be 40 and a sergeant—he will earn a pension of £2 a week and a tax-free terminal grant of £200. If he stays until he is 55 and if, for instance—which is quite possible—he is promoted to warrant officer, he will have a pension of £6 a week and a terminal grant of £600.
I do not think that is a bad career to offer to people in the Army, but it is not enough because, as I have stated, every man who joins under this engagement can leave at three-yearly intervals. In the future there will be no man in the Army who has a binding compulsion beyond three years. That is good in one sense, but it puts an obligation on us to study conditions so that we get rid of the snags and causes of discontent which drive men out of the Army. I wish briefly to analyse what they are and what we propose to do about them.
I believe the first cause of discontent is the compulsory retention of Regulars beyond their term of service. If we do that, the man who wants to go is kept in for a year and becomes discontented and he is a bad influence on his unit. Not only that, but it is a deterrent to recruiting because a man who might take on a three-year Regular engagement considers, "I might be kept on for four years, or more." Therefore, we have decided to eliminate this compulsory retention of Regulars as a matter of policy. That cannot be done at once, but it will taper off and it is our policy that by September, 1953, no Regular in the British Army will be compulsorily retained after his period of Service has expired.
The next snag which I believe to be a cause of discontent is cross-posting, which is sometimes called lack of stability, that is to say, moving from job to job with great rapidity. Soldiers have a more expressive, but less Parliamentary, term for this type of treatment.
It is due to various causes, but primarily it is due to the fact that at present the battalions remain overseas for a long time and men come and go in accordance with the fact that they are going to do three years service overseas and three years at home. Thus, a man at the depot might be posted to the Middle East with his battalion, his battalion then comes home and he has, say, another two and a half years of his overseas tour to complete. He is posted to a different battalion and completes his service; and then, his battalion, he finds, has been posted to Germany and he is posted to yet another battalion.
In order to minimise this cross-posting, we have decided that in all infantry and armoured corps units we shall

institute the three years' battalion tour. That is to say, a battalion will go overseas for three years and will be at home or within that area for the other three years. Units and battalions will move in that way with all the men in them irrespective of the length of time they have been overseas. I believe that will do much to avoid cross-posting, but I must say to the House that for the moment, with so many of our units overseas, North-West Europe will count as home service for this purpose. I think the House will understand that is inevitable. I attach great importance to the elimination of this cross-posting.
The creation of seven second battalions will facilitate the transference of some men from their second battalion to their first. The re-creation of the regimental depots will help. We must cut down cross-posting because the British Army is fiercely tribal. Hon. Members can imagine what would happen, were he still in the Army, if I were to post the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan), from the Black Watch to, shall I say, the Devons. I do not know what the Devons would say, but I know that every hair on the head of my hon. and gallant Friend would bristle—

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: The Devons might have more to say than the Black Watch.

Mr. Head: These are matters of speculation. I should not like to say, in the absence of my hon. and gallant Friend, anything which might cause him embarrassment when he reads it in HANSARD tomorrow.
Another matter which sometimes tends towards making men leave the Army is separation from wives and children. With so many of the British Army abroad, this is obviously and inevitably a cause of discontent. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), knows, it is a matter difficult of solution, but we must do our utmost to provide the maximum possible number of quarters overseas so that wives and children can follow their husbands and fathers. The question of the education of children who cannot accompany fathers who are moving from place to place presents another problem, and we are considering that matter. I


hope shortly to announce some steps which I believe will help.
Lastly, there is the burning question that is very much in the mind of every man in the Army, perhaps not so much when he joins but when his service is nearly completed, namely, "When I leave, can I get a job?" I wish I could have come to the House and said that any man completing his 22 years' service, with good conduct, could have a guarantee of a job. For technical reasons which hon. Members opposite will understand, it is not possible to give such a guarantee, but I can assure the House and the Army that a man who engages on a long-term service commitment is virtually almost certain of employment when he finishes.
In this respect I base my remarks on the advice of the Ministry of Labour, whom I should particularly like to thank—and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman opposite would join with me in so doing—for the quite exceptional work that they have done in helping the Army on the question of employemnt. I would couple with them the T.U.C. and employers, who have given their cooperation.
I have mentioned what we propose to do, and I now wish to speak about recruiting itself. Recruiting used to take place throughout the country with the aid of a fine-looking sergeant with a black moustache and a red, white and blue rosette. There has been a change, and today recruiting for the Army must to a large extent be done within units and regiments themselves. The National Service man is there, and it is up to regiments to recruit him. It is particularly marked in the Army today that where units are good and efficient the recruitment of National Service men is high. It should be the aim of every regiment to recruit into the Regular Army as many National Service men as it can, but I say to the House that there must not—I have this in mind—be undue pressure.
Furthermore, our ordinary recruiting system is, in my opinion, not entirely up to date. We have, therefore, appointed—and within a matter of days he will start his duties—an active and able major-general on a temporary basis and without any staff—

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: That will not last long.

Mr. Head: I will have a bet with the hon. and gallant Member on that subject. He will go round our recruiting organisation in order to bring it up to date and to adapt and adjust it so that it can be more efficient in recruiting throughout the country. I believe this should help—

Wing Commander N. J. Hulbert: Is my right hon. Friend suggesting that there is a difference between an ordinary major-general and an active and able major-general?

Mr. Head: My hon. and gallant Friend is making an innuendo to the effect that all our major-generals are not always active and able. I will therefore amend my remarks and say "An exceptionally able and active major-general."
With regard to recruiting, hon. Members may have seen in the Press that we are also proposing to start an Infantry Regimental Boys' Battalion. That is a scheme whereby boys who want to make the Army a career and to become N.C.O.s and warrant officers—and indeed they can get commissions—will go there at 15 and leave at 17½. They will have a general education with a military bias, and 10 weeks' holiday a year. The school will hold 450 boys and will be situated on the fringe of Sherwood Forest. I hope and believe that it will be a success. If it is, we shall expand it.
I now wish to speak about the National Service intake. In 1951, the three Services required 223,000 National Service men and there were available 206,000. As a result, the Army went 10,000 short that year. This year, by means of an artificial boost, that is to say, five call-ups instead of four, which can never be repeated, and which has the effect of reducing the call-up age near to the original age of 18, we are all right. But in the years to come it is virtually certain that the total National Service intake will be below the combined needs of the three Services. That further emphasises the importance which I attach to the question of Regular recruiting.
While all this is going on, the Reserve Army is filling up, and by the summer of 1954 it will have reached its maximum strength. But that is not the mobilisation strength because, through the reduction of the part-time service from four years to 3½ years, the Reserve Army lost


55,000 men. As the Reserve Army fills up, the need for officers of about the rank of captain, with war experience if possible, and particularly of sergeants, in the volunteer element within the Territorial Army becomes more and more pressing. I hope that those men who in the past have done such great service in the Territorial Army as volunteers will be forthcoming to help us out as the Reserve Army fills up.
The position in the Reserve Army is not too bad, although we urgently need volunteers. But it is definitely bad in the Supplementary Reserve. I believe the reason for that is largely ignorance. I must confess that I am speaking entirely for myself because until I went to the War Office I never realised the size of the Supplementary Reserve today. This Reserve at its maximum strength numbers no fewer than 100,000 men. Before the war it was a few small units.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: Including officers?

Mr. Head: One hundred thousand men of all ranks. I do not believe either that it is generally realised what is the scope or size of the Supplementary Reserve today. It covers units which vary from postal units to port operating squadrons, and in all walks of life there must be men whose civil occupation coincides very closely with the functions of many of these units. They do no drills in their part-time training. Their part-time training is restricted solely to 15 days in camp. I hope that in the future more recruits to this element will be forthcoming, for it provides administrative and specialist units not only for the Reserve Army but for a large proportion of the Regular Army as well.
I should like also to say a word about what in the Memorandum we term "Regular Women," in other words, the women of the Women's Royal Army Corps. These women have done great service with the Army. They are now serving in almost all the theatres in which the Army is stationed, and we want more of them. At the moment we have a committee of officers sitting in the War Office thinking how we can make ourselves more attractive to women—[Laughter.]—by "we" I mean the Army. We intend to make available more vacancies for

women within the technical corps. As a result of this committee, I hope to announce some steps which will improve recruiting.
So far, recruiting has been on the increase, but it has to compete with a considerable wastage rate, a good deal of which is caused by matrimony. I wish also to extend a welcome to the issue of what I think hon. Members will agree is a rather becoming uniform, the new green uniform, for the W.R.A.C.—but of course, that may increase our wastage rate !
We have in the Army today, I think, the best manpower the Army has ever had, and I cannot sufficiently stress the importance of having an adequate supply of good officers. Our need is for about 37,000. We have 33,500; so we have a deficiency of about 3,500. But this is the point: of the 33,500 whom we already have, only half are Regular officers. The remaining half are either short-service commissioned or National Service officers. So we have a dual problem; it is to reduce the deficiency of officers as a whole and to increase the proportion of Regulars among them.
We cannot do that by a sudden increase, even if we could get the men. Supposing we could get 3,000 young officers in a year; it would be disastrously unfair to them, because they would all reach the top of the promotion pyramid at the same time, with disastrous overcrowding at the top and with a disastrous effect on their own career. Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the right aim would be to get into the Army 1,000 officers a year. At the moment we are getting 580 a year from Sandhurst and 200 a year from National Service and university candidates.
If I am not wearying the House, I will say a word about the steps that are being taken 'to try to overcome this shortage of officers. First, we are pursuing a step for which the entire credit belongs to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West, namely, the employment at static headquarters up to the age of 55 of officers who do not reach the highest rank but who retire with the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel. We are trying to increase that number, particularly in the War Office, and thus to free an increasing number of young officers to go to fighting


units. In addition, I am considering allowing a proportioin of short-service officers to serve on in the Regular Army, particularly in the technical arms, and to grant commissions to ex-Indian Army officers.
I also believe that many headmasters and parents are ignorant of what the Army offers as a career to a young man today. The young officers we require include a considerable proportion of officers with a technical and scientific background. The Army is becoming more and more technical. We used to be accused of containing a large proportion of "Colonel Blimps." In my opinion, Mr. David Low could very well bury "Colonel Blimp" and if he wants a substitute I would suggest "Colonel Boffin" because the Army is becoming very technical and we must provide a technical background for the young officer coming in.
I have two projects in mind which might help, which I should like briefly to mention. We own a remarkable establishment known as the Military College of Science at Shrivenham. This is a magnificent building, and is as well equipped as any equivalent organisation in the country. We have courses of young officers going there, and also senior officers. One project I have in mind is to open this college to young men who have a scientific and technical interest and who could go there as an alternative method to Sandhurst for entering the Army. They would spend two years there, at the end of which they could take a B.Sc. degree and pass straight into the Army. I believe that would be attractive, and might give us an added proportion of this type of officer.
If one analyses where our best young engineers and scientists come from, one finds that a very high proportion come from the grammar and secondary schools in the North of England and schools in Scotland. Very few of these young men have even considered taking a commission in the Army. I need not go into the reason; but it is our belief that if we started a school giving a general education with a technical bias, for boys from these schools between the ages of 16 and 18, we would have a source of intake, so far untapped, of immense value to the Army.
I have discussed the scheme with the Ministry of Education and also with the

headmasters. From the discussions I have had so far, and from the fact that we have a very suitable building in view, I am hopeful that this project may turn into a reality; and if it does I believe it would be of great value to the Army as a whole.
I remember that when I sat on the other side of the House and the right hon. Member for Easington was the Minister I, and many of my colleagues, exerted considerable pressure on him on the question of colonial man-power. I think it would be rather dodging on my part were I not to say a word on that subject, now that our roles have been reversed.
I would first say that two battalions are now being raised in the West Indies for service throughout the Caribbean. In Malaya, where the Malay Regiment recently raised a fifth battalion, they are now in the process of raising a sixth. In East Africa they are in process of raising two battalions. I am aware that many hon. Members opposite, and a number of my hon. Friends, will say that this is something, but it is not enough and why cannot we expand the Colonial Forces so that they can take the place which the Indian Army once filled? I think the best way I can explain it is by saying that the Regular Army is particularly short of middle piece officers and N.C.Os. That is exactly what we want for a Colonial Army.
There was a project which we have examined in the War Office for forming a West African Division. To explain the difficulties to the House, I must tell them what the bill would have been. The bill for officers and N.C.Os. for one West African Division would be 1,200 British officers and N.C.Os.—the scarcest commodities in the Regular Army. The bill for the buildings to house them in West Africa would be at least £13 million, and it was estimated that they would take between four and six years to complete. We intend to increase the Colonial Army as far as we are able, and I hope that those figures will show that there are difficulties in the way of very rapid and considerable expansion.
I have been a long time on this question of manpower, but I think that it would be wrong if I left it before I gave the House some assurance that we are


taking steps to economise in manpower: in other words, that we are combing our tail in order to form new battalions. In this respect, I think that I have something in common with the Leader of the Opposition, who has just left the House, because he also is somewhat preoccupied with his tail and its control. Indeed, I sometimes wish that I could emulate his experience of last week whereby, so to speak, his own tail broke off in his hands and formed a very battle-worthy battalion in a matter of hours.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: It was the head, not the tail.

Mr. Head: I must leave that to the House. Not only was it battle-worthy, but in its very first engagement it dug itself in and managed completely to disorganise two Divisions.

Mr. E. Shinwell: The trouble is that they are all officers.

Mr. Head: It is a very virile O.C.T.U. Although he is not here, I would say to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) that he is deserving of a battle honour for this deed. He might adopt, with some amendment, one of the most famous regimental mottoes in the British Army, Nemo me impune flagellabit, which, freely translated, might be taken to mean "No Whip is going to try and push me into the wrong Lobby."
The late Government appointed General Templer, to whom I am sure we all wish the best of fortune in Malaya, to go round the static and administrative units in this country with a view to reducing their size and increasing the number and size of fighting units. Since that was done, we have considerably extended that policy, and General Callander, with great efficiency and despatch, has been to Germany, Trieste, Austria and the Far East. We have not included the Middle East because I do not believe that it would be opportune at present, although I hope that we shall include it later.
He has completed that combing out, but we have extended it further in that General Harding, who commands our Army on the Rhine, is now experimenting and making attempts, which I know will be successful, to reduce the size of, not static, but operational headquarters

which, in my opinion, grew too big at the end of the war.
We have extended it still further, because under General Templer's examination in England the War Office was exempt. The War Office has been reduced considerably since the war, but I felt that with this intensive comb-out, it was not really right that the War Office should be exempt. The experience I have had of reductions in establishment is that it is no good arguing over every man, every clerk. The only way out is to have an arbitrary cut. Therefore, I gave instructions that the entire staff of the War Office should be cut by 10 per cent. That has been most loyally implemented and it will result in a saving of 750 soldiers and civil servants.

Sir Ian Fraser: Does that include all ranks—generals included?

Mr. Head: It includes all ranks. It seems poor gratitude for the support I have had in the War Office to take this type of action.

Mr. Shinwell: The Minister is cutting down by 750. Are they dismissed or sent elsewhere? To where are they transferred?

Mr. Head: Soldiers are sent to fighting formations. I do not wish to turn civil servants out into the street, and where their decrease is concerned, we are allowing a year in which to implement it. We do not replace wastage and we stop recruiting to fill vacancies. Within a year we shall have got rid of those numbers without any undue hardship to the civil servants.

Mr. Bellenger: In view of that statement, I think that the right hon. Gentleman ought to explain what the proportion is between military and civilian personnel.

Mr. Head: I will guarantee to give that information to the right hon. Gentleman when I wind up the debate. I have not got the figures with me.

Mr. George Wigg: Will the right hon. Gentleman give us the numbers by rank which have been taken away—including generals, colonels and so on?

Mr. Head: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would like me to offer him a few generals for the quo vadis net.

Mr. Harry Wallace: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether he is referring to established civil servants or temporary civil servants?

Mr. Head: The majority will be civil servants whose time has expired or will expire shortly. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are taking a great deal of trouble to see that no civil servant in the War Office is victimised by this step. I must confess that I am rather alarmed by the resistance with which this cut appears to be met.

Mr. Wigg: rose—

Mr. Head: I must get on. The War Office has been cut before by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easing-ton. We have now cut very near the bone.

Mr. Shinwell: Hear, hear.

Mr. Head: A considerable proportion of the War Office staff is preoccupied with such matters as Z Reservists, National Service men and—which is a great credit to their zeal—the correspondence of hon. Members of this House. I do not complain in the slightest about that. Personal inquiries about men are essential and that is one of the rights of hon. Members. However, I wish to make a suggestion, and in this connection I am entirely in the hands of the House.
I would suggest that on certain questions possibly the two Army Committees of both sides of the House might meet with myself and an expert from the War Office, and we might be able to devise something in connection with Standing Orders which would be of mutual advantage. If we could do so I should be much obliged, but I am entirely in the hands of the House.
The total of the reductions which I have mentioned before amounts to a total saving of men out of the "tail" into the "teeth" of 10,000, and I think that is not a bad saving. In addition, we have saved 10,000 men from the German Service Organisation, which is the administrative side of the British Army of the Rhine. I have not included in these figures what is termed "civilianisation"—the substitution of civilians for men—because it will take a long time to implement and it costs a lot of money.

Mr. Wigg: Can the right hon. Gentleman say where the other 9,000 come

from? He has mentioned 750 from the War Office, and now says that the total is 10,000.

Mr. Head: I assure the hon. Gentleman that the figure of 10,000 is correct. It comes from Germany, Trieste, Austria, the Far East and these islands, and I will give him the exact numbers, if he wishes, before the end of the debate. There is nothing bogus about the saving; this is a direct saving from the "tail" into the "teeth." It is largely owing to these savings that we have been able to form seven new battalions.
I have noticed in other debates in the House that hon. Gentlemen opposite are particularly well informed concerning our election manifesto, and I am sure that they will be interested in what was said there. We said that:
By close scrutiny and pruning in nonessential administrative units, our fighting strength could be increased.
We have got many new battalions, and I have saved 10,000 men, and I am sure that the fair-mindedness of hon. Gentlemen opposite will cause them to scamper to their constituencies and tell their constituents all about it.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman will admit, in his fairness and generosity, that other things were said in the manifesto.

Mr. Head: We are not debating the manifesto.
Not only is it important for us to economise manpower in the Army, but it is, as I think right hon. Gentlemen will agree, equally important that we do not waste the time of the National Service man. When I went to the War Office, I imagined that it was a comparatively simple thing to call up a man and post him to the Regular Army. That is not so, and it is only comparatively recently that we have brought in a more scientific method of ensuring that a man's whole-time service with the Regular Army will correspond with his part-time Service in the Reserve Army. Hon. Gentlemen may think that that is simple, but, at the risk of wearying them and for the reason that they may receive complaints on this subject, may I explain the procedure to them?
At the War Office we have had to make a complete and comprehensive survey, numerically and geographically, of the


whole of England. Let us imagine a town of, say, 30,000 people. First, we draw a ring round it. Within that ring live the men who can be expected either to cycle or walk to the drill hall. We take the number of people inside the ring, and work out what the annual call-up is likely to be. Let us say it is 100. That gives us an idea of the size of unit which the drill hall can support. Then we take the characteristics of the town into account. Let us say that it is agricultural, with some mechanical workshops, and perhaps provides some road transport.
We therefore give the unit a company of infantry, a light aid detachment of R.E.M.E. and a R.A.S.C. transport platoon. Whenever a man inside that ring is called up, he goes before the military interviewing officer concerned, who asks him what he does and places him into a unit which he thinks is most suitable for him, and he is then passed into the Regular Army into an equivalent unit. When he comes out for his part-time service he goes straight into a unit which corresponds to that in which he did his full-time service.
This system has been introduced only comparatively recently, and it is not foolproof. In the initial stages, it was perhaps a bit chancy. I am not guaranteeing anything, but at least I am hoping that we shall find that a man who is immensely skilled in, say, electronics, will not be grooming horses in Knightsbridge Barracks.
I now turn to the re-armament programme. Our object in re-arming is, first, to provide enough up-to-date equipment for current arrangements, which is quite considerable; secondly, to provide balanced equipment for the active Army; the Territorial Army and Anti-Aircraft Command; thirdly, to provide reserves for them; and, fourthly, to supply the Commonwealth nations and N.A.T.O. with the equipment necessary in maintaining their defences.
I am aware that the re-armament programme must affect our present situation. It so happens that the Army's programme conflicts, particularly in its building programme and the programme concerning the metal-using industries, with our civilian needs. The programme has not been cut; it has been extended.
Before I come to discuss certain points which I think may be of interest to hon. Members, I should like to make some remarks on the question of specifications and staff requirements. Hon. Members may remember that, in a recent debate, the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing), and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire (Mr. Woodburn) both made what, in my opinion, were very good speeches, accusing the Services of requiring too much detail and too high a standard for some of their equipment, which, they argued, placed an undue strain on industry. I believe they were right, and they may be interested to know that, in January of this year, we issued a standing instruction which applies to all staff requirements, and says:
In cases where stores and equipment are required for the whole Army and for the other Services the consequent heavy charge on production capacity must be kept to a minimum by simplicity in design and production. Furthermore, such items should be made from materials which have the maximum useful life and are readily available in war.
Over-refinement involving large scale development or production difficulties, higher cost, and exacting requirements in training, operation and maintenance must be avoided.
I hope that that may have a beneficial effect. We in the War Office are aware of the importance of simplicity of design and of keeping down requirements so as not to place an undue burden on production.
I should like first, in dealing with the re-armament programme, to say a word or two about tanks. The Centurion tank, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in the defence debate, is one of the best—if not the best—tanks of its size in the world, and, what is more, production is proceeding very satisfactorily. I thank the right hon. Gentleman opposite for that legacy, and I think that it reflects the greatest credit on British designers and the factory producing it.
It struck me that some hon. Members might like to visit this factory which is making this very important tank, and, by the courtesy of the Ministry of Supply, if hon. Members will let me or the Under-Secretary of State have their names if they wish to go, such visits can be arranged. The factory is in Leeds, and it might be of interest to some hon. Members to visit it.
There were some snags about this tank at first. It had a very short range in mileage, and lacked a Besa gun on the turret. These defects have been overcome. The tank has been criticised—and I admit I have done it myself—of being built too much on a Cartier standard and in regard to the stabiliser. The gun control equipment costs £1,600, and the actual gadget that works the stabiliser only £100. That was a surprise to me, and it is no doubt of interest to the House.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: How does the right hon. Gentleman explain the difference in cost? The Minister of Supply said that this tank is now costing £38,000 as against £35,000 last year, and the price of steel is rising. How does the right hon. Gentleman explain the difference of £3,000.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Before the right hon. Gentleman answers that question, can he give us figures of the relative cost of tanks built at this factory and at the Royal Ordnance Factory?

Mr. Head: I am afraid I cannot, but I will try and get the hon. and learned Gentleman an answer. The only things which are now—

Mr. Hughes: That does not answer my question.

Mr. Head: The short answer is really that prices have been rising. Whether of tanks or other commodities, prices are going up.

Mr. Cecil Poole: That was not in the manifesto.

Mr. Head: This subject, as far as I know, has never been in any manifesto.
I should now like to say a word about what are called "soft" vehicles. This is a somewhat generic term which does not mean that we are feather-bedding the soldier. It refers to jeeps, lorries, transporters, and all non-armoured vehicles. Right hon. Gentlemen will admit, I think, that the Army has been badly off in this way. For a long time we have been living on our fat, rebuilding and repairing old vehicles, and the fat has been getting of worse and worse quality. This year—and the credit for this lies with the late Government—we shall get a considerable number of good, new four-wheeled

drive vehicles for cross-country performance capable of towing trailers.
In the Estimates last year, the then Secretary of State announced a 20 per cent. reduction in vehicle scales. Up to date, a 12 per cent. reduction has been achieved, and we intend not only to complete that reduction, but to exceed it in many establishments to a total of 28 per cent. That will be done in co-operation with General Harding to cut down at headquarters. I am firmly convinced that we must cut down the number of vehicles in the British Army. We cannot hope to enjoy the kind of air situation which obtained during the concluding stages of the last war. The best thing is not to have too many vehicles.
Ammunition presents a problem at the present time. We are preparing for a war with a smallish Army against superior numbers, and therefore we can be sure that the whole of that Army, at any rate in Germany, will be simultaneously engaged. There will be no large reserve. Everything will be largely in the shop window. Ammunition expenditure will be very high. That, indeed, has been confirmed by Korea. Therefore, our requirements are considerably in excess of the normal requirements of an Army of our size. This presents a very big problem for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply and we are directing the closest attention to the problem in order to ensure that sufficient and adequate supplies will be available.
Another problem is anti-aircraft equipment, particularly of this country. We have got new inventions of Radar and predictors and new inventions for increasing the rate of fire of guns. They are expensive and difficult to manufacture, but we cannot let up on that particular aspect until the quantity production of guided missiles is in sight. At the present moment, the aeroplane has a marked ascendancy over ground defences, and therefore, of necessity, we are pressing on with what is an expensive and difficult procedure.
I cannot leave the re-armament programme without saying something about standardisation. I wish I could report to the House that progress was as satisfactory as we could wish. Hon. Members will, I know, agree that whether it be individuals or nations, it is always difficult to persuade people that one's own


particular idea is the best and that they should stick to it and follow it. Perhaps I am preaching to the converted in the case of hon. Gentlemen opposite, but the trouble with re-armament is that we now have a need for the rapid production of as many weapons as we can get, and yet standardisation can only really be achieved by the sacrifice of time and by incorporating it into long-term development and production. No very spectacular achievements have been made, but in the less spectacular items definite progress has been made. I am equally sure that this country is more than playing its part in attempting to achieve standardisation.
I now come to the last part of my remarks concerning the operational role of the Army. We have responsibility with the two other Services for protecting this country. There are practically no active formations in the country. As hon. Members know, we have formed mobile columns at the direct order of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence, which have been a great success. We have also formed the Home Guard, concerning which I want to reinforce the remarks of my right hon. Friend regarding the importance of people joining the Home Guard, and to say, incidentally, that I was disappointed that the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) did not fulfil his promise concerning his eventual support.
Overseas, our biggest effort is concentrated in Germany. The British Army of the Rhine—and I think the right hon. Gentleman opposite will agree with me—has gained a deservedly high reputation. We have got there no fewer than three armoured divisions, which is a very large contribution to those Forces by this country in time of peace. Not only that; we have the obligation to reinforce those divisions with our Territorial divisions at the earliest possible opportunity.
This question of the operational preparedness of Territorial divisions is a very difficult one. I have read articles in the "Manchester Guardian" which, in my opinion, were somewhat pessimistic in this respect. But it is not easy to keep decreasing the period required before these Territorial divisions can go overseas. It is a matter on which we are thinking hard and long.
Except for the garrisons in Trieste and Austria, the rest of the Army is scattered all over the world in fulfilling its commitments in the "cold" war and in protecting our strategic bases. I do not believe that either in the country or in this House it is sufficiently realised to what extent the Army is bearing a major responsibility in the "cold" war. Of all the active formations now in the Army, no less than 36 per cent. are engaged in what amounts to active operations.
Since the "cold" war began, they have suffered casualties of 4,000 killed, wounded and prisoners of war. In many of these theatres they are operating in conditions of danger and hardship In Egypt, owing to the need for reinforcements and for confinement in the Canal Zone, conditions are far from what we would wish them to be. The troops are carrying out wearisome duties such as those of stevedores. They are dangerous duties, inasmuch as they are constantly being shot at, though mercifully less so at the present moment. In Malaya they are operating in intense jungle in a difficult climate, and are continuously exposed to sudden and often unseen attack. Hon. Members are well aware of the difficulties and severities of the climate in Korea, and indeed many hon. Members have been there.
There has been considerable criticism in this House of the assistance given to the troops in Korea. I have made two statements on that subject and I do not propose to develop it now. But I would assure hon. Members and, more important, the men in Korea that these men are very far from being a forgotten army. It is not easy to ensure absolute accuracy of supply to a comparatively small force at the end of a 12,000 miles long line of communication. Had it been possible—I hope hon. Members will believe me—I would have tried to go to Korea by this time because I am very much aware of these men and the fact that they need attention and encouragement. In all these areas—Malaya, Korea, Egypt and elsewhere—testing and difficult duties have been carried out with efficiency, determination and cheerfulness.
I am not suggesting for one moment that the British soldier has lost his talent for colourful and often blistering complaints and comments on the less


attractive aspect of his duties, but between them the National Service men and the Regular soldiers have fused or, in Army parlance, have "mucked in" to form a very fine national Army. In my opinion it has the makings of the best Army we have ever had.

Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: I suppose it is perking up now the right hon. Gentleman has taken it over.

Mr. Head: I said it had the makings. The hon. Member makes these rather squalid interruptions but the British Army can overcome almost anything, including the hon. Member if he wants to have a row with me.
Everywhere in the Regular Army there is admiration for the way in which the National Service man has approached his two years' compulsory service. Some of them complain, of course, but I am sure that hon. Members will not take a distorted view of the attitude of the National Service man because they hear most of that vocal minority. The vast majority of these men have accepted what was an unwanted obligation with a degree of co-operation which has exceeded all expectations. Indeed, their presence in the Regular Army has injected a wider outlook and an increased interest which have been very beneficial.
The Regular Army itself, which has had National Service men and Z Reservists introduced and its overseas commitments to undertake while under strength and widely dispersed, also well deserves praise for the way the men have done their job. I believe all hon. Members will agree with me that all these men of the British Army, many of them parted from their wives and children, many of them conscripted against their wishes, many of them in danger and discomfort all over the world, have done their duty in a way which deserves the admiration and the gratitude of the whole of this House.

4.54 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: We have listened to a most interesting and valuable survey of the condition of the Army and of the manner in which the very large sum of money voted last year and the still larger sum to be voted this year are being expended.
I will not follow exactly the order the Secretary of State for War followed, because it seems to me, in looking at the Estimates this year, that what dominates the scene is Vote 7—the Estimate which is rather oddly called "Stores." That, of course, is really the Vote for weapons and equipment of all kinds. It will be seen that of the increase of nearly £120 million in this year's Estimates no less than £81 million are for Vote 7, and no less than £59 million of that £81 million are for warlike stores.
I think that represents the fact that this year we have come to the stage where the actual delivery of weapons under the re-armament programme will be considerable. The basis in manpower and in equipment had begun to be laid last year, and this year there should be seen a considerable delivery of actual warlike stores.
Therefore, at the beginning of my remarks I want to turn to that part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech in which he spoke of some of, these weapons and to ask him one or two questions about their further development. The first weapon he dealt with, naturally, was the tank. He noted the very real success of the Centurion tank in the experience we have had of it in Korea. That is a somewhat limited and special experience, but, in the opinion of those qualified to judge, it has shown, as the right hon. Gentleman said, that we have a really good tank in the Army today.
That is something for which we ought to be very thankful, because this tank was designed long before either he or I held official responsibilities; and the Centurion must have been in the nature of a gamble for whoever was responsible for it. One has to put one's money on a particular design which takes years to develop and then years to produce in large numbers. It is a matter for great thankfulness that it has turned out that our British designers, as the right hon. Gentleman said, have done an admirable job in this respect.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke with satisfaction about the rise in the number of tanks produced. What is of greater importance is an increase in the country's productive capacity for tanks. I thank him for what he said about the work the previous Government did in this


respect. I think he will agree that before the Korean war began moves were on foot for increasing productive capacity, which takes so long in the case of a tank factory and is of such very great importance.
I hope that other parts of the tank programme—the modernisation of gunning on earlier types of tanks and the provision of a successor to the Centurion tank—are also going forward. Although the Centurion is proving a most valuable weapon, it was designed some years ago and it will need a successor, indeed several successors, in due course.
The right hon. Gentleman said nothing to us about anti-tank weapons. I hope that he, or whoever replies for the Government, will say something about them, because I think he will agree that most experts believe they are of at least equal importance to the tank itself. Nobody knows who will win in the battles of the future between the tank and its opponents. I know there is a whole programme for a range of anti-tank weapons, running right through from section to division, with which the Army is to be equipped to repel its most dangerous assailant—the tank attack.
The stop-gap measure we had to undertake of equipping infantry battalions with 17 pounder guns has been very much better than nothing, but I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree, as we agree, that that is only a stop-gap and that a range of specially designed weapons from the rifle grenade for the section right up to the divisional antitank weapon is needed. In the field of weapons, the progressing and development of this range is one of the most important, if not the most important, tasks for those equipping the Army.
Here, as in so much else, I ask the right hon. Gentleman not to let the best be the enemy of the good. It is terribly difficult to know when to go into production with all these things. If we begin too soon we only produce an obsolete weapon. On the other hand, I think that on the whole the temptation of the expert is perfectionism; there is always something a little better, and one may delay going into production too long. I hope that this range of weapons, of which

the Bazooka is one of the most important, will fairly quickly appear amongst the units.
I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman about another subject that has been discussed a good deal in the House but which he did not mention. I refer to the infantry's own weapon—the much discussed question of the rifle. I have made it my business, both in office and subsequently, to talk to everyone I could who had actual first-hand experience of fighting in Korea, and I should have thought, from all I have heard, that there one of the great lessons is that the actual fire power in small arms of the infantry itself was perhaps proving once again the most important single factor in the whole struggle.
The right hon. Gentleman graphically described the character of a third world war, and if that almost ultimate disaster did take place, the infantry would probably again be fighting against very considerable superiority of numbers, and I should have thought that in such a struggle the fire power of the infantry battalions would be of almost crucial importance. The fire power of our men in Korea has, no doubt, been good. From all I hear, the Bren gun has once again proved itself an admirable weapon. But can there be any doubt that all the expert opinion that I know of was correct in thinking that the provision of a weapon such as the 280 rifle would be of enormous benefit to the infantry in that sort of war and in the sort of struggle which we might, alas, find ourselves engaged?
I am not suggesting that mere rapidity of fire is everything. The experts can, no doubt, show very good reasons why a fully automatic weapon has almost prohibitive disadvantages. But the 280 rifle in its semi-automatic role has a capacity to give a very much larger number of aimed shots per minute than the bolt action weapon can ever hope to do, and I should have thought that the advantage of that, both actual and from the point of view of the morale of an infantry man with such a weapon in his hands, was very great indeed.
That is why some of us are deeply disturbed by the present position of the 280 rifle. I say that I am disturbed by that position, but I do not pretend to know exactly what it is, and I should like to be told. So far as the Prime Minister's


answers to Questions on that subject go, and so far as I can understand them, he says that we are going in for experimental production of the 280 rifle. I do not quite know what that means, but I fear that it means probably very little.
After all, what really matters here is the question whether or not we are tooling up one or more of our small arms production units for this new rifle. We all know, as the Prime Minister has said very often, that it is going to take a very long time at the best for us to be ready to start on an appreciable scale of production even if we start tooling now; but surely, if we think this rifle is the right thing, that is a reason for increasing our anxiety if we are not really beginning to tool up properly. If, on the other hand, we have sacrificed or postponed indefinitely the introduction of this weapon on the altar of the principle of standardisation, I can only say that I think it is a very unfortunate and wrong decision.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke very cautiously about standardisation. I think he was right to do so. Of course it is a good thing. Of course we should like to see it increased in N.A.T.O. Forces. But is it something for the sake of which we ought to sacrifice the introduction in the foreseeable future of a new weapon of such importance as this to our own Army? I cannot think it is. Our American friends have got a very different problem. They have got a semi-automatic rifle of a kind. They are experimenting with a successor to it, but it is an automatic rifle of a kind. For that and other reasons, this is not anything like so urgent a problem for them.
We have the old 303 which is a magnificent weapon, but nevertheless it does date from the Boer War, and it really is time that we gave an up-to-date weapon to our infantry. I do not think there can be any doubt, in view of the weight of expert opinion, that our British designers have designed a really fine weapon themselves, and I feel deep disappointment that the introduction of the new rifle has apparently slipped away into the indefinite future. We profoundly deplore this decision.
Now I come to the question of antiaircraft guns. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman is able to tell us that the programme is going forward. The commitment both in manpower and in

the production is, of course, a terrible weight on the Army; in this case it is a matter of adaptation of weapons, but it is a most elaborate adaptation. It involves an enormous amount of productive capacity, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply knows only too well, in developing a very expensive anti-aircraft programme. But there it is. It is something which obviously has to be carried.
The right hon. Gentleman touched on the question of "soft" vehicles, and I am glad that he agreed with the cutting down on the truly gigantic requirement which, under the old scales, the Army had for "soft" vehicles of all kinds. He touched very well on the question of the strain on industry which the demands of the Army impose if everything has specially to be made for the Army—and specially made to exceedingly exacting specifications. It is in this field of "soft" vehicles, above all, that the dilemma between quantity and quality makes itself felt in a most intense form.
It is possible to get literally many times the number of vehicles if they are based on the ordinary run of the vehicle building industry of the country, as against the extremely high performance specifications which are, no doubt, ideal in the Army. No doubt it is not possible to make any clear-cut decision between quality and quantity here, but I think I am right in saying—the right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong—that lately opinion in the War Office has tended towards thinking that a rather higher proportion of the "soft" vehicles can come from the ordinary run of industry—of course, adapted to Army purposes but not a completely new line—and that we can, at any rate, satisfy a large part of the Army demand in that way. I should have thought it was right to do so and that one should limit to the maximum degree possible the demand for the vehicle built ab initio, which takes an infinitely longer time to get and is an infinitely greater strain on industry that has to start a special run to get it.
There is one small point to which the right hon. Gentleman did not refer but which is in his Memorandum. I am glad to know that he is going ahead fast with covered storage. It sounds dull, but it was something which caused me—and the War Office in general—great anxiety.


As these deliveries come forward it is of great importance that they should go into covered storage, or they, in turn, will begin to deteriorate just as a good deal of the equipment with which we were left at the end of the war has deteriorated, and they will need to be refurbished. It takes a lot of steel; but I wish him well in his struggle for steel in that respect.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I should like to suggest to the right hon. Gentleman and my right hon. Friend that it need not take steel. Nowadays one can construct these things out of pre-stressed concrete. No steel is needed and it is far cheaper.

Mr. Strachey: I think the requirement of steel cannot be avoided altogether; but it can be minimised by that means.
The right hon. Gentleman dealt in some detail with the subject of manpower. He generously mentioned the measures which we had taken to build up the manpower of the Army. There were six measures which I mentioned in last year's Estimate. They were the increase in pay; the increase in the time of National Service; the call up of the Z Reservists; the arrangements for men coming out of National Service going into the Territorial Army; the recall of Regular reservists, and the retention of Regulars for one year or 18 months. The last two were in the nature of emergency measures. One has been dispensed with altogether, and I agree that the other should be dispensed with, as the right hon. Gentleman told us he was going to do. It was agreed that we should do this as soon as we possibly could.
I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman one question on the issue of the Z Reservists. It is almost a matter of curiosity. When we debated this issue in the House the other day, I ventured to chaff him a little for continuing exactly unchanged our plans in that respect—though I am glad of the compliment of imitation. He told me that in saying this I was skating on very thin ice, and later in his speech he said that I knew exactly what he meant when he said that. I did not know what he meant and I should like to know, or to have an idea, because I think it would bring out that issue more clearly.
He then passed to what I agree is an essential problem, that of building up an adequate Regular content of the Army. He told us of the programme of the various measures to do this, and it is a considered programme.
First of all, there is the three-year enlistment period. I was delighted to hear of the success of that offer and the increase in recruitment which it has meant. He is following that up by an amendment of the Army Act, which will give a man the right to enlist for a full career of 22 years and, at the same time, will allow him to leave the Army at three years' notice—at three-yearly intervals. Those and the measures associated with them are admirable measures, and I think it would be absurd for us to have a controversy in claiming the credit for that scheme.
I think the right hon. Gentleman would be the first to agree that it was a scheme which was, in part, actually adopted and, in part, actually under consideration, when he came into office last autumn. It has steadily evolved in the Adjutant-General's Department of the War Office, and I think it is one which should do a good deal to build up the Regular content of the Army. It should take us a good deal nearer the point where a career in the Army is like any other career one enters upon with the intention of carrying it on as one's life work but which one can leave on ordinary terms of contract—not at a moment's notice; one cannot leave any decent job at a moment's notice—but by due notice and due contract on each side. I am sure that is the modern way to recruit a Regular soldier.

Mr. Wyatt: There is one job which one can leave at a moment's notice.

Mr. Strachey: I hear murmurs that there is one job which can be left at a moment's notice.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say a word about the Supplementary Reserve. I agree that that has been rather the Cinderella of the whole organisation, and I should like on the spur of the moment to offer him a suggestion, and that is that it is partly something to do with its curiously uninspiring name. I think it may be seriously worth while to change that name. This Reserve has become very important. It is supposed to have 100,000 men in it. Could it


be called something like "The Special Corps of the Reserve Army?" Perhaps somebody could think of a better name than that. But "Supplementary Reserve" is somehow very depressing, and I wonder whether that has something to do with the difficulty of building it up today.
The right hon. Gentleman then dealt with the question of the need for officers. I wish to deal with the question from the angle of the selection of officers. The Secretary of State emphasised very strongly the shortages of officers and the importance of increasing their numbers, and he referred to various sources which could be drawn on, such as older men, and sources we have drawn on in the past; but I want to put another aspect of that matter. What I am going to say is, of course, partly a criticism on myself. I am concerned now, as I was when I was in office, with the difficulty of getting these older men; but I should like to say that my concern is with the whole method of selection of officers in the Army today.
After all, this selection is done in the main in the first few weeks in which a man joins the Army—and this applies both to Regulars and National Service men. A man does not become an officer in the first few days or weeks; but he is marked down as suitable or not suitable as an officer almost within those first few hours of his joining the Army; it is certainly in the first few days. I am not suggesting that, in general, there is anything very much wrong with that.
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I was watching the process of selection going on in a battalion just the other day, and it is perfectly clear that in many cases it stands out a mile—to use a coloquialism—which of the recruits coming in are potential officers. It is due to the advantage of education which, either by luck or ability, the boy has got. There is no doubt that because of those advantages he is officer material rather than the chap who, perhaps through pure bad luck, has not had those advantages. For the mass of the selection of officers that is no doubt the right and the inevitable way to do it, but it does mean that in the Army today there are, in effect, two distinct ladders of promotion; there is the other-ranks' ladder of promotion which leads from private to W.O.1, and there is the officers' ladder of promotion

which leads from second-lieutenant to field-marshal.
Those two ladders of promotion diverge at the very first rung, and once a man has set his foot climbing one ladder or the other it is not impossible but certainly extremely difficult for him to pass over from one to the other. Again, I am not saying that is entirely wrong, and I am not saying that in at any rate some measure it is not inevitable, but it has unfortunate consequences.
We all know Napoleon's hackneyed phrase that "every soldier has a field-marshal's baton in his knapsack." It is more true to say of our soldiers today that the other ranks have only a W.O.1's stick in his knapsack; once they have begun climbing the other-ranks' ladder they have very little opportunity to pass over to the commissioned ladder. It is not impossible, and it is occasionally done. I have not the figures, and no doubt the right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong, but speaking from memory I think that something of the order of 100 senior N.C.O.s each year pass on to commissioned rank. I do not know the number of senior N.C.O.s in the Army, but it runs into tens of thousands, and there is a very tiny trickle going into the commissioned ranks.
Again it is true to say that a great majority of senior N.C.O.s probably do not themselves wish to become commissioned officers; and I say perfectly frankly that some of them are not suitable for commissioned rank; but I think there ought to be more than 100 a year who wish to go on and who should have the opportunity of going on. I am bound to say that I found in sergeants' messes, and generally amongst senior N.C.O.s, a certain feeling of dissatisfaction about this.
I might well be asked, "What did you do about it?" I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman would agree, but I do not think it is a matter for new regulations. The regulations are there; there is no bar by regulation to the senior N.C.O. getting a commission. All the procedures are laid down, and I went into that most carefully. It is a question of the attitude of mind throughout the Army, through the commanding officers and the like, and I do ask the right hon. Gentleman to continue at any


rate the pressure which I tried to exercise to modify prejudices—and there are prejudices which he will encounter in this field—because a cross channel between the two ladders of promotion at the level of the senior N.C.O. is needed, and the way must be cleared for it. It would be of great value if that were done.
It is in that connection that I wish to ask some questions about the new boys' battalion or school which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned. It may be an admirable thing in many ways. We do not know very much about it, but in the announcement in which we were told about it there occurred a phrase which gave me a good deal of concern, because we were told that the aim of this boys' battalion or school was to produce soldiers of high calibre who will later become regular warrant officers and N.C.O.s of the Infantry of the Line. That sounds as if it is to be a sort of N.C.O.s' school.

Mr. Head: I did add that they may also gain a commission. I would point out that the primary object of this school is to get hold of boys who had intended to join the Army eventually, who would go to this school when they left their primary school and spend their time preparing for it, and it would be a school for N.C.O.s and warrant officers, who, if they merited it, could obtain commissions in the Army.

Mr. Strachey: I quite understand that. I intended to ask for that assurance, which I imagined I should get. There will, of course, be nothing to stop a boy who has graduated from this school and become a senior N.C.O. getting a commission, any more than at present, but it really comes down to the main point I was making, that there ought to be considerably wider opportunities in practice for the senior N.C.O., whether from this school or not, to graduate to commissioned rank, otherwise the foundation of a school of this sort is really pre-selection with a vengeance.
As I have said, I do not altogether like the fact that a man should at the very outset of his Army career have to put his foot either on the rung of the commissioned ladder or on the rung of the other-rank's ladder, but that the principle of pre-selection should extend right down into his boyhood is something we do not

like at all. We suggest that the right hon. Gentleman should look very carefully at the way this school is run, and at its future publicity, so that he makes it a general school for the Army and not a school to manufacture N.C.O.s. It should be a school to manufacture good soldiers who will find whatever their appropriate rank is.
With the excellent curriculum which the right hon. Gentleman says he will give the boys, I should have thought that a great number of them ought to find themselves with commissioned rank sooner or later. After all, great as is the need for non-commissioned officers, the need for commissioned officers, as the right hon. Gentleman has been stressing, is equally great, so that I should have thought there needed to be some recasting of the way in which the school has been presented to us in those respects.

Mr. A. Woodburn: It is pre-destination.

Mr. Strachey: As my right hon. Friend says, with his Scottish Calvinism, there is a little too much pre-destination here rather than pre-selection.
I now wish to say something about the training side, upon which the right hon. Gentleman only just touched. The lesson of Korea has shown that the training work of the Army has proved to have been on exceedingly good lines.
Perhaps I might venture to tell the House a story I heard from a man recently returned from Korea. I do not vouch for its accuracy, and he could not vouch for it either, but I thought it was interesting. This man, one of the heroes of the Korean operations, told me that there was current in the Chinese Armies, so they had learned from prisoners, a story that when the Chinese forces were facing three hills in the hands of United Nations Forces which they desired to attack, their men were told, "If you see bonfires burning on a hill, that means it is in the hands of one particular member of the United Nations Forces. If you hear a great deal of shouting going on from the second of the hills, that means it is in the hands of another certain member of the United Nations Forces. If you see that the third hill is absolutely silent and dark, that means it is occupied by the British Forces, and you should then choose to attack another hill." I think


that is a tribute to the training which our men have received.
The right hon. Gentleman also spoke about the colonial troops, and we were slightly amused there because of the very strong pressure which had been put upon us to make great developments in the raising of colonial forces. He is going ahead with some limited raising of colonial forces, just as we were, but, as he told us very frankly and very clearly today, he is up against just those same limiting factors—and they are very real—which made it inevitable, in our view, that we could go ahead only at quite a modest pace in this field. On that, at any rate, there is really no difference between us.
He went on to tell us of his efforts in the field of combing the tail and sharpening the teeth, and everyone, I am sure, will congratulate him on going on with that work. However, I am sure he would agree that what is happening is that the work of the Templer Committee, carried on, as he says, by General Callander, is bearing fruit. I am quite sure it will bear increasing fruit, and it is very good that that is so. Of course, there has never been any suggestion that the War Office should be exempt from cuts. In fact, it was severely cut both in the time of my predecessor and in my own time, and the right hon. Gentleman tells us that now it has once again gone down still further. No doubt, it flourishes on these cuts, and I think it is right that it should help to bear the burden, too.

Mr. Head: I cannot forbear from saying that the right hon. Gentleman's particular cut was a cut between establishments, and that in the actual strength of the War Office, in effect, there was not a reduction of personnel, but a rationalisation of the establishments.

Mr. Strachey: We always can, of course, dispute what the actual effect of a cut is. There is nothing in that; but that does remind me of one question, to which, I dare say, there is a simple answer, I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman. He tells us he is having a 10 per cent. cut in the War Office numbers. It seems strange, then, that Vote 3 of the Estimates—the Vote for the War Office—should have gone up by £560,000. Perhaps the explanation of that is that the right hon. Gentleman is increasing the

emoluments of the remaining ones a good deal. At any rate, the cost is not going down. However, I am quite sure that this very strenuous work being undertaken by highly distinguished officers in cutting down by any possible means the tail of the Army is bearing fruit and will bear fruit.
Finally, I should like to say just one word on the heavy commitments which the Army must face and which the right hon. Gentleman must face. We must all have been struck by the words he had to use in his Memorandum, where he says that
These commitments have compelled me to reduce our active Army at home to negligible proportions.
I am not blaming him for that for one moment, of course; but there again I cannot forbear from saying that he is finding he has got to face the same problem as we faced when we had those responsibilities, and which we were not always given very much credit for having to face. These commitments which do necessitate the Army in this country being at so low a level face him in just the same way. They are imposed by the general defence policy of the country, and that is imposed very largely by world events, and there is no easy way, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, of overcoming them.

Sir Waldron Smithers: The right hon. Gentleman is talking about world events. He has made, if I may say so, a rather moderate speech—more moderate than I had expected. May I ask him this question? Has he ever publicly renounced the creed he once proclaimed, that the coming of Communism would alone render our problems soluble?

Mr. Strachey: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman expected me to make a highly contentious political speech on the Army Estimates. I am extremely sorry to disappoint him, if I have disappointed him, in that respect, but I will give him a promise that when we come back to political and economic debates I will make a highly contentious political and economic speech. Meantime, the answer to his question is, "Yes."
What I was going to say in conclusion was simply that I join with the right hon. Gentleman in his tribute to the extraordinary skill and devotion which


the British Army and the British soldiers of all ranks are showing in these really terribly heavy burdens which they have to bear in every corner of the world today. They have a wonderful record, and they achieved a wonderful renown.

5.36 p.m.

Colonel J. H. Harrison: I should like to take up one point that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) has made, and that is about the interchange of ladder as between the commissioned and the noncommissioned ranks. I speak in regard to our Reserve Forces. While I was commanding a Territorial battalion for 4½ years I sent forward a certain number of names of men in the ranks for commissions. Whether the number actually granted by the War Office was so small as the right hon. Gentleman suggested is the case, I cannot say, but I think that, on the whole, there is a genuine desire for those who have served well to get a recommendation when they are worthy of it, and, when they have not become too ingrained with non-commissioned rank, to be able to hold commissioned rank.
I should like to speak about the Reserve Forces. The Prime Minister the other day pointed out how "naked" we were in this country because of our commitments abroad. He spoke of the steps he had taken in regard to troops at depots, and about forming a Home Guard. I think that we are all agreed on both sides of the House that in preparing we are doing our utmost to try to prevent war. At the same time, it would not be realistic if we did not face up to what would happen if that great calamity of war came upon us. How ready are our Reserve Forces?
I had the honour to command an infantry Territorial battalion for 4¼ years up to August last year, and I should like to trace the history of this Reserve Army of ours in the last five years because I believe that it has changed tremendously in character compared with what we thought before 1939 a Reserve Army should be.
Before 1939 we looked upon a Reserve Army as a volunteer civilian army. It was based on villages and towns. The recruits were friends together in those villages and towns. I am certain that the

War Office took the right step in the conditions prevailing after the war to introduce the National Service element into our Territorial Army, but I would say that today it is far more a national Reserve Army than a Territorial Army as we understand that term.
What happened? We had in the first place commanding officers who had to try to recruit a large number of volunteers. Volunteers were obtained from three sources: men who had volunteered before the war and came back; men who had been Regular soldiers, and who, after the war, took civilian jobs, but who could not help but go on being soldiers, and who came back to the Territorial Army as volunteers; and men who were conscripted during the war, who liked soldiering, who came back to civilian jobs but who wanted to go on soldiering in their spare time. Those were the three sources of our volunteers, all being men who had war experience.
I think some people, and perhaps the whole country, were disappointed that recruitment figures were not greater, but in my opinion that was understandable. Many men had commitments, such as getting their home going or getting reestablished in their civilian occupations, trying to make up time they had lost compared with those who had not been away.
There were sufficient recruits in all units to form a cadre of volunteers—to make trained leaders, both commissioned and non-commissioned—to be able to cope with the National Service men when they came into the force. We began receiving the National Service men in the summer of 1950. That flow was interrupted for six months and then went on regularly. Last year was the first year we had them at camp.
As my right hon. Friend has said, 25 per cent. of the National Service men coming into the Territorial Army have become volunteers. That is a good and high percentage, but I think it is fair to point out that the other 75 per cent. are there because they have been ordered to be there. They have no desire to be there but, while they are there and while they are in camp, they carry out all the duties allotted to them efficiently and well, with one or two minor exceptions. Under this new system, we have a body


of competent soldiers, and that is a great advantage—trained men are coming into the Army instead of our having to teach volunteer recruits the elements of squad drill and sloping arms as we did before the war.
I believe that the remaining 25 per cent. of National Service men who have volunteered represents an unnaturally high percentage. Some units were keen to get all these men to volunteer. Others, perhaps, did not do so much. I talked to a large number of these men and I believe some of them volunteered because they thought, for one reason or another, that they would be better off—financially for example. I do not think we ought to count on all the 25 per cent, continuing as volunteers at the end of their 3½years.
A percentage of them, however, are extremely keen, and it is to these men that we must look for our volunteers in the future. It is distressing to note that the number of the old volunteers is decreasing. There has been a decrease of 10 per cent. in the last 13 months. My right hon. Friend hopes that the number will increase, and I hope he is right, but personally I do not think that is very likely.
There, then, is the background to our national Army today, and in another two or three years it will reach its full numbers. How will it conflict with industry? By Act of Parliament all these men have to do 15 days' annual training. On the other hand, it is only by making our economic position sound that we can afford and pay for this large national Army and for the other Services. Although this is a trained Reserve Army it is still, in the main, a civilian Army. Can we make the Army service of these men compatible with the maximum output from them in industry?
As a commanding officer, I usually found it difficult to get time off for a man to attend camp during what is known as the holiday period. Some firms close down for a week in this period so that every one can go on holiday, but the majority, and particularly the smaller firms, send a percentage of their personnel, which may be as high as 10 per cent., on holiday from mid-June to about mid-September. While that 10 per cent. is away the firms are strained to keep their business going, and if any

more are away their business goes backwards and production drops, which is the last thing we want. They are not keen, therefore, to release Army personnel during the holiday months.
When we have this very large Reserve Army I suggest that we must no longer treat it as a volunteer Army which needs a camp by the seaside and a pleasant time. I believe many men prefer that their training during the 15 days should be hard training so that they know they are doing a job which is necessary for the defence of the country. We fight wars in the winter and in the spring as well as in the summer, and, if we have to call up this large number of men, I suggest that there would be much less disruption of our industrial production if more and more of the training could be done in the early spring and the late autumn.
It may not be possible for these men to go under canvas at that time of the year, but we have already heard how empty are many of the barracks of this country. These men could easily be put into these barracks and could do their training from there. I ask my right hon. Friend to consider this suggestion, which is made to keep the Army as efficient as possible and, at the same time, to cause the least possible disruption of our industrial machine, on which we depend so much.
I turn now to the administration of the Territorial Army. In the past—and now—a great deal of it has been done by the county associations, and I see in the Estimates that another £850,000 is being granted to the county Territorial associations. Having served on one, and having received an enormous amount of assistance from them as a commanding officer, I should be the last person to cast any aspersions upon them.
They carry out a vital function, but in my opinion they are ceasing to be used to carry out the function for which they were formed, which was to encourage the recruiting of volunteers within their county. That work has now been taken out of their hands by the creation of our national Army.
I suggest to my right hon. Friend, therefore, that he should investigate whether the county Territorial associations are the best medium through which


to carry out all the work which is now being thrust upon them and whether he is satisfied that he is getting value for money. For example, is it wise for all clothing and kit to be divided between the Ordnance branch of the Army and the county Territorial associations?
I can well see that there is an extremely strong case for the associations looking after the upkeep of Territorial drill halls, accommodation for the permanent staff and so on but, in asking us to vote this extra money, I think my right hon. Friend should look at the position again to see whether they are being asked to do the work for which they were originally formed and whether they are the most efficient and cheapest medium to carry out what he wants done.
In the Reserve Army we hope to have something like 12 divisions. How soon can they be ready? That is a question which I think no commanding officer or ex-commanding officer would like to answer. I suggest, six to eight weeks—very much quicker than in 1939.

Mr. Bellenger: The whole 12 divisions?

Colonel Harrison: I was speaking as an ex-commanding officer about most of the units which have been in being for four or five years. I do not think any commanding officer would like to say that his unit would be ready in less than six to eight weeks, particularly at the moment, when he is making up the strength with reservists who may not have been in training for four or five years.
We know our commitments abroad. That is one of the reasons why I suggest spreading our annual training, because we might then have more troops actually under arms if anything happened in the spring or autumn. We all know that 30 days in camp is of more value to a soldier than two lots of 15 days. It may well be worth while considering, particularly in the larger towns, having one or two brigades doing 30 days in one year instead of spreading the period over two years, so that we may have Reserves in a high state of readiness.
I pass to the question of manpower raised by my right hon. Friend. He said that in this call-up in the next year we were reaching the bottom of the Reserve

barrel. I would suggest, although perhaps it may not be acceptable, that it is not the absolute bottom. There are still in this country a large number of men of Army age, at least under 45 years, who have never done any active service with any of the fighting Services.
I believe that there is, at this time of emergency, justification for requiring all men under 45 who have not served in any of the Services to register, and we ought to see whether, in the present state of the country, they are in jobs of national importance. I am quite certain that there are a number of men who, for example, may have worked on the land during the war, and who are now probably at the age of 28 or 31 clerks in stockbroking offices, and I do not see why all these men should escape all forms of National Service.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggesting that stockbrokers are not doing work of national importance?

Colonel Harrison: I did not say that I should never consider stockbroking work as being of national importance. However, there is a reserve if we need it at any time, because I think it will be found that there are quite a number in that category who are not at the present time doing work of national importance.
I turn to one last point in which I have been brought into contact purely in my civilian capacity. Before I entered this House, I was often asked to give lectures to the Army both at home and abroad. I would suggest that an investigation of the whole of the Education Corps of the Army might be an extremely wise step. I believe that it is not right that a clever man called up for National Service to be trained to be a soldier should become a sergeant quite quickly in the Army Education Corps. He is far too valuable a man.
If he has the brains to teach other men who have not learned the three Rs well, he ought to be used in another branch of the Army, and if there is any education to be done in the Army it should be done by permanent civilian instructors. I do not think that it is the primary task, although it may be a useful one, of the Army to educate a man if he has failed, maybe not entirely owing to his own fault, to pass the elementary tests in education. I think that


a great deal of that education should be done outside normal training hours.
I make the plea, having seen quite a lot of very capable National Service men who are sergeants in the Educational Corps that they should be moved where their abilities can be of greater service to the country, and that the whole of the education of National Service men in training hours should be investigated, particularly the employment of outside lecturers, of whom I was one. Quite often, I arrived at some unit and was told, "We did not know you were coming; they are all out; do you mind not doing anything about it?" That, of course, has come to an end with the smaller units but there was a leakage and wastage of time, and I know that my right hon. Friend is glad to investigate this sort of thing. I offer this to him from my own experience.
The most important point, however, which I should like to reiterate before I sit down, is the spreading of annual training over a greater period of the year.

5.55 p.m.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: I can agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) when he said in his closing remarks that it would be worth while the Secretary of State investigating the Royal Army Education Corps. That was mainly set up during the war to provide an opportunity for National Service men, who were likely to be serving for some considerable time, to fit themselves for the period when the war would come to an end and they would take their place in civilian life once again. I think that now we are not calling up young men before 18 years of age who, in the main, have finished their education, the right hon. Gentleman might, when he is examining his "tail" have a look at the R.A.E.C.
I personally have been struck by the large number of young men—well-educated young men, it is true—who are teaching others, when education, after all, is only a very small proportion of the time which the Army spends in its military training. I would rather see the period of National Service reduced to allow the National Service man to go back to his educational activities if he wants to, if that is the vocation which he has chosen in civilian life, rather than

we should keep a large number of young men merely teaching National Service men academic subjects.
I must say that it is rather a strange thing that when we have debates on the wider issues of defence, we have a much more hectic time than when we come down on the Service Estimates to considering details. That may be due to the fact that in the last defence debate we had two right hon. Members from the Front Benches of entirely different calibre from those speaking for the Government and Opposition today. The Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) might be compared more with Generals Bradley and Patton and the Secretary of State and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. J. Strachey), to the A branch of the Army rather than to the G Branch. The fact remains that today we are discussing these details in a comparatively calm atmosphere. It may he that it is the calm, as my right hon. Friend intimated in reply to the hon. Member for Orpington (Sir W. Smithers), which precedes the storm of those wider economic matters in which he told us he would take part later.
In regard to recruiting, I think that the Secretary of State and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West, to whom the Secretary of State paid tribute, have done right in submitting a scheme which does at least offer greater attractions in these days of full employment to the man who wants to make the Service his life career. Therefore, I welcome the 22 years' scheme with its breaks if the individual wants to, at three years or multiples thereof. I would, however, ask the right hon. Gentleman this: This scheme, although it relates to other ranks—and in my opinion is a good one—does not, of course, apply to officers, and I would like to know from him, when he comes to reply, what is to be the position of the young officer, whom he wants to recruit, who wishes also to change his mind after three, six or nine years, or whatever the time may be. Will he be allowed to resign?
I am bound to say that since I left the War Office I have got out of touch with some of the details and I am not at all sure what is the position today about an officer who may want to change his mind. I do not want to encourage him to do so,


and I believe that there are remarkable opportunities for young men to make a successful career in the Army. I think I once heard Field-Marshal Montgomery say in a lecture that there was a chance of something like one in two for the junior officer to reach the rank of lieut.-colonel before he finished his Army career. If that is true then the Army offers a very good career in the commissioned ranks for the young man who wishes to make it so.
The right hon. Gentleman will have to do something more than he has already done if he is to recruit larger numbers of officers and other ranks to the Regular Army. The main consideration is not pay. I agree with the illustration he gave of the amount of pay a man can get after a certain number of years' service; today, the pay of other ranks, and indeed of officers, in the Army compares very favourably with the basic rate of pay, although perhaps not with the earnings, that can be obtained by their opposite numbers in civil life.
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman has to pay a little more attention to housing and to other amenities which can be got by civilians. I know that under my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington we passed an Act of Parliament which put housing in the Services on its proper level. I wish that the right hon. Gentleman could have given us a little more information—although in such a wide subject it is difficult to know what to concentrate on—about what is actually happening with the housing of married officers at home and overseas.
On overseas stations, I recently put a Question to the Secretary of State asking him how many visits to overseas stations had been made by members of the Army Council. The answer I got led me to believe that no visits had been paid by members of the Army Council, to stations far overseas. I was very pleased to hear the right hon. Gentleman say that he would have liked to visit our Army in Korea. I think the troops out there would have welcomed it. The right hon. Gentleman said that some of his hon. Friends had been in Korea but, from an answer which the Prime Minister gave to me, it is no longer possible either for Members supporting the Government or for Members who sit on these benches to visit our troops out there.
The Prime Minister laid it down, for reasons which I think were trivial, that it would not improve the state of morale of the troops. I quite agree that their morale is good, but why should United States Congressmen visit their troops and some of ours who are serving alongside U.S. units—apart from the physical consideration that they are nearer to them—.while Members of this House are not to have the same opportunity?

Mr. Ian Harvey: Does the right hon. Gentleman not consider that the visits of these Congressmen may, in fact, have tended to reduce morale?

Mr. Bellenger: I am putting my suggestion in all seriousness to the right hon. Gentleman. I am not personally a volunteer to go out there, but I do remember that during the war Members of this House were for some time not allowed by the present Prime Minister to visit our troops overseas. It was not until early in 1945, when representations were made to him from both sides of the House, that he permitted some M.P.s to visit Italy, and very welcome those visits were to the troops, although on that occasion two hon. Members lost their lives during the journey.

Mr. Head: I would like to clear up this point by making it plain that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is not forbidding any hon. Member to go to Korea. What he said was that he was not prepared at the moment to organise a delegation from this House to go out there, but that hon. Members could go on their own initiative.

Mr. Bellenger: Is this what the right hon. Gentleman is saying: that the Government, who have the facilities in transport and in other ways out there, are not prepared to put them at the disposal of hon. Members, but if hon. Members like to pay their own expenses they can go? I do not think, if that is what the Prime Minister said, that it is fair, and it does not meet the point that I am putting to the Minister.
In all our discussions on this matter there is, constantly overshadowing what we say, the feeling that war may be very near. None of us likes to admit it, yet the policy of this Government and of their predecessors, the Labour Government, is based on the consciousness


that war—whether we call it "the cold war" or whatever we call it—might come about at any moment. It is in that light that our discussions ought to be framed this afternoon.
The House is greatly obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for the wide scope of his address and for the details he gave us of the progress made in certain branches of Army training and recruitment, but I was struck, as I listened to his speech, with the air of unreality to the problem in hand. It is true that, in passing, the right hon. Gentleman mentioned aspects like the Reserve Army, but he said very little about them, and I was led to believe that what he did not say about them conveyed a great deal to those who understand the position.
I want to emphasise that portion of the speech in which he said that 36 per cent. of our Regular Army was now involved in active service. That is a figure which I am sure will please those who sit in the Kremlin. If they have the comparable figure for the United States Army they can be very gratified with the cold war and not deem it necessary to convert that cold war into something of far greater intensity. There they have our trained men, and if this applies to the other Services, it is very serious, because 36 per cent. of our Army is deployed in different parts of the world instead of being concentrated in the really vital areas, namely, Europe and the Middle East.
The right hon. Gentleman should consider what size he wants the Regular Army to be. Frequently in this House I have mentioned a figure, a target, a ceiling, or whatever we call it, to which the Regular Army should aim or rise. I have expressed that figure as 250,000, but I have never heard in precise terms just what it is that the War Office want, in regard to the Regular Army. If 250,000 is the right figure, why does not the right hon. Gentleman say so? Is he afraid that he might not reach it and that, therefore, we should criticise him?
In a debate like this it is preferable that we should know precisely what the War Office have in mind for the Regular Army, as we could easily ascertain according to age groups how many the right hon. Gentleman will get from the National Service groups as they are called

up. The Regular Army is now largely concentrated in Europe and in the Middle East. Judging from the talks which Field-Marshal Montgomery and others gave to certain hon. Members of the House when they visited S.H.A.P.E. headquarters, it would seem that so long as the other N.A.T.O. Powers do their share, the position is not so serious in Europe in the event of an attack as a lot of people would have us believe.
I have listened to my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington and my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) constantly concentrating our minds on the large number of Russian divisions already mobilised on the perimeters of Central, Northern and Southern Europe ready to strike if they want to. If those figures are taken completely out of their context, they are alarming. They are bad enough I quite agree, but I like to think that on a comparative basis as between Russian troops and British troops and, I venture to suggest, German troops—that may be a subject for debate later on—the disparity would not be so serious as sometimes we are led to believe.
I think it was in an answer to myself that Field-Marshal Montgomery said that with a certain number of divisions—far less than the Prime Minister mentioned in a previous speech—he could hold a line for a certain period in Europe if he were told to do so. What he went on to say—and I am not disclosing any secret talks—was that he was far more alarmed at the reserve situation. He could hold a line for a certain period, but it would be difficult for him to encompass the retreat of the enemy if he did not have adequate reserves.
The reserves would consist of far more troops than the British Army could provide. The hon. and gallant Member for Eye mentioned the question of British reserves and how they are organised. I wonder if the Secretary of State for War would tell us how soon it would take to get some of those reserve divisions to where the commander of the Western Front would want them. It might be comforting to know—as comforting as Field-Marshal Montgomery's remarks to some of us.
The hon. and gallant Member for Eye talked about units not being ready for six weeks. I presume he meant by that not only kitted out but each man


equipped with his weapons, so that when the men were transported overseas they would be complete as fighting units. If that is true about the units, I wonder what is the position about the formations. In the First World War the B.E.F. consisted of four divisions. The reserves came afterwards it is true, but it was a long time, and there was a lack of trained reserves in those days, though we had the Territorial Force which was far more efficient as a fighting Force than it is today.

Colonel J. H. Harrison: When I said six weeks it was the minimum that a commanding officer felt necessary before taking his men into battle, and I say that having commanded a unit. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the Territorial Force before the 1914–18 war being more efficient than the Force today. I must take exception to that, because the Territorial Army today, with its National Service men, each having two years' training behind him, is a far more efficient force.

Mr. Bellenger: But the Territorial Army has not got the National Service men yet, except in small numbers. In those days of which I have been speaking a man volunteered for long periods of training. Today, we are only starting to decant the National Service men out of the Regular Army into the Territorial Army. No doubt, in two or three years' time the hon. and gallant Gentleman will be quite right when he talks of large numbers in the Reserve Forces, but the answer to the hon. and gallant Gentleman is that today they are simply not there. Whether he is right about the six weeks' period for readiness I do not know, but I want to know from the right hon. Gentleman how soon he thinks he can provide those reserves to back up Field-Marshal Montgomery, who, probably, would be the commander of our Regular Army, and move them to where they would be operationally required.
Might I recall that B.A.O.R. is at present serviced by a large number of civilians, who happen to be in uniform. They are Germans, civilians, although the situation might arise when Germany becomes part of the European defence Community, that they would be soldiers. I personally hope and believe that that

will happen, but, if not, the right hon. gentleman will be faced with the loss of 30,000 or 40,000 German civilians, who, at the present, are undertaking very responsible duties for the British Army serving in Germany.
Everyone knows about it, so what I am saying is not secret. Only recently Dr. Adenauer, the German Chancellor, asked for these Germans to be demobilised. This is a problem which the right hon. Gentleman did not mention today and which has to be faced by B.A.O.R. If they are not completely self-contained at the right time, they will not be very effective as fighting formations.
There is one other branch of our Forces which, I fear, is certainly ill-equipped and starved of personnel. The right hon. Gentleman, in the Memorandum accompanying these Estimates, and in what he said today, admitted it. We have practically no defence force in this country. This is the fortress, and this would be the target at which the enemy would attempt to deliver a shattering blow as early as possible. The enemy have read the various memoirs published since the war, including those of the Prime Minister as well as of Hitler's generals, not to overlook all that was revealed at the Nuremburg trials. He will have read how the Germans failed because they were not able to subdue England.
As the Prime Minister indicated in his speech in the defence debate the other day, if an attack were launched on this country we would have mobile groups to meet it. Would the Secretary of State for War tell us a little more about those mobile groups? Has the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, merely put some arms amongst the cooks and batmen and the rest of them just as we arm all personnel when a situation becomes desperate at the front? Has he merely done that and called them a defence force?
Would the right hon. Gentleman tell us how they are organised? Are they organised on a depot basis, a training regiment basis, in small reserve depots or what? He told us that some of the units were in companies and platoons. That may be very well for guarding their own particular vulnerable points like bridges and so forth, but how far could they really be termed mobile. To be mobile,


troops have to be organised at least in batteries and battalions and certainly in not less than companies if they are to contend with large numbers of parachute troops.
Ever since I was at the War Office, in days when we were demobilising rather than recruiting, I have wondered what would happen to Anti-Aircraft Command, the largest Command in this country, and on more than one occasion I have offered the House views on how it should be recruited. In the main, our antiaircraft defences are static and are grouped around the positions which would be most likely to bear the impact of the enemy's strike.
Would it not be possible for the right hon. Gentleman to recruit from those areas, and put into the Territorial Army or the Supplementary Reserve, large numbers of men who are no longer young enough to be as mobile as the so-called mobile groups but which could serve at such stations?
When we look at the anti-aircraft gun positions in some parts of London we see civilians living in the barracks or huts which the soldiers used to occupy. Surely it would be possible to recruit for our anti-aircraft defences large numbers from the static population in reserved occupations who have to stay at their posts and turn out the weapons to back up the Fighting Forces.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: The right hon. Gentleman is advocating something which I have canvassed at various times. A difficulty has been put to me, and I wonder if the right hon. Gentleman has a solution to it. He is suggesting that people who are employed in factories should be recruited to man the defences of their factory and the surrounding area. He is wrong in doing so, because the factory defences will not be in the area itself but on a perimeter 20 or 30 miles away.

Mr. Bellenger: I agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman that all the antiaircraft defences would not be close to the factory, but the lighter guns used to combat low flying aircraft which get through would be near the factory, and surely it would be possible to recruit some men for that purpose. At any rate, I should like the right hon. Gentleman to tell us his views on the proposal.
I am also concerned about the liaison between the Army and Civil Defence. It seems to me that we are tackling these matters piecemeal. The Home Office is dealing with Civil Defence, as I suppose it must do, but I wish we could hear a little more about liaison, because there is no doubt that in war a proportion of the Army would in certain circumstances—such as, in the event of a heavy attack—be concerned in Civil Defence.
I have dealt with one or two salient points, and I will now let the right hon. Gentleman attack them and demolish them if he can. At any rate, they are pushed into his territory and he will have to deal with them if he wants to convince us that he is a Secretary of State for War whom we can all applaud in spite of various party differences. I have long said that this matter should be above parties and in that respect, although, obviously, I cannot speak for my party as a whole—[Laughter.]—an ever-growing number seem to be adopting that role today—I have always expressed my thoughts as they have occurred to me and I hope I shall not incur the same displeasure from official quarters as have some of those who, as the right hon. Gentleman said, have caused disruption in the ranks in two Divisions.
There may be something constructive in what the right hon. Gentleman said in one respect. It is something out of which we cannot make a lot of party capital, because we are all implicated in it. He said that a substantial number of employees, presumably military and civil, are engaged at the War Office in dealing with letters from Members of Parliament. That applied in the days when I was at the War Office, although we then had more letters because we had a larger Army.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that many queries could be dealt with without letters from Members of Parliament and long investigations and replies by the Secretary of State. Members of Parliament are often glad to pass on to their constituents an official letter, feeling that they have then done their duty. I do not think that is the way to do it, although I am not presuming to tell my colleagues the way to deal with their constituents. However, I have only troubled the right hon. Gentleman about matters to which I have not had the answer or to which I wanted an official explanation,


knowing that it was hopeless for me to give the right answer. I hope he will agree that my letters to him are very infrequent.
In conclusion—again, I do not know how far this will meet with the approval of my right hon. and hon. Friends, but I put it forward for what it is worth—the Territorial Army was inaugurated by a very great Secretary of State. I hope I shall not offend any other right hon. Gentlemen who have occupied that position when I say that I do not believe there has ever been such a great Secretary of State as the late Lord Haldane. Although he was a lawyer and, presumably, came unprepared to the War Office, Lord Haldane introduced into our Reserve system something which has lasted for nearly 50 years.
In view of the situation that we have to face in the next 10, 15 or 20 years, and particularly as we have now lost vast areas which previously provided us with large numbers of troops, we ought to apply fresh minds to the problem of defence if we are to remain an imperial nation, or, if hon. Members do not like that—[HON. MEMBERS: "We do like it."]—a Commonwealth.
I urge the right hon. Gentleman to convene another committee like the Esher Committee. The Esher Committee did good work in its day. That is something which could be started without a great deal of opposition from any part of the House. If the right hon. Gentleman did that, and right hon. and hon. Members with wide knowledge of the subject served on it, he might produce a long-term plan. Today, he has not spoken much about that, but has concentrated more on his short-term problems.
I wish the right hon. Gentleman luck. I say that sincerely. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West, dealt with the same theme in his speech. Naturally, we must wish the right hon. Gentleman luck, because times are far too serious for us to wish him anything else.

6.30 p.m.

Brigadier Christopher Peto: It is a curious thing that the former Secretary of State for War, the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), the present Secretary of

State for War and the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) all put the same point in the forefront of their speeches, namely, the shortage of manpower and the difficulty of attracting officers and other ranks to join the Services. The difficulty with which I want to deal is that of attracting potential officers.
Many reasons have been given why the shortage of officers is now so evident. In Vote A, which we are supposed to be discussing today amongst others, the figure is given as a decrease over last year of 4,000 officers, and in Vote I the decrease in pay and allowances for officers is given as no less than £950,000. When I first read those Votes, I wondered whether the decrease was intentional or accidental. Having listened to the Secretary of State today—and, if I may, I should like to compliment my right hon. Friend on his interesting and excellent speech—I am quite convinced that it is not accidental, but because we have not been able to offer the necessary incentives to attract the young men who should be joining.
Last year, when he was Secretary of State for War, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West, was quoted as saying in his Memorandum—

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;

House counted, and 40 Members being present—

Brigadier Peto: I was in process of saying that at about this time last year the right hon. Member said:
I am still not satisfied with the Regular officer situation and with the comparative dearth of candidates of high quality for Regular commissions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 715.]
The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw also referred to this point and said that, though the suggested improvements put forward today by my right hon. Friend were in every respect very good, they did not apply to the officers. I had that in mind also. It is an excellent idea that a man may now join for 22 years and may leave if he so desires after three years have passed or subsequently, but that does not apply to officers as far as I know. Then the warrant officer or sergeant who leaves after 22 years gets a pension of


nearly £6 per week. What is even more important, he has a practical guarantee of employment on completing his 22 years' service.
Where does the officer get a similiar Guarantee? I have never heard of such a thing and I have not heard it today. An officer, after giving 22 years or even longer service, as many do, has no guarantee of further employment and it is one of the grievous deterrents to young men joining the Army.
I must disclose a slight interest in this, since I am colonel of a regiment of the R.A.C. I often meet potential officers and others who are trying to make up their minds about joining. I find that one of the main reasons which deter a boy from making a plunge for a Regular commission as opposed to a National Service commission is that he has no feeling of security in life after finishing his service. He asks himself what he can do at the age of 35 or thereabouts if he is a failure in the Army. I do not think that the Secretary of State for War touched on that sufficiently. I wish he would say a little more about the guarantees that can be given or the hopes that can be held out to potential officers to persuade them to go for a Regular commission rather than a National Service one.
In my opinion, the main reasons for the shortage of officers, at any rate in the R.A.C., are as follows. We have to compete now with the call made by the R.A.F. Before the war it was not much of a competitor, being a small force, and it did not seem to clash with us. Today, however, many boys are attracted to the R.A.F. who might otherwise have joined the R.A.C. because both have mechanical attractions, although they did not compete with each other to any extent before the war.
I agree with the Secretary of State that it is ignorance about the Army and all that it means which, in the main, causes boys to decide not to join. My right hon. Friend said that parents and headmasters are often ignorant of what the Army offers today. I find that, too, going round to various schools as I do, meeting boys and receiving letters from them asking me about the Army. It is extremely difficult to tell them what it means in a few words at a short interview.
I want to suggest ways of attracting boys towards the Army while they are at school, in addition to the two projects put forward by my right hon. Friend—the excellent idea of the Military College of Science and that boys of 16 should go to a separate educational establishment after leaving school with a view to qualifying for a commission. We cannot over-emphasise the attraction of visual propaganda and I believe that exciting and interesting War Office films, portraying various aspects of Army training and fighting, would be valuable. Also some degree of assistance might be provided by giving them opportunities to see the Trooping the Colour, the Sovereign's Parade at Sandhurst and the Royal Military Tournament. At present practically no boys ever go to any of those functions.
I also suggest that someone like the present Minister of Defence, Lord Alexander, or Field Marshal Montgomery might, by means of B.B.C. broadcasts perhaps once a year give a resume or an up-to-date talk, mainly for boys, with a view to making them think about the Army as a career. [Laughter.] The hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would not agree with that.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: That would kill it.

Brigadier Peto: Lesser mortals, perhaps, than the two I have mentioned, who are up-to-date and are employed either at the War Office or in some other capacity, could, by invitation, go to schools and lecture with slides or with the cinematograph. These are some of the smaller ways which could be used to encourage young people to think about the Army as a career. At present they do not do so.
I should like to raise a point concerning officers who are at present serving. I can quote a recent instance where, out of the ordinary establishment of a regiment, including those who were absent sick, away on courses, on leave and so forth, there were 34 officers. That figure included National Service officers also. As against that, no fewer than 20 Regular officers were away detached on various staff duties. It is almost impossible for any commanding officer to get efficient training from a regiment with that number of Regular


officers away on permanent duties at any one time. It is one of the most difficult factors to be competed with. There must be an answer to it. What it is, I do not know, but it cannot be right to take away most of the middle piece of a regiment—all Regulars—and to have them detached all over the place on different staff duties.
Finally, I make a plea for more flexibility in the number of commissions to be granted to candidates from Sandhurst for any particular unit. At present, in nearly every instance units are tied rigidly by the War Office to a quota of two or three a year. If in any one year there are four or five excellent candidates ready to go into a certain unit, with the proper credentials and, perhaps, family association with the unit, why should not a unit commission that number of officers in any one year, even at the expense of forgoing a certain number in a subsequent year? The present system by which units are tied rigidly is a handicap rather than anything else.
On balance, the proposals for improvement which have been put forward today by the Secretary of State were extremely valuable, but they should be judged entirely from one aspect only: do we get value for money as a result? I do not believe that all the extra pay, the bounties, and the terminal grants which have been brought in, have solved the problem. The problem is a much more personal one, and calls for the Army to be explained to the boys before they leave school. Boys between the ages of 15 and 17, who know nothing of Army life, are the people whom we want to attract and the people who need to have it explained to them.

6.45 p.m.

Mr. James Simmons: I feel a little diffident in taking part in the debate, because when I was serving in His Majesty's Forces I never reached a rank higher than that of private. No doubt, if there had been an even lower rank I should have occupied it. But here I am flanked by majors, generals, colonels and goodness knows what and, therefore, I speak with a certain diffidence.
After all, the private has a point of view. In our old Army days, we used to sing,

'Grousing, grousing, grousing,
Always jolly well grousing.
That, of course, always was, and always will be, the prerogative of the private soldier.
I listened with great interest and a certain satisfaction to the speech of the Secretary of State for War, especially when he outlined the plans for giving our young men an opportunity to make the Army their career. I am one of those who believe that a pledge was given when National Service was introduced that conscription was not to become a permanent part of our national life. That being so, I welcome any measures which are taken, by any Government, which will enable the needs of our defence to be met by voluntary recruitment into the Regular Forces of the Crown.
The idea of conscription and compulsory military service is entirely alien to the traditions of the party on this side of the House, and I know that the professional soldiers on the other side of the House would rather have the Regular soldier than the National Service man. I therefore hope that the scheme for getting greater numbers of young men to take up the Army as a profession will be crowned with the utmost success.
As far as recruiting is concerned, I am old enough to remember the kind of recruiting sergeant whom the Secretary of State described, with his gay uniform, his ribbons and his waxed moustache. I remember Sergeant Wilson in Birmingham, by whom I was recruited. In those days, of course, the recruiting sergeant was considerably helped by economics. The offer of a good dinner in the Army, or of a "hot" dinner, as we used to call it, to the undernourished, would-be recruit, was always an added attraction, apart from the colour of the recruiting sergeant.
Now we are told by the Secretary of State that we are to have a super recruiting sergeant. He will be not a non-commissioned officer, but a major-general. His job is to be that of a kind of operator, going up and down the country, hopping from twig to twig, from branch to branch, of the Army to try to stimulate recruiting.
We are told that he will have no staff. That is a little hard to believe, because I cannot imagine this major-general walking around the country to do his job. I


imagine that he will have a staff car and a staff driver. What is meant, I suppose, is that he will not have any office staff. If so, who is to tabulate the results of his activity, to get out all the statistics, and to draw up all the White Papers and memoranda?
If a man is appointed to do an important job without staff, he is being paid for doing something which will be of no real and permanent value, because the poor man, even if he is a major-general, cannot be expected to carry every detail in his head. The appointment of this super recruiting sergeant is regarded as an incentive, but I am concerned about other incentives to recruiting.
We were told today by the Secretary of State that the pay increases initiated and carried on during the term of office of our Labour Government were incentives. The right hon. Gentleman was rather grudging in his admission that it was to our credit and talked about it being overdue. It was overdue; I am not 90 yet, but I remember when I got a "bob" a day and when I got married it came down to a "tanner." There were quite a lot of Governments of various political complexions between then and the Labour Government of 1945, which improved the conditions which used to obtain. It was the "King's shilling" and in Blatchford's day it was the "Queen's shilling." We have travelled a long way since those days and at a far more rapid pace since 1945 than at any other time in the history of the British Army.
What are the disincentives to recruiting? I believe that one of the disincentives is class distinction. We live in a democratic age, for good or ill—we on this side of the House think for good—but though the age of pulling the forelock, curtseying and bobbing is an age of the past, there is that old feudal atmosphere in the Army.
For instance, we have as the backbone of the Army, the senior N.C.O.s. The officers would be nowhere without the N.C.O.s. Where would the old subalterns be without the jolly old sergeant major to keep them right? From where are the N.C.O.s recruited? From the working-class. There is the backbone of the British Army, drawn from the working-class, yet they are regarded as of a different standard from the officer class.
In the Army we still have officers' batmen, personal servants cleaning buttons, cleaning boots and doing the chores. When we talk about the teeth and tail of the Army, what about the batmen? Are they the teeth, or the tail? Why cannot the officers polish their own buttons? Why cannot they polish their own boots and make their own beds? The ordinary soldier has to do it.
Then we have the officers' mess. I remember in the 1914–18 war, when we were in a very hot position right away from the base, the officers' mess was taken right to the front line, even in the support trenches. When we had to evacuate, the poor old donkeys of officers' cooks and batmen had to carry all the gear round. Unfortunately, a shell was dropped and five of them were killed doing chores duties instead of the duties for which they enlisted. As long as we have that kind of thing, we have a class Army.
Then there is this saluting business. It is no good saying that saluting is necessary to maintain the discipline of the Army. If we have officers of the right kind, with the right demeanour and attitude to the men they command, that will be sufficient to get the men's respect without bobbing up their hand to their eyebrow every time they pass an officer, even on the other side of the road. There is another thing which has to be considered. I understand that it is still necessary to get permission of an officer if a man in the Army wants to get married.
We had an illuminating remark about Army education from the first hon. Member opposite to speak from the back benches today. He said that it was not the place of the Army to educate men who had failed. Why not? If they are taken into the Army, away from their usual surroundings, surely they have a right to an education they have missed as a result of being in Her Majesty's Forces. One of the objects of Army education should be to get an educated Army. Surely in these days an educated Army would be far better than an uneducated Army. In the old days it was all right:
Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do and die.
There may be some diehards and Colonel Blimps who believe in that philosophy today, but if we are forced to engage in


an ideological war on the physical plane, it is far better that our men should know what they are fighting for and why they are fighting. In the old days they did not know.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: They do not know now.

Mr. Simmons: They were like
dumb, driven cattle.
If they are fighting for an ideal and a principle, fighting against evil things and evil systems, it is far better that they should know, and they have a far more effective weapon in their hands if they know why they are fighting, and what they are fighting, and the principles for which they are fighting.
The question of re-armament costs was mentioned by the Secretary of State and he was asked if he could give figures of the comparison between the cost of Centurion tanks produced by a private firm and those produced in our Ordnance Factories. From the point of view of production, I ask what use is being made of our Ordnance Factories and whether full use is being made of them.
In the First World War the experience was that private manufacturers of arms robbed this country left and right until the late Mr. Lloyd George set up his Ministry of Munitions and controlled the production of munitions. The munitions produced in the Royal Ordnance Factories and Government-controlled dockyards were cheaper than those produced by private enterprise.
I wish to raise a point about training in the Royal Ordnance Corps. Recently, I was speaking to a group of National Service men who are now doing their post two-year training in National Service. They told me that all they had to do was to go to a depot to get on some trucks, drive so many miles and pretend there was a dump there and drive back again. That was all they did during the weekend, and during their two years of National Service they only went on the rifle range twice; on one occasion they used air rifles and on the other occasion Army regulation rifles. I ask the Secretary of State, or the Under Secretary, who is to reply, whether men in the non-combatant corps, the Royal Ordnance Corps, Royal Army Service Corps and R.E.M.E., are adequately trained in case of attack.
I think the points I have raised are worthy of consideration and I apologise, as a mere private, for keeping the House for so long, but I hope that some of the questions I have asked will evoke an answer from the other side of the House.

TRAINING METHODS

7.0 p.m.

Sir Stanley Holmes: I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House urges Her Majesty's Government to consider the necessity for developing advanced methods of training with a view to reaching higher efficiency in a shorter time and to take immediate steps to this end.
In the old days before conscription the Army consisted of volunteers, both officers and men. As there was, as a rule, no likelihood of war, the training of both classes proceeded at a modest speed, with the result that after a number of years each soldier of every rank was a very efficient man. But times have changed. Today, we have conscription with a minimum of two years as the whole-time period of compulsory service. We have a new kind of war which demands of all arms very high technical skill, and we have the possibility, as has been mentioned by the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), that another war may come at any time.
The object of this Amendment is to ascertain whether the methods now adopted are calculated to bring about the highest efficiency in the shortest possible time under the new conditions. In former days a commanding officer of a regiment had only two kinds of soldiers with whom to deal, the Regular officer and the Regular soldier. Today there are five different kinds who make up a Regular unit, namely, the Regular officer; the National Service officer; the long-term Regular soldier; the short-term Regular soldier and the National Service soldier.
Further, war has become almost completely mechanised. Officers and men must have very high technical training and skill, not only in the use of machines but in their ability to repair them when necessary. It should also be remembered, and this point has been referred to before, that nowadays a war starts


with astonishing suddenness. In the last two wars we have failed to resist the initial impact, with nearly disastrous results. It is vital that this should not occur again owing to the danger of attack on our towns and our civil population by projected missiles, and possibly by atom bombs. We all remember the effect of the limited attack by projected missiles during the last war.
It is clear, therefore, that the commanding officer of a regiment has many different problems to solve today, having regard to the fact that different types of soldiers go to make up a unit and that most of them have to be taught to be specialists in some branch of technical skill. He must bear in mind that war may occur at any moment and that the majority of his unit, both officers and men, will be under his guidance and command for a period of only two years.
It must also be remembered that today physical fitness is more than ever essential in war. His ability to fight and his technical skill are wasted unless a soldier is able to reach his objective in a fit condition. It can be assumed that recruits coming into the Army from civil life are not usually up to the highest standard of fitness, but it can be assumed also that most of them, having responded to training, have in a few months a first-class physique and are ready for anything.
But it must happen that during this early training it is found that a number, owing to some physical or mental weakness, are not able, and will never be able, to suffer heavy bodily stress. It would be of interest to know whether such men are given duties which make them useful to the Army, and are not given positions which, owing to their lack of adequate physique or mentality, may cause them to let down their comrades at a critical moment.
This Amendment has been put down in order to obtain information, and not with the object of criticising. We desire to know, in the changing conditions and circumstances which I have ventured to describe, whether the War Office have made such alteration in the training of recruits as to give the new soldiers the best chance of serving their country well, and to give to the country its new soldiers in as high a state of efficiency as possible. I hope, Sir, that with your permission my

hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) may be allowed to Second this Amendment, as I am sure that, from his long experience in the Army, he is fitted to deal with these matters more fully and more adequately than I have done.

7.8 p.m.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I beg to second the Amendment.
The problem before not only the British Army, but European armies today is, in my view, clearer than it has ever been before in history. It is the problem of dealing with vast numbers of enemy combatants who may be properly equipped and supported by intense artillery fire and air support, but who are not necessarily well led. I do not think anybody will suggest we should ever achieve parity in numbers with our potential enemy. It is therefore more important today than ever before that training should be of a very high standard, and that it should be the sort of training which can be inculcated with speed and without waste of time.
The solution to this problem comes under three heads; mobility, fire power and training, and the greatest of these is training. So far as mobility is concerned, I have been to the manoeuvres in Germany twice and I am very impressed that there is still the attitude of mind which existed during the recent war in regard to the ordinary line infantry.
If, which heaven forbid, war should eventually break out in Western Europe, it will be a matter of stopping successive holes, preventing infiltration and then stabilising the position. With the numbers available, unless these men are trained to move from one part of the front to another at great speed, they will not achieve that object. When I refer to great speed I do not refer to miles an hour but to the ability of soldiers to get into their vehicles and on the move as quickly as possible on the receipt of orders.
For the motorised battalion this is the bread of life. They have been brought up on this kind of movement and they understand it fully. I believe that the ordinary infantry brigade must in future be trained on the lines of the motorised battalion. That, I know, is heresy to a


large number of senior officers in the British Army and the danger is that they will not see the strength of the argument.
I do not suggest that the infantry should have their own vehicles permanently. Clearly, they cannot have them, but it is possible to train men to get into vehicles which have been supplied for them at short notice and to move at speed to a destination, get out of the vehicles and be in a position to fight in a very short time. But if they are asked to do that suddenly in the middle of a battle, without previous training, they will not be able to do it.
I should like to give an example. I had the honour to train several brigades in England at the time when we did nothing else but training. There was not a battalion which left my command which could not get into vehicles, move off and take orders over the radio in 20 minutes. In Italy during the war I wanted a battalion as reinforcements. I wanted them by 4 o'clock in the afternoon to take part in an attack. They were stationed 3½ miles away and they had their orders at 10.30 in the morning.
They did not arrive by 4 o'clock that afternoon and I had to hold up the attack for an hour. When they did arrive they were at sixes and sevens. They were unaccustomed to moving off at short notice, and the whole effort came very near to disaster. These men suffered more than anybody else.
That is a perfect example. The job could have been done properly with just a little bit of training and foresight and the right attitude of mind on the part of the commanders concerned. They should not resist the suggestion that their men should be trained to get into buses at a moment's notice, to move from one part of the front to another and to be prepared, if necessary, to take orders on the radio as they go.
I should like to know what is happening about cross-country vehicles for the infantry. Again, I speak from my own experience and I apologise for that, but it does add an emphasis to what one is saying. I happened to be the first commander who had under his command in battle vehicles called Kangaroos. They were old Sherman tanks with the insides taken out.
Into them we were able to put a section of infantry. Two battalions were carried in an attack in these Kangaroos behind my tanks. They fought for an entire day and their total casualties were one sergeant with his eye blacked and one subaltern with his arm broken. Yet they came under very heavy mortar and shell fire.
It is necessary to have something of this nature to be able to get infantry to their objective without casualties. That needs training. It needs training in enbussing and debussing, in finding one's way across country, and in carrying on radio communication with tanks. I should like the Under-Secretary to say whether or not the War Office are still in favour of Kangaroos; whether they are being produced or whether similar vehicles are to be introduced for transporting infantry.
Many of us have had experience of infantry attempting, under heavy shell and mortar fire, to get on to an objective captured by tanks. I hope that the one great lesson we have learned in this connection will be implemented in future.
I come to the question of fire power. What is happening about medium machine-guns and the training of men in their use? Is there a new medium machine-gun or are we still to rely on the old Vickers with its 16 stoppages. That takes up too much time in the training of the ordinary machine-gun company, or whatever it may be, in a battalion. Surely, we have got to the stage where we can have a medium machine-gun with only one stoppage so that if something goes wrong a man can replace the part with one out of his bag and so that he can be taught to use it in a short space of time.
I should like to add my words of regret at the passing of the 280 rifle, if in fact it has passed. I can understand the argument about production on a large scale in this country. I know exactly what the problems are but, to use Parliamentary language, have all the avenues been explored and have all the stones been turned on the question of arriving at an agreement with America that she should go into production on this rifle with us? That is the only solution to the problem.
I hope that every effort is being made to try, if there is still time, to persuade


the Americans to change over and to go into production if not on the 280 then on a modification of the 280—a weapon which has this excellent single-shot capacity and tremendous accuracy. I have had evidence from commanding officers in battle. On many occasions they have said, "Must we take these rifles up into battle with us? They are only an encumbrance."
They have asked for a short-range weapon and I have replied that, provided they did not use all the ammunition in the area, they could use tommy guns in the ensuing "rat hunt." When an objective is captured, a 308 is about as much use as a 20-pounder gun. What is required is a short-range quick-firing gun. The same is true when men are resisting a counter-attack. In modern war the soldier does not fire at men two miles away. There is far too much smoke and dust caused by the artillery, and the soldier does not see the enemy until he is about 50 yards away. In that case he wants something like a tommy gun or, ideally, the 280 rifle. I hope that the idea of the 280 has not been thrown overboard.
I feel strongly on the question of training for supply in the field. Both in Germany and Italy at the end of the last war we were fighting in conditions of almost complete air superiority. That taught us some false lessons. Lorries drove nose to tail in broad daylight and they were able to use the roads at will. I wish that people would remember the early days before Dunkirk. They should remember what the roads were like then. They will be like that if war comes again. Transport will not be able to move at all in day-time but only at night, and even then it will be pretty uncomfortable.
During the exercises in Germany I have seen the most appalling mistakes in this respect. I have seen staff officers, presumably with no war experience, feeding lorries on to a road until the road was so congested that the vehicles were unable to move in any direction. They seem never to have heard of the lesson we learned even when we had air superiority and were able to move in daylight. It was a simple lesson: a road will hold a certain number of vehicles and no more.
The right way is to feed the vehicles on to the road in groups and, having done

that, to say, "No 30 miles an hour or any rubbish like that. Go as fast as you can until you get to the other end." If there is somebody ready for them at the other end to put them under cover, we shall in that way get many more vehicles fed into a road in 24 hours than in any other way. I appeal to those who might, in future, be reading what I have said to look into this question. I have seen a formation which would not have been able to do things in the way in which it did them during exercises if there had been any kind of air superiority on the other side.
It is again a question of training, and of teaching the man to drive in convoy at something more than 30 miles an hour. I was present on one occasion when I heard the perfect answer on that point. The driver was one of these American darkies, and he was doing quite 55 miles an hour when he was stopped by a British A.P.M., who said "You ought not to be doing more than 30 miles an hour." The darkie replied "You will not win this blank war at 30 miles an hour," let in his clutch and drove on. That is quite right. Let us get rid of this old-fashioned nonsense about 30 miles an hour.
Next, there is the question of the air drop, if the roads become impassable. We are the nation which started the air drop, and we have more experience of it than anybody else. Is it not possible to supply troops in forward areas at night by air? I do not think the aircraft would be attacked if they flew low, and I do not think they would suffer one-tenth of the casualties which road transport would suffer; and they would get their stores there more quickly and from a greater distance further back, so that we could cut out one echelon of the system. I have not been in the Army for so long that I may be talking through my hat, because a lot of these things may have been done a long time ago.
I happen to be one of those people who first experimented with tanks talking to the air and I remember that during the last war, in a battle in Italy, all my forward squadron leaders were talking direct to the air without reference to brigade headquarters. That is the kind of training we want, so that these small formations are able to operate without constant control from formation headquarters.
I saw it most successfully carried out in the last manoeuvres in Germany on the higher level, and I hope that we shall not lose some of those officers who can train men to do the job quickly so that, if any forward unit commander calls for air support, he can have it in five minutes, and with extreme accuracy and devastating effect.
Next, I want to refer to the apparent inflexibility in attack—in the sense of not being able to alter direction—of the role of the infantry in attack. It really is alarming. If it is purely a question of training, cannot we do something to alter the present system of men walking in line one by one to reach their objective when something happens on the right or the left flank?
I have seen commanders get out of and leave their tanks in order to lead infantry in another direction, to save them from suicide and disaster. There is something drastically wrong in infantry training so far as the large-scale attack is concerned. I do not mean small infiltrations, but large-scale formation attacks, and I think something should be done about that.
I wish now to refer to the Home Guard. I hope my right hon. Friend, when the time comes, and I do not suppose it has come yet, to try to encourage people to join the Home Guard in large numbers, will do something more than has been done already to publicise what is to be the role of the Home Guard on this occasion, and what it will be asked to do. The Prime Minister said the other day that he had a feeling of nakedness. We all know perfectly well that there are no Regular troops left in this country, and that the Territorial Army will also go abroad, provided that we still hold the Channel Ports. By the way, they ought not to be called the Channel Ports any longer; that is a Napeolonic term. They are the launching sites of the prospective enemy's projected missiles.
Provided that we still held these places, the Territorial Army would be abroad in a very short time. Therefore, we should be left with the Home Guard, and we also have the new idea, which I do not think should be criticised in the way it has been criticised by hon. Members opposite, of making training battalions in depots capable of fighting, if necessary. Most of their training is for fighting, except for

that of a few technicians, and merely by an extension of that training we could make them into formations which, if trained in getting in and out of transport quickly, could supply a mobile column which would be very useful, if the necessity arose.
On this question of training the Home Guard, I hope the role of this formation will be made quite clear to everybody in the country, because it is something totally different to what it was last time. There is no question now of the Home Guard defending the beaches or guarding bridges with sticky bombs in their pockets. They are to be trained much more on a commando basis.
There is to be a real rat hunt for the extermination of any people who are foolish enough to descend from the air on this country, and, in that particular period of weakness, the period within three hours of their landing, when they are befuddled and before they can attempt any re-organisation, it will be the Home Guard of this country, possibly assisted by their lady friends, who will exterminate these people before they can do any damage.
For this task, the Home Guard will need a high standard of training, quite different from that which it received in the past. Furthermore, in recruiting, it is essential that we should have a certain number of the old Home Guard in the new formation. But what we really want is a high proportion of men who have had recent war experience and who will not be called up for the Regular Forces. Those are the fellows whom we want to see in the Home Guard at the earliest possible moment.
Now, one last word about Class Z Reserve. I am interested in this question of the call-up of Class Z Reservists and the 15 days' training. We have been told many times that they will be used to fill the gaps in the big formations which exist, and that they went last year to the Regular Army units as well as Territorial units. The Regular Army is not at home any more, and so, therefore, they will now go only to the Territorial Army.
That is fine, because, of course, the Territorial Army wants them and must have them, but what about the divisions in Germany? Have they not got corps troops whose numbers will require to be made up at a moment's notice with Reservists? Would it not be possible, and


also provide a good exercise for Transport Command of the R.A.F., to fly some of these Reservists over there? I do not know what the expense would be, but it seems to me very serious to have these units and formations in Germany and not to give them the same treatment as units of the Territorial Army here in England.
I do now know how my right hon. Friend would implement any of the suggestions which I have made, even if he thought they were good ones. As a politician, I find that it is very different from being in command, when one could ring a bell and say "This is to be done." Some of the senior officers with whom one has to deal may have been reared in out of date ideas; some of them may have achieved success through those out of date ideas which existed in the last war. They are reluctant to give up those things with which they achieved success, because they might not be so successful next time if, for example, they had to use a microphone or speak on the wireless. I hope some one will go like an east wind through the training of not only the junior but of the senior officers, because sometimes it is deplorable in this respect.
Just one last example. On one occasion I was supporting an infantry divisional commander whose predecessor, unfortunately, was hurt and who had to go back. The new one was sent up and I had to rely, as I often did, on one staff officer and one driver without anyone else near me at all. I said to this fellow, "You had better lie down and watch what happens." This was my new senior commander. He watched for a minute or two and then said, "Do you often use that thing?" He was referring to the microphone. Having lived with it for six years, it was a shock to think that I was going to deal in battle with someone like that.
Then I put the earphones on him and said, "Listen to this and you will hear what goes on." He seemed exactly like a man who was listening to a play written in some obscure native dialect for all he understood of the jargon. There, again, something has got to be done about that. Everyone in the British Army has got to be taught to use wireless properly—I do not care what his rank is—otherwise there is the danger that they may pick up the microphone and that before they have

spoken into it for three minutes they may have jeopardised the lives of 3,000 people.

7.34 p.m.

Mr. James H. Hoy: I came into this Chamber to listen to the debate, but after hearing some of the things that have been said this afternoon I thought I would like to add a word or two, and preferably to the debate on the Amendment which has just been moved by the hon. Member for Harwich (Sir S. Holmes) and seconded by the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer). There is no doubt that the hon. and gallant Member was on very strong ground in the last part of his speech. He and I have frequently discussed the question of communications since we arrived in this House, and we also had the privilege of visiting the British Army in Germany during large-scale manoeuvres. We saw there just what good and efficient training could produce.
It is essential in the modern Army that communications should be of first-class order, and I want to say a few words about them. When the Secretary of State for War opened the debate this afternoon, he spoke of the tremendous amount of time and money wasted in polishing up implements which might quite well have been turned out in a rougher state, thereby saving a considerable sum of money to the Treasury. He mentioned the suggestion made in a speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Stirling (Mr. Woodburn) in a debate two years ago, and said that as a consequence of my right hon. Friend's speech and of another speech in that particular debate certain instructions had been issued by the War Office.
I suggest that a somewhat similar procedure might be adopted with regard to the training of certain tradesmen in the Forces. In my training days we spent a lot of time on the finesse of wireless operating, but immediately we got into the field we were told to forget half of it and to concentrate on that part which really mattered. I think much better results might be obtained if practical experience were gained by the day-to-day use of the instruments which the operators are eventually going to use.
I will give one example. Every wireless operator has to achieve a certain speed in Morse, but he is very rarely called


upon to use it when he goes into the field. It then becomes radio-telephony only, so that all the time spent in becoming proficient in Morse is wasted. I am suggesting that the Army authorities might look at this matter when they are considering future training so that, just as they have saved on the production of certain arms, they might save in the time of training and, at the same time, produce much more efficient soldiers in the field.
That leads me to something that was said this afternoon by the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison). He sought to criticise the work of the Army Education Corps. I hasten to assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that I was never associated with that department of the Army, but I was rather staggered when he was supported by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), who complained of the tremendous expenditure taking place on education in the Army. If my figures are correct—the Secretary of State for War will correct me if they are not—I understand that the total cost is something in the region of £2,500,000 out of an overall budget of something like £500 million.
If we are to have a first-class Army, it has Rot to be first-class from the top to the bottom. Everybody must know the job he will have to do, and money spent on the educational services is money well spent. For the life of me I cannot understand why there should be a complaint about an expenditure of £2,500,000 out of a total budget of £500 million, unless my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw and the hon. and gallant Member for Eye can prove to the House that the money is being wasted.
What is it that the Army seeks to do? I understand that, aided by a central committee for education, it attempts to link up the educational courses of the Army with the corresponding counterparts in civilian life. Therefore, those in the Army are taken on a parallel with those outside. It is the duty and the responsibility of the Army to make these facilities available to the soldiers, not only on their home stations, but also overseas.
I do not think my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw quite under-

stood all the duties of the Army Education Corps, because he spoke as if its sole job was to provide some vocational training. That is far from the truth. Its job is not only to provide educational services for the man in the Regular Army, but for the National Service man who goes into the Army. Unless he has received the school-leaving certificate, I understand, he has to receive a general training for the first 12 months of service in the Forces.
It should not be overlooked—and this is particularly important in view of the Amendment which has been moved—that in 1949 a decision was made to re-introduce the first-class Army certificate for those soldiers who wish to reach the position of warrant officer. The whole basis of promotion was educational qualifications corresponding to those which roughly obtained before the war.
In view of all these things, surely it is essential that this money should be spent on members of the Forces, and if opportunity is to be equal to all, these educational facilities are necessary, and, in my view, must be provided by the Army. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will dwell a little more on these services than did his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in the White Paper.
We have heard a good deal in this debate about things which might help to attract men into the Army and help to make them happy there. One of the essentials is to look after the men's families. Under the Army education scheme it becomes the duty of the Army, especially in overseas stations, to provide facilities for educating the men's children. I think they are doing a good job of work in this field, and I should like to know from the Under-Secretary whether there are to be further developments on these lines.
When the men leave the Army they have to resettle themselves in their civilian life, and the Army Education Corps plays an important part at the resettlement centres in fitting men for their civilian duties. All these services are first-class; and indeed that fact is reflected in the statement made by the Secretary of State this afternoon when he said that the Army today has the best manpower it has ever had. If he believes that to be true, it must reflect credit to some


extent, not only on general educational standards, but on the services provided by the Army itself.
It should never be forgotten that the Army Education Corps has a very important part to play in the intake of National Service men, for no matter what one might say, it is a fact that a greater proportion of the men than we should like have to receive education because of illiteracy. The Army Education Corps has to provide that service.
Despite all these things, we have had the tribute to which I have referred paid to the Army by the Secretary of State this afternoon. He must have had to pluck up a little courage to say those words because they did not quite square with what he said on previous occasions about the Forces. The same applied to the statement he made today on colonial troops and the raising of colonial garrisons. It was rather amusing to see the right hon. Gentleman come to the House today and say, in effect, "Now I know what the difficulties are, I find I cannot do what I was telling other people they ought to do."
Be that as it may, we must not only have a well-educated Army but we must provide the best facilities possible for the men and for their children. If we do these things we shall make the men fitter to receive the military training they must have to make them good members of the Army. If we do these things we shall not have cause to regret the money spent by Her Majesty's Government on the Army Education Corps.

7.45 p.m.

Lord John Hope: If I intervene only for a few moments it is because the gist of what I want to say has been so ably put by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer). I want to take the House back for a moment to the Home Guard and their training. I have one or two specific questions to ask the Government, and I hope my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War, will answer them.
My hon. and gallant Friend defined to the House quite clearly and succinctly what the duties of the Home Guard are to be. The Explanatory Notes to the Army Estimates state that:
The role of the Home Guard on the outbreak of war will be:

(a) To supplement the national army in the defence of airfields against airborne attack … and in defence against invasion; …
and so on. During the Second Reading of the Home Guard Bill, the Secretary of State for War said only this about the training of the Home Guard:
Turning to facilties for training, the Territorial Army, as far as possible, will make available ranges and drill halls, but I am aware, … that in certain areas there is congestion within the accommodation available … Therefore, provision will be made for the hiring of local halls, and so forth, to facilitate training."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd November, 1951; Vol. 494, c. 584.]
I am not suggesting for a moment that my right hon. Friend thought then or thinks now that these facilities are enough, but I mention what he said to underline the fact that there is a great deal more to it than ranges and drill halls, and that I hope very much that that will be borne in mind by the War Office and by the Home Guard.
Ranges are, of course, very important. The Home Guard must be able to shoot accurately and quickly. I am aware that drill halls are not used entirely for drills. I speak as one who was taught soldiering in the hardest of all schools in this matter of drill and who has never regretted it, but if the Home Guard spend much of their time on drill they will waste their time. What little time they have to spare must be used in learning to do the job they will have to do in the event of war.
I refer to the duties of the Home Guard in relation to the protection of airfields and other strong points. They may have to counter-attack to recapture an airfield or, better still, to prevent it from being captured, by destroying an enemy force landed from the air. No enemy force will land by parachutes or gliders on the airfield itself. The enemy will land some distance away. Will the Home Guard commanding officers be given specific orders, and will they be instructed through the area command about these areas in their own location where air-borne troops can land to attack an airfield or some other strong point?
Such open spaces are limited. In some areas there will be many and in others few. The Home Guard ought to learn as a drill every means of quickly counterattacking those spaces. They ought to be taught exactly how to get to them by


covered approach by day and exactly how to manage the job at night. That can be done by battle drill. I hope that in these few words I have described adequately what I conceive to be the necessary training for the Home Guard. It will be not only great fun, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing has said, for those taking part—for that kind of training is fun—but it will be supremely valuable and vital to the Home Guard.
I should also like to know from the Under-Secretary who is to be responsible for the training of the Home Guard. I presume that this training generally comes under the Director of Military Training, but I should like to know what grade of Staff officer is to be involved. I hope that whatever his grade the War Office will see to it that he is good.
Now, as to the commanding officers of the Home Guard. There is not an hon. Member who does not feel great admiration for all that these officers are doing. They are unselfish and courageous and so forth, but those qualities are not enough. In the Home Guard they have got to be really first-rate, imaginative tacticians, at any rate minor tacticians—this is an unfortunate term, for minor tactics is very important. This applies to any commanding officer, but particularly in the Home Guard, and if they are not brilliant minor tacticians they ought not to command a Home Guard battalion.
I appeal to the War Office to get the Home Guard out of the drill halls; by all means teach them to shoot on the ranges, but get them out of the drill halls and on to the ground. It is on the ground that they will win the battles which they may have to fight.

7.51 p.m.

Mr. Julian Snow: Unlike the noble Lord the Member for Pentlands (Lord John Hope), I cannot claim to have learned my basic foot drill in the Guards. Curiously enough, my pre-war training was in a very honourable body called the Calcutta Light Horse. Incidentally, I do not admit that that body was in any way inferior to the Guards.
I would address my remarks to the Amendment which I regard as very useful, and deal with anti-aircraft in general and Anti-Aircraft Command in particu-

lar, because it was in that corps that I had my experience during the war. I feel that one of the greatest difficulties with which the corps was confronted at the outbreak of war was in having the wrong sort of instructors for the very large civilian entry with which these instructors had to deal. It was not by any means the fault of the individual senior N.C.O. instructors. For years they had been trained to instruct the type of men to whom an hon. Friend of mine has referred as people who just could not get another job.
Everybody remembers the sort of scene we used to see at Waterloo Station before the war—the colour sergeant walking round with a hang-dog crowd of men such as could be picked up at the labour exchanges. Those are the sort of people the N.C.O.s had been trained to instruct, and when they had a large civilian entry they did not have the proper psychological approach to instruct them properly.
I remember standing on the grounds of the Honourable Artillery Company in the City on one occasion watching a Bofors gun being brought into operation. Standing next to me was a Swedish gentleman who, I suspect, had enlisted under a wrong name. The senior N.C.O. instructor said, "This, gentlemen"—that is what we were called then—"is the Bofors gun." My Swedish friend said, "Oh no, sergeant major; it is pronounced Boforch." The instructor said, "What do you think you are—a sanguinary Swede?"
The sort of instructor we want when we are confronted with another large civilian entry, as we shall be on the outbreak of another war, is the man who in previous years has been trained in civilian psychology. Although it would be going too far to suggest a special corps of instructors, I do suggest that in the nominal peace-time training of the instructors special care should be devoted to the question of civilian psychology. As the last war proceeded, we learned techniques which produced most magnificent and speedy results by merely studying the personal problems of civilians.
I hope that should Anti-Aircraft Command have to be enlarged considerably on the outbreak of war, it will not become a sort of hide-out—an unpleasant term, but I think it is justified—for a lot


of people who might be put into other and more competent corps. I speak with some feeling on this, because I was one of many young men who tried to get into the Royal Artillery in the field and were told that at the age of 27—this was in 1939—we were too old. I have no doubt that hon. Members with experience will be aware that that happened. We were too old at 27 to get into a really competent corps. As the war went on, those of us who had got into Anti-Aircraft Command found that we could not get out because we had to instruct the new intakes.
There is another point about Anti-Aircraft Command which I would mention. I had hoped that when the war came to an end there would be sufficient senior staff officers in Anti-Aircraft Command to fill the senior appointments of the reduced Anti-Aircraft Command staff. Hon. Members who have had experience of anti-aircraft during the war will remember that when they went to Larkhill or some senior staff college they found that anti-aircraft staff officers were regarded as something pretty low. They were not treated as proper soldiers at all. Anti-Aircraft Command is so important that it should produce from its own ranks its own senior staff officers.
If hon. Members care to refer to the minutes of evidence given before the Select Committee on Estimates last year, they will see the sort of thing I am talking about—senior staff officers who do not understand the minimum technical requirements of Anti-Aircraft Command. That ought to stop. Anti-Aircraft Command should not become the depository of gallant and, for all I know, very efficient staff officers from the field side of the Royal Artillery. Perhaps it would be as well to take away anti-aircraft from the Royal Artillery and form it into a proper corps of its own.

Mr. Ian Harvey: I am following with sympathy what the hon. Member is saying, but is it not a contradiction of the very argument he is putting forward to suggest that Anti-Aircraft Command must produce its own staff officers? By doing that, we should in fact isolate Anti-Aircraft Command. Would it not be better to do what I am informed is the policy in the Royal Artillery at the present time—namely, to ensure that all Artillery officers have a term in each of the arms?

Mr. Snow: I do not think I am competent to judge which of the schools of thought is the better. I should have thought that the technique of antiaircraft gunnery and the requirements of deployment in the field are so specialised that there is a case for divorcing it from the Artillery. During the war the staff at headquarters at the various levels in Anti-Aircraft Command got far too large. One could go into group headquarters, brigade headquarters and regimental headquarters and there were far too many people there.
I believe that in Italy during the war there was a curious unit known as "Popski's Private Army." It was nothing on "Pile's Private Army." It was said that General Pile had such a pleasing Irish personality that he could put it over the present Prime Minister. Whether or not that is so I do not know, but the fact is that many of us in that corps during the war came to the conclusion that at the lower levels either the brigades were unnecessary or the regiments were unnecessary and that one of the two headquarters could be eliminated with a great saving of staff.
It is essential to anti-aircraft that there should be a very large percentage of women soldiers. I do not agree with this idea of considering women as shy bashful creatures. Many of them did a first-class fighting job, and I think it is imperative that we should realise that if and when Anti-Aircraft Command is enlarged, in the event of a war, we shall have to rely, to a very large extent, on an increased number of women in each unit. If that is the case, I think it is wrong that Anti-Aircraft units in peacetime should have basically more men than women, especially on the instrument side.
I should like to say a few words on the equipment that is being presented to anti-aircraft units in the field at the present time. I appreciate that this is a digression, but I should just like to make these few remarks. I want to know whether, in the considered view of the Under-Secretary of State, the predictor which is issued to mobile heavy antiaircraft units is now capable of coping with modern aircraft.
When the Select Committee on Estimates last examined witnesses on this point, just over a year ago, it was discovered that the standard predictor in use


in mobile units was a predictor which was in use during the last war. Although I am beginning to forget the more detailed technique of it, this particular predictor relied on hand balancing in order to provide the necessary deflections. That hand balancing is quite impossible with modern aircraft, and yet I am informed that that same predictor is still being used in mobile anti-aircraft units. If that is so, it is something that should be looked at. An electrically balanced predictor should be designed and issued for mobile units.
I was very proud to belong to the Royal Artillery during the war, but what occurred there on this question of inflated staffs rather shook me. At Larkhill I remember being shown the Master Gunner, a very important gentleman who, at a time when we were scrambling for anybody we could get to do jobs, was attended by six scarlet clad A.T.S. who attended him at the mess—not in any questionable sense, but to see that he had the requisite drinks.
The question of training which was raised by the hon. Member for Harwich (Sir S. Holmes) is, to my mind, absolutely essential. Unless we train our instructors to deal with the civilian we shall find ourselves once more faced with the very difficult training problem which we had at the beginning of the last war.

8.2 p.m.

Mr. Baker White: I, like the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tam-worth (Mr. Snow), welcome this Amendment. I agree with what he said about the necessity for instructors in the Army having a proper knowledge of civilian psychology. I wish to address myself almost entirely to the question of personnel, as distinct from the question of equipment; the question of men rather than machines. Korea, the Middle East and Malaya have shown that, considering the shortages of equipment, there is not much wrong with the quality and the basic training—I emphasise the words "basic training"—of the Army, whether Regulars or National Service men.
I believe that the quality of all ranks in the Army today is higher than it has ever been within our lifetimes. The Secretary of State this afternoon talked about getting value for money. I think we are getting value for money. Since

we last discussed the Estimates I have had the unusual opportunity of being able to watch, week by week and month by month, the impact of National Service training on a young man from the day on which he gave up his job as a farm labourer, in March last year, to last Thursday, when he marched off across the parade ground at Mons Barracks, Aldershot, to take up Her Majesty's Commission. That young man is my own son. I have seen him develop physically and mentally, gaining military knowledge and, what is perhaps more important, a knowledge of his fellow men. So far, he has reacted to his National Service in such a way as to make me confident that the system of training is achieving its end pretty well.
There are, however, one or two points about this National Service training that I should like to put to my right hon. Friend. They are minor criticisms, but they are points of substance. They are based not only upon what my son has told me but upon wider inquiry. Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that, after the first six weeks of National Service training are completed—the necessary and very important "square-bashing" period, as we used to call it—those National Service men spend enough time on the range, particularly on the field firing range? As an old rifleman I may be rather prejudiced, but I believe that more range instruction would be a good thing. As a rifleman, having seen the 280 rifle demonstrated, like other hon. Members on both sides of the House, I deplore its disappearance, temporarily at least.
Is my right hon. Friend certain that after the National Service man has passed the War Office selection board and gone to his officer training centre, there is a proper balance between drill periods and other instruction? I suggest that the drill periods might be reduced in favour of tactical training. In his speech the Secretary of State said that we must not waste the time of National Service men. I entirely agree, and that is why I ask him if he is satisfied that there is no waste of time between passing the War Office selection board and being posted to the officer training centre. I think he will find that there is waste of time in many cases—often as much as 14 days, hanging about the depot. I can give him chapter and verse of a young man who


hung about for six weeks before going to his officer training centre, just at the moment when the potential officer cadet is mad keen to get down to his job.
Finally, is my right hon. Friend certain that the period at Sandhurst could not usefully be reduced from 18 to 14 months. Mons Barracks and Eaton Hall produce an efficient National Service officer in a minimum of four months. It is quite true that Sandhurst's task is to produce Regular officers, but the disparity between 4 and 18 months is unduly large and several young officers at Sandhurst have told me that they began to feel stale and overloaded with paper instruction in the last three or four months. I feel that that question is worth looking at, not only with a view to increasing the output of Regular officers but also reducing the cost. I think it would be interesting to know the comparative cost of producing a National Service officer and a Regular officer.
Last week I was able to go down to the passing out parade at Mons Barracks. To me it was an impressive, moving and inspiring ceremony, and I would urge hon. Members, if they have time, to go down and attend one of these frequent parades. I also venture to hope that on some early occasion the Secretary of State or the Under-Secretary might go down and take the parade. I think even the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would be interested to see that, because he might come away convinced that the training of young men in the Army is not such a brutalising process as he believes.
Pouring rain did not detract from the excellence of that parade. There were the flanking pieces of artillery, two orderlies carrying lances and red and white pennons of the cavalry and the Royal Artillery Band. I thought the standard of marching and drill was superb, right up to the moment when the young officers slow-marched up the steps off the parade ground to their new duty and high responsibility. Then there was a simple and moving service in a nearby church. I do not think that that day will be forgotten, either by the young men or by their parents, and as I walked away there came into my mind a passage from the book, "The World Crisis," written by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister:

As in the shades of a November evening, I, for the first time, led a platoon of Grenadiers across the sopping fields the conviction came into my mind with absolute assurance that the simple soldiers and their regimental officers, armed with their cause, would by their virtues in the end redress the mistakes and ignorances of Staffs and Cabinets, of Admirals, Generals, and politicians—including, no doubt, many of my own.
On the question of training, I should like to pay my tribute to a section of the Regular Army which is sometimes abused but more often forgotten—the long-service senior non-commissioned officers, especially those working as instructors of National Service intake and in the officer training units. They are very like the craftsmen at the potter's wheel who take the unshaped mass of raw material and mould it, applying their own skill, to become efficient and useful.
I have all my life been in close contact with the Services and I have had always among my friends chief petty officers of the Royal Navy and senior N.C.O.s of the Royal Marines and the Army. They are a grand race of men, and we should be very thankful for them. I remember the first letter my son wrote home after he had reported at the Royal Armoured Corps Depot at Carlisle. He said of the non-commissioned officer in charge of him: "He's a damned good bloke." That is fairly high praise for a 'tough N.C.O. from a young man in the early stages of National Service training. Only yesterday I was reading a letter from a friend of my son who had just joined his regiment as a subaltern, and he said:
They are very considerate, and for the first month or so I am working with a sergeant who is terribly nice and who will eventually be my troop sergeant.
I think that those sentences tell of a perfect partnership between the highly experienced non-commissioned officer and a young inexperienced officer. I know that it is nothing new; it is as old as the Army itself. Kipling, in one of his books, puts words into the mouth of his immortal character Mulvaney when he says:
And there, mark you, is the virtue that no money and no drill can buy—the virtue of the old soldier that knows his officer's work and does it for him at the salute.
These N.C.O.s are great craftsmen, and I should like to mention the name of one of them who, I expect, will be known to many hon. Members in this House—Regimental Sergeant-Major Britton, who


I saw and heard on parade at Mons Barracks last Thursday. I think it is very wise that a plan should be devised to keep these men in the Army until they are 55. Luckily the nation does not lose them when they retire if they take posts in the schools and in training establishments. Some of them are in the service of this House, and friends of us all. In civil life they have the same sterling qualities that they had in the Army.
I now wish to mention one thing that impinges very much upon training, because it affects the supply of young officers, and that is the outfit allowance. I want to make an appeal to my right hon. Friend on the subject of officers' outfit allowances. Perhaps I am speaking more for the parents of the young officers than for the young men themselves. I am certainly speaking with recent personal and sharp experience, but I do not think it destroys the case. As the allowance was raised recently from £29 to £36 10s. I hope I shall not seem ungrateful, but it is still not adequate to meet the needs of officers joining a large number of regiments and certain corps. For many of them blue patrols are essential, which will cost at least £40.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris): Although that would be relevant to the main Question, I find difficulty in relating it to the Amendment.

Mr. White: I was coming to the point of giving one or two examples. The total cost to a young officer can be £120, and that relates very much to training because units are not getting these young officers for that very reason.
The establishment of one regiment I know is 25 subalterns: it has only 11. There are parents unable, because of the low uniform allowance, to send their sons into regiments in which they themselves served. The Secretary of State may argue that this is not applicable in some units, but it does apply to many.
I now turn to a very important aspect of advanced training, and that is the question of the Special Air Service Regiment. Can the House be told, within the limits of security, more about the Special Air Service Regiment? It is not mentioned in the Memorandum to the Estimates. In the Explanatory Note to the Estimates it is mentioned in 14 words:

The Special Air Service Regiment carries out small scale operations behind the enemy lines.
I believe that there is a Territorial unit up to strength, but I should like to know something more about such Regular formations as there are. My own wartime experience in close contact with special operations leads me to believe that the Special Air Service Regiment should be raised as soon as possible to divisional strength, and I do not believe there would be any lack of volunteers for it.
I do not believe that war is likely; I do not believe it is imminent; but if it does come we know who it will be with; broadly we can see the nature of it, and we know the sort of training we must have to meet the situation. It would be a war in which we should have many allies fighting along the enemy lines of communication—many more than in the last war—and to these specially trained men of the Special Air Service Regiment would fall the vital role of keeping contact with them, of carrying out operations with them, of training them and giving them the leadership they want.
I do not suppose there is anyone in the War Office today who knows more about the value and importance of the Special Air Service than my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State. He will also know the hostility that existed to the Special Air Service in the War Office during the war, based on a deep-rooted fear and dislike of private armies, until the Special Air Service, the Long Range Desert Group, and the Special Boat Service of Raiding Forces Mediterranean had proved their sterling worth. I hope we shall have a Special Air Service Division as soon as possible.
Finally, I want to say a word about the broad design of training. I welcome the new Regular engagement as mentioned in the Memorandum. It will be further improved by the new proposal put forward in pages 4 and 5 of the Memorandum, that of a 22-year engagement with an option to leave the Army at three-yearly intervals. I believe that the argument that National Service training is a waste of time is proving more and more to be a false argument. It may be a waste of time if it is measured in the narrow sense of earnings lost, apprenticeships interrupted and university careers deferred. I do not believe it is a waste of time when measured in


terms of developing the national character, of broadening the mind, and, above all, of training the young men of the nation in leadership.
We are desperately short of leaders today at every level in our national life, and most of all in industry. All too many of those who ought to be leading the nation today are just precious dust on some half-forgotten battlefield. The names round the wall of this Chamber remind us of our own loss in two World Wars. I believe that this National Service training is doing something to fill that gap. Although the Estimates we are discussing tonight involve the spending of great sums of our national treasure, we should not only look at it in terms of weapons and formations, but we should remember that this training and service in the Armed Forces is paying its dividend as well in national morale and national courage.

8.21 p.m.

Mr. Edward Short (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central): I wish briefly to mention a subject which arises from the Amendment, which asks for certain measures to reach a higher efficiency in training. I desire to call attention to the need which I believe exists for a higher standard of efficiency in Army teaching. I am not talking about advanced training in the Army, but the training in the first few weeks when the recruit arrives, because I think that those few weeks set the tone for the whole of his soldiery.
During the last 25 or 30 years there have been tremendous advances in the technique of teaching in the universities and in educational institutes. I believe that instruction in the Army has rather lagged behind. To give instruction, three things are needed—certain personal qualities with which I am not concerned here; a knowledge of the subject; and a very definite knowledge of the technique of putting that subject across. Our instructors are second to none in the world in their knowledge of the subject, but I believe that they are not good enough in their knowledge of the technique of putting it across. That is because in the training of the instructors that aspect is not sufficiently expressed.
I am sorry that the noble Lord the Member for Pentlands (Lord John Hope) has gone. I started my Army training within the same forbidding walls as he

did, and I have suffered as much as anybody from the verbal lashings of R.S.M. Britton. While I retain the highest degree of affection for that worthy gentleman, the training I got there was about the least intelligent I have had anywhere.
From there I went to the depot as an officer of a very famous light infantry regiment in the North-East of England, the Durham Light Infantry. There, under an enlightened commanding officer, I commanded for a time the training company, and the standard of teaching was raised to a high degree of efficiency. I am glad that the Secretary of State has recognised the efficiency and the tradition of this great regiment by selecting it to be one of the regiments to have a second battalion. On behalf of the regiment, I should like to thank him for that.
Under the stress of war two great experiments were carried out, and I was partly concerned with one. The first one was in Canada and, speaking from memory, I think it was called Brand-ford. The second experiment was conducted in England and was called Brancepeth. In that experiment a psychologist was brought from Oxford and he spent many weeks analysing all the lessons of the weapon-training pamphlets. Out of that experiment beneficial results came in the re-writing of the pamphlets. That was done during the war, and if the Minister turns up the results of that experiment he will find that what was done has led to greater efficiency and the saving of considerable time.
This should be a constant process, and I should like to make a concrete suggesttion. The Army ought to have a college of instructional technique, which should have two functions. Its main function would be to carry out research in conjunction with the university training departments and the university institutes of education and, above all, with the Army Education Corps. That would be a most useful function of the Army Education Corps and it would help to integrate it with the training of the rest of the Army, giving it a more stable and integrating purpose than it has at present. Its second function would be to run advanced courses, and from those courses the very latest developments in instructional technique would percolate down into the training depots.
The Secretary of State said we did not want to waste the time of the National Service man. I could not agree with him more, but if we have inefficient teaching, or even dull teaching, it will waste time. If the right hon. Gentleman turns up the results of the Brancepeth experiment, he will find how time was saved by going into the matter in a systematic and scientific way. If teaching is dull, it will frustrate the recruits, and, as I said, that will set the tone of the whole of their soldiering. If the right hon. Gentleman will look into the whole question of the technique of teaching in the Army, his efforts will be well rewarded.

8.27 p.m.

Mr. W. F. Deedes: The hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short) has applied to his remarks certain practical experience which he has had in relation to training. I want to do the same thing with my remarks in relation to the Z Reservists. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) said something about the Z Reserves in seconding the Amendment, but otherwise we have not heard much about the training which began last year and will be continued this year.
One ought to begin by saying how limited must be the picture of any individual Z Reservist. I was among them but, in offering to the right hon. Gentleman certain suggestions about their training, I recognise that no one man could see more than a fraction of what happens to the Z Reservists, and to that extent my remarks are limited.
I will begin with a word on the subject of the papers which are sent to the Z Reservists before they begin their training. This is an all-important moment to the man who will be called up for 14 days, for it is the moment when he decides if it is a good idea and whether he will enjoy it or not. It would help enormously if the candidate could be put into the picture a little more fully and told why he is required in the Service with which he is to train.
In this training there has necessarily to be a good deal of cross-posting, and men are summoned for the 14 days' training to an arm of the Service which is not necessarily that in which they were employed

during the war. It is out of the question for the right hon. Gentleman to send each man a personal letter, but these men would have a very much better idea of why they are wanted if each Service could send a letter to them explaining the needs of the Service. For instance, it would help if a man could be told that the Royal Army Service Corps was short of 6,000 men and that he was wanted to learn his job in that branch.
My second point concerns the training of the Z Reservist. One does not want to generalise on such an obviously wide range of training as must be employed when there are 145,000 men in the different arms of the Service. However, it struck me as extraordinarily difficult to give the N.C.O., and particularly the junior N.C.O., his money's-worth in the 14 days available. That is obviously difficult because, apart from the extreme efficiency of the permanent staff instructors provided by the Regular Army, the machinery which surrounded the Z Reservists in the call-up last year took from the junior N.C.O. called up a great deal of the responsibility which would otherwise have been his and should be his.
As I understand it, this form of training is designed not only to familiarise those called to it with the weapons, the technique, and so on, of the arm to which they are called, but also to give them an idea of the place they will eventually occupy in the chain of command. In view of what the right hon. Gentleman and others have said before now about the vital necessity of getting the junior N.C.O.s to hold the right attitude towards their job, it seems to me important to step up the responsibilities that they get out of their 14 days training, if one can do it. There is nothing more difficult, if I may say so as one myself, than to train the amateur N.C.O. to do the job as he would do it in the Regular Army.
My final word on the training of the Z Reservists is to correct a general misapprehension, namely, that the entire 14 days should be devoted to instruction by lecture, by cinema and by other agreeable and not very strenuous means in subjects on which perhaps the soldier has got out of date since the end of the last war. There was a tendency, I think there still is, to regard anything that is not instruction on new technique as a complete waste


of time. My experience was that it was an admirable thing that those 14 days included some elementary drill—what I think is called "square bashing"—and the more rudimentary and strenuous military arts. I say that for this reason, that particularly among the specialist arms of the Service there is a need to get what experience can be got in those things. In my unit, which I will not specify, there were one or two who experienced the greatest difficulty in firing a rifle.
It is a fact that, with the enormous tail to which the right hon. Gentleman referred in his remarks earlier this afternoon, there are thousands of men today who, once an emergency comes upon us, do not take a very military part in the war. They are concerned in the 101 administrative and technical aspects of the Army and may get through the war without firing a rifle or any of the small arms of which they ought to be masters, in view of the remarks made recently by the Prime Minister on the mobile columns. The growth of the technical services has emphasised the need to make this 14 days' training for those going into the tail of the Army an opportunity to learn about the weapons and the elementary military arts of which they might otherwise not get to know anything.
In regard to the training of the Z Reservist, a tribute is overdue for the work done by the Regular Army and the Regular Army instructors. They had this scheme imposed upon them at short notice and it is quite clear that in order to meet it last year they were stretched to the absolute limit. One hopes it will be different this year. I feel that the success of this training scheme last year, when out of 145,000 called up only 100 had to be prosecuted for failing to attend, has been rather taken for granted without attributing it to the part played by the Regular Army instructors.
The instructors were called upon to work four or five months at a stretch. They regarded it as all in the day's work, and I certainly should not suggest that there should be any rate of training or instructional pay for them. They would not desire that. They realise that if they were not engaged on this work, they might be doing something less pleasant. It is arduous work, and calls for great patience among those concerned.
In the long run it is astonishing that a scheme which began with so many misgivings, not only among those who took part in it but amongst those who criticised it when it was introduced, should end with so few grievances. I attribute this largely to the attitude of mind which the Regular Army adopted to the whole scheme from its inception. There was brought to bear towards this form of training a splendid balance of mind, a flexibility of mind which some hon. Members opposite occasionally suggest is lacking in the Regular Army and particularly among senior officers.
The treatment of the Z Reservists was a fine advertisement for the flexibility of mind of the Regular soldiers. They balanced, on the one hand, the minimum of discipline, which there must be if men are being trained in those numbers, even for 14 days, with, on the other hand, the knowledge that they were training men who were amateur soldiers and had been uprooted for only 14 days. The Regular soldier in all these things has his little ways. A great many of them were waived, and waived deliberately, in order to make this thing possible—indeed, popular—with those concerned.
I felt a little wistful at the equipment, and the amount of it, that was bestowed upon these men in relation to what has in the past been bestowed upon the training of the Territorial Army. The lavishness of what was delivered to those in, volved in Z Reserve compared very favourably with what the Territorial Army has had for training before or since the last war. None the less, there was much good to be said on that point.
A great deal of credit has been given to the Z Reservist, and much has been said about his spirit. I do not want to say anything to underrate that, but in accepting the scheme, which is to be repeated this year—if my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing is to have his way, it would be repeated on a scale which involves some of the Z Reservists, which is not a bad idea, in training in Germany; at least, it should be on as big, if not a bigger, scale this year—the country ought not to underrate the skill of the Regular officers, N.C.O.s and other ranks who are essential towards its success.
We all rejoice in the success of the scheme. The country, which in times of


peace tends almost to take its Regular Army very much for granted, should recognise how much it owes to the Army in this form of training of a very important section of our reserves.

8.38 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): It is a useful system which allows a special Amendment to be interwoven with the main Estimates debate, and such Amendments range from the gay, such as we had during the Navy Estimates last week, to the graver, more serious and very important theme of the training of the Army tonight. We are indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Sir S. Holmes) for providing us with this facility and chance of turning the limelight on to what must always be one of our main considerations if we are to have an efficient Army.
The criticisms have ranged widely and have shown considerable variety. I should like to answer those criticisms in the order in which they were made, although that will, I am afraid, make for a somewhat disjointed reply.
First the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) spoke about spreading the annual training period over a longer part of the year, and instanced the difficulty caused to industry by having that period concentrated in a few months of the year. The tendency towards doing that has in fact already been evidenced, but I think—and my right hon. Friend agrees—that the point is one well worth looking into in order to see whether that tendency can be extended further.
I am not forgetting the main burden of the speeches of the mover and seconder, to which I will come later on. The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) asked whether we were satisfied that the training of National Service men in more specialised types of units was satisfactory. He said that in one case he knew of a National Service man who said he had only twice been on the range.
I think the best answer to that is to point out that since the Prime Minister decided that such units—technical units, depots, training establishments and so on—were to be given definite operational

tasks and trained in mobile columns their training has been taken up with great keenness. They are to have their efficiency tested this summer along with other troops, and exercises will be arranged for that special purpose.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich asked about physical fitness of men and whether they were guided into tasks for which their physique equipped them. That point is constantly under review. I know it to my own cost because constantly I get letters about medical boards and the condition of particular National Service men. We are very jealous to see that a man fit only for light duty is not given more than light duty to carry out.
Many points were made in an able speech which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) clearly felt deeply. He wanted to be satisfied as to the provision of armoured personnel carriers and spoke about the kangaroos. The position is that a new six-wheeled armoured personnel-carrier is coming into production which we consider to be better than the Kangaroo. I saw them the other day at an infantry demonstration at Warminster being used in an exercise.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Are they tracked or wheeled?

Mr. Hutchison: I think they are wheeled, but I should like to check up. My information is that they are wheeled, but they are used for cross-country work. My hon. and gallant Friend asked whether any plans were made for airdrops for supplying troops in a forward area. Of course this question is being studied. It came into prominence in the last war and is obviously a method of supplying troops in forward areas, particularly if those areas tend to be cut off. The difficulty at present is the provision of suitable aircraft, but the problem is not lost sight of and already there are improvements in packing methods.
My hon. and gallant Friend spoke of the necessity for flexibility of modem infantry and the need for them to be able quickly to change their objective. That is emphatically realised and I will come to that matter in more detail a little later. He and other hon. Members spoke of the role of the Home Guard. My hon. and gallant Friend said he hoped they


would be given a sort of commando role. I want to emphasise that the Home Guard are not, at any rate in the earlier stages, to be mobile units. Consequently, their responsibility and the locality they will be called upon to defend will be within a certain area. Within that conception, of course, the whole of the Home Guard training must be directed—and one hon. Member emphasised this point—to be able to do their job properly in respect of that area or vulnerable point. Consequently fieldcraft, mobility, movement at night, concealment and musketry must come into all Home Guard training. We thoroughly agree with my hon. and gallant Friend that the type of men we wish to get into these units are the younger men who have had some war experience and who, for some reason or other, are not able to take part in a more active and more distant role.
The hon. Member for Leith (Mr. Hoy) talked about the desirability of using specialists during their training and service in the sort of role which they would be called upon to fulfil in the field. I think he is absolutely right. A man who is expected to be able to send wireless messages should be constantly tapping the keys in order to become efficient. I have tried to learn to do so myself and I know how necessary it is to be constantly tapping the keys in order to be able to do the work properly.
The hon. Member asked about education and the cost of education in the Army. He is quite right. The £2½ million of which he spoke is shown in some considerable detail if he will look at pages 196 and 197 of the Estimates. And as he rightly said, the Army educational service provides education for the children of those serving overseas and indeed sometimes for the children of those serving in other Services. At the present time it is a problem as to how that is to be carried on in Germany so that the children there can get the best possible form of education. I am pleased to state that the Army educational services operate in all circumstances for the resettlement of soldiers when they are about to leave the Army and go back into civilian life.
My hon. Friend the Member for Pentlands (Lord John Hope) spoke about the need for the area of responsibility being pointed out to Home Guard units.

That, of course, will be done. The Home Guard being largely, not immobile, but having modified mobility, there will be unit and sub-unit areas of responsibility which will be pointed out.
My hon. Friend asked who was responsible for the training of the Home Guard. We have thought it wiser, instead of having a Home Guard directorate, as existed during the last war, that the Home Guard should be taken under the direct care and charge of the ordinary departments or ordinary branches in the Army. So ultimately the training of the Home Guard comes under the Director-General Military Training, with a special colonel, a G.1 at the War Office, concerned only with training matters of the Home Guard. At each Command there is a G.1 concerned with the training of the Home Guard, and I think that that system will give satisfaction.
A point was made by the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow), who asked about N.C.O. instructors, and whether it was possible for them to study more closely the civilian psychology of the modern Army, which is doing so well in the theatres to which it goes. It is hard to see how one can, particularly in the time and with the facilities available, teach, for example, psychology to an instructor. But surely psychology enters into the handling of men and the character of the post-war Army. As it has altered I think it must be automatic that those who are instructors must change their outlook and, if they are to be good instructors, be able to fit into the picture.
The hon. Member made a point which I am afraid I cannot answer at the moment about Anti-Aircraft Command, and that it must not be a repository for those artillery officers who do not make the grade elsewhere. The point will be noted, as indeed will all the points made tonight, and will be looked into.
Then there was the interesting and able speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Baker White). He wanted to be sure that there was a proper balance between the "square bashing," as I think he called it, and the field firing range and tactical instruction. I think that there is. The amount of time


now available for pure drill on the barrack square has been very much cut down compared with the amount of time available in the old days.
The basic unit training, the beginning of the training of the National Service man, now occupies only six weeks. It took months before the war. Nevertheless, I will have another look at the programme and the curriculum to make sure that the best use is being made of the time available.
Then he mentioned something about outfit allowances, a matter which will also be looked at. I do not think that it came quite within the ambit of training. He also mentioned the Special Air Service Regiment with which I had a considerable amount of experience and for which I have the greatest respect. When my right hon. Friend winds up the debate he will probably say something on that theme.
Then there was the interesting and temperate speech on the question of the technique of training by the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short). I appreciate the three needs. They are fundamental needs in all the training that he instanced. We have a tremendous need of instructors. They are being called for by the Territorial Army in ever-increasing numbers. When a unit selects a man as being of the type to become an instructor in tactical and other matters he is, first, sent on an instructional course.
That gives some guarantee that he will know the proper technique for putting his teaching across. Then there are Methods-of-Instruction teams who go around the whole time watching instruction throughout the Army to make sure that the instruction is being given in the right way, and that it is up to the most modern technique in content as well as in method. They link up also with the operational research group who are the people who see that the most modern teaching is made available to the instructors. They are, in fact, the people who instruct the instructors or see that they are as up to date as they can be.
I have not had time to look at this aspect in great detail. While it may not be perfect, and I do not know, I feel satisfied, and I think that the hon. Gentleman will be satisfied, that we are doing a great

deal to see that the instruction which is given is properly given, and that it is up-to-date.
Finally, there was the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) in which he introduced the theme of the papers sent to Z Reservists putting the men into the picture about the sort of job they will ultimately be expected to do. I think that there is something in the theory. It is, of course, the old idea of Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, who always believed in letting all ranks know as much as possible about what they were to be called upon to do. If the hon. Member will let us see whether there is anything more to be done along those lines, I should be glad.
But, in talking about Z Reservists, let us remember that the scheme went well last year. Perhaps it went off better than anybody expected. But there are very few Regulars in England this year to look after these Z Reservists. They have been called upon for other duties.
I want to revert for a moment before I conclude to the main theme of the mover and seconder of the Amendment. It was: how were we seeing that the training of today was the training that would be required in the sort of warfare with which we might expect to have to deal?
It has been said today that we must anticipate that there will be a mass onslaught by large numbers of infantry, almost irrespective of casualties, and we were asked how we proposed to deal with that. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), also touched upon this theme, which goes right back to the time when the chief feature of the British Army was musketry—giving to the defence the volume of fire power which it must have in order to stop that sort of attack.
So we come back to the small arms fire and the question of the rifle, the light machine gun, the medium machine gun—and here may I say that an improved pattern of the medium machine gun is at the pilot model stage—and, for fighting at very close quarters, the Sten gun.

Mr. Paget: Could the hon. Gentleman say which rifle?

Mr. Hutchison: I will leave that theme, which is still under discussion, because the hon. and learned Gentleman knows as much about it as I do, as the statement


was made publicly by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister not long ago. I am bound to say, however, that there is a great deal to be said in favour of the 280, but there are many facets to be considered and many influences which play on the situation.
The British Army has always concentrated on musketry, which has been at the basis of all its training. We have always had the highest standards, such as was indicated by the letter sent by an East African soldier in the 1914–18 war who was in an isolated post in no sort of contact with the enemy, but who wrote: "Sir, I have the honour to report that I am surrounded by 300 Germans. Please expedite the arrival of one Service rifle, mark III, and 300 rounds of ammunition."
That is the sort of standard which the British Army has always tried to inject into its musketry, and I must say that musketry is very much to the fore at the present time. For example, in a passing-out parade at a school in Worcestershire the other day, out of 36 cadets passing-out, 20 passed as first-class shots and none failed. Again, the other day, at an international rifle competition held in B.A.O.R., the British Army walked off, as I hope it always will, with the first prize. These are not isolated cases, and I only quote them to show the importance that we still attach to musketry.
Infantry anti-tank equipment and fire power, mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing, has been considerably increased since the war, and they now have the Energa grenade, fired from the rifle, the rocket launcher, which derives from the Bazooka, to which some hon. Members opposite have referred. There is also the 17-pounder anti-tank gun, and all these things considerably improved the antitank fire which modern infantry needs to possess.
The point has also been made that modern warfare demands a very high technical skill, and that is very present in our thoughts. In order that this technical skill may be constantly improved in the Territorial Army and the Supplementary Reserve, the number of permanent staff instructors allotted to those units has been immensely increased since the time when I had the honour to command a Territorial unit, and we plan to increase it still further.
The point has been rightly made that there is great danger in formulating and planning our training by basing it on experience in the concluding stages of the last war, when we had air superiority and artillery superiority. This matter is constantly in our thoughts, and the danger is recognised in every exercise which the Army undertakes at the present time. Much thought is devoted to it, based on the situation which obtained in 1940 and not that of 1945.
That leads us, as has been said, to training in rapidity of movement and decision of young officers, training in movement by night instead of by day, and all forms of deception and concealment. It is very clearly realised, and the necessity never to forget it is very much appreciated.
Although the subject has not been mentioned today, I want to say a word on the atom bomb because I think it may be of general interest. In this matter, too, the training authorities have by no means been idle. The problem of protective clothing has been considered in very great detail, and although I cannot disclose to the House just how far that has gone, from what I have been told the situation certainly justifies a feeling of confidence. The matter is being understood and mastered.
Demonstrations of atom bombing are now being held in the Army, and representatives from all over the world—friendly nations, of course—come to study them and the lessons that can be learned from them. I am going to one the day after tomorrow. A pamphlet is in print at the present moment and will very soon be issued to all troops telling them what action they can and should take in the event of atom bombing.
There will take place this year on Salisbury Plain the training of two Territorial divisions using up to brigade units. It will be a composite training, that is to say, training of the units up to brigade formations. They will be using a considerable proportion of staff officers who will be called up for that period, because it is recognised to be immensely important that staff officers at present in industry and who will be called up in the event of war should be given training which will equip them to fit quickly into the task they would have to perform in the event of war.
One word about officers. As has been said this evening, our main source of supply of officers is Sandhurst. Indeed, we are examining the desirability of lengthening the Sandhurst period. I think it was my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury who said it should be shortened. With all the complications and technicalities of modern warfare, that is just not possible. Indeed, it is more a question of whether the period at Sandhurst should, in fact, be lengthened. At the same time, we are also examining whether it is possible to cut some of the gap between the passing of the Sandhurst examination and getting into Sandhurst, which at the present time may be quite considerable.
But Sandhurst does not fulfil all the requirements of the Army at the present time, and so, as my right hon. Friend has already said, we are examining the possibility of getting a supply of officers to the technical branches of the Services through a pre-Sandhurst school designed to attract at an earlier age boys who will ultimately become officers in such specialist services as the Ordnance Corps, R.E.M.E. and the R.E. But I want to emphasise that neither at Sandhurst nor at the pre-Sandhurst school will there be any need for a candidate to have any private income at all.
I think I have answered most if not all of the points raised during this interesting debate.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Could the hon. Gentleman give us some further details about the preparations going on for the protection of soldiers against the atom bomb?

Mr. Hutchison: They are being trained in the action which they must take in the field to minimise the effect of an atom bomb attack. That is all part of the training. The training will be set out in pamphlet form and issued to all troops. I have no doubt the hon. Member will be interested to receive a copy of that pamphlet and to study it, and perhaps even to take evasive action himself some day.
I do not want the House to feel we are completely satisfied that all is well. That can only be so if there is constant research, study and examination of every changing problem. But I think the War Office and the training staffs are abreast

of military needs and that the training of the Army is good.
If any hon. Member is interested and would like us to arrange a visit to a school or an exercise at any time, my right hon. Friend and I would be glad to receive names and to try to arrange it. There Members will be able to see the advances that have been made in the technique of training since the war. I think they will be satisfied that the role played by the Army and National Service men, particularly in Korea, bears evidence of the fact that our training programme has not been built on shifting sands.

9.7 p.m.

Sir S. Holmes: The House has devoted itself for the last two hours and seven minutes to discussing my Amendment. I feel it would be for the convenience of the House and of future speakers to dispose of that Amendment so that all subjects concerning the Army may be discussed and not merely a limited Amendment of this kind. I should like to thank the Minister for his reply, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

9.8 p.m.

Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: I think it would be in order to congratulate the Under-Secretary of State for War on the accomplished and lucid way in which he replied to the Amendment and to compliment him from this side of the House on his much better frame of mind than when last he spoke.
When the Secretary of State, in his very witty and entertaining fashion, opened the Army Estimates this afternoon, I thought he was taking credit for rather too much. He was implying, for instance, that the saving of 10,000 men from various headquarters and other static formations had been his doing, but of course he knows perfectly well it was not. It was done very largely as a result of the activities of the Templer Committee which was taken over by General Callander before the General Election and had very little to do with the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member is quite wrong.

Mr. Wyatt: If it is quite wrong, I think we should have the evidence.

Mr. Head: I do not want to squabble about the saving of these men. I can assure the hon. Member that General Callander did not leave England for B.A.O.R. until a very long time after the General Election.

Mr. Wyatt: When I saw General Callander in Germany in August, it had already been decided that he should take over the Committee.

Mr. Head:: The hon. Member is being a little too smart and I am not going to let him get away with it. General Callander at that time was commanding a division in Germany. If the hon. Member is suggesting that in commanding a division in Germany he was carrying out this Committee's task, then it is rubbish. I can only state the fact that the Templer Committee carried out this duty in England, and subsequently, quite a long time after the General Election, General Callander who had then ceased to command a division started out on his pilgrimage to extend the activities of the Callander Committee. The fact that the hon. Member met General Callander in Germany had nothing to do with this case.

Mr. Wyatt: The right hon. Gentleman is quite wrong. In August General Callander was acting Commander-in-Chief in Germany and was not commanding a division at all. I have now established a claim for knowing at least as much about it as the right hon. Gentleman does.
One of his so-called savings I thought was particularly interesting, namely, the 10 per cent. cut in the War Office staff. I suppose there must be some simple explanation of this, but when one comes to look at Vote 3, far from there being a 10 per cent. cut in the War Office staff, whereas the War Office staff numbered 7,451 last year, in the coming year it will number 7,734—an increase of 280 odd.

Mr. Head: If the hon. Gentleman wishes to be controversial I can beat him. This increase has come about not during my régime but as a result of the pile-up of last year, and in the same way the decrease which we have now made will be shown next year. It is a question of the sins of the father showing up in this Estimate and the virtues of this Government showing up in next year's Estimate.

Mr. Wyatt: The cut therefore appears to be an extremely delayed action cut, and appears hardly to have any real effect at all.
There are a number of matters which the right hon. Gentleman used to twit us about when he was in opposition, and now that he has assumed his present office he has found how wrong he was in the past. He has hardly been gracious enough to admit it. For instance, there is the striking example of the local overseas allowances in Korea on which the right hon. Gentleman has been dodging my Questions during the last few months. He constantly told us that we should pay these local overseas allowances. He even went through the rigmarole of pretending that, when he became Secretary of State, he was considering the matter and would revise it. What has happened? There is no mention of it in the Army Estimates today. He was utterly wrong and he has not had the grace to admit it.
Then we had his jeers at the Class Z Reserve system last year, when he told us that it was no good at all and that the call-up period was not long enough.

Mr. Head: I should keep off this if I were you.

Mr. Wyatt: There is nothing that we have to be afraid of.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman will find out.

Mr. Wyatt: I do not know if the right hon. Gentleman is going to try to emulate his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and produce some strange secret paper, because there is nothing that he can produce which can be critical of our policy or the stand we are now taking.
There was an interesting item in the Estimates which needs a good deal more examination, because it bears some relationship to the great claim which the right hon. Gentleman made to the effect that he was going to get far more divisions out of the present number of men in the Army than we had. I remember his very brilliant speech last year in the Army Estimates debate when he explained how this was going to be done, and when he said how shameful it was that our divisional slice was far greater than the Russians'. He has got 10,000 men out of operational headquarters and


static formations and he is going to form seven new battalions. Is it not a strange thing to form seven new battalions when the battalions in Austria and Trieste are well below strength and when there are many others in other parts of the world which are below strength? Would it not be better, instead of having battalions well below strength, to bring them up to strength?

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman, who has so much experience in these matters, will appreciate that the formation of seven new battalions does not take up 10,000 men. He will further realise that the gradual making up of the strength of the battalions can be done from the surplus of that amount. I would also point out that in my speech of a year ago, to which he referred in such favourable terms, I did not mention, as he said, that we were going to form new divisions. I said I thought a saving could be made in the tail and that the increase could be made in the teeth, and I think that has been done.

Mr. Wyatt: It was certainly done by us before the right hon. Gentleman got to his present office. He has certainly been unable to make any improvement on it. I know that seven battalions do not require 10,000 men. They would require, perhaps, 7,000 or a little less. But surely he is not going to claim that if all those savings were drawn from static formations and headquarters, they would be fit to go into front line infantry battalions, because that is clearly not so.
Then there is the question of the 280 rifle, which is the one case where the right hon. Gentleman has made a startling departure from the policy of the Labour Government without any conspicuous success. It had already been decided that the280 rifle would be put into production, even if it were impossible to achieve standardisation with the Americans. The basic reason for deciding that was that we, unlike the Americans, could not afford to wait any longer for a new rifle. The Americans have a semi-automatic rifle; we have not. We are still using the Boer War pattern. There seems to be no logical reason why we should not get on with the large-scale production of this rifle so that, in two or three years, it would begin to come out in fairly large numbers.
This is a vital thing for the British Army, for two reasons. First of all, it is vital to morale, because when the 280 rifle was published to the world as having been invented there was a tremendous surge of pride throughout the British Army, which thought, "Here is a British weapon, which is the finest of its kind in the world; not even the Americans have a better rifle." That made for a very high morale, but that has all been damped down.

Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan: May I interrupt?

Mr. Wyatt: I am sorry. I have been interrupted so often by the Secretary of State that I shall never be able to complete my speech if I give way. All this advantage of morale has been completely lost.
The second reason is that this new rifle is a very superior weapon. The British soldier is put once again into a position where he can deal with greatly superior numbers, and that is what he will always have to do in any future wars, if there are any. The best way to give him confidence is to give him a rifle which is a semi-automatic weapon and with which he can really take on vastly superior numbers of troops.
For both these reasons it has been an absolute disaster that the Conservative Government have wavered and shillyshallied, and finally practically abandoned the 280 rifle except for putting it into experimental production. It is shameful treatment of a British invention which would give the British Army a fine new spirit.
Until the General Election we were told by hon. Members opposite that our Army in Korea was not properly trained. Even the right hon. Gentleman, in the defence debate last year, said that he thought the Labour Government had made a mess of our defences. If he looks up his speech in the defence debate last year, he will find that is what he said.

Mr. Head: It was nothing to do with Korea.

Mr. Wyatt: What it has to do with Korea is that the British Army has been demonstrated there as the finest Army in the world, and this Army was produced under a Labour Government. [Laughter.] Oh, yes. Whilst the right hon. Gentleman


was saying that the Labour Government were ruining our defences and our Army, they managed to produce the finest Army in the world. In fact, we left him with a far better Army than has ever been left by a Conservative Government in peacetime. [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen opposite laugh, but that will in no way rub away the fact that the Labour Government produced the finest Army Britain has ever had in peace-time in her history.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) reminds us that when Lord Haldane went to the War Office he said, "What kind of Army do we want and what do we want it for?" I think that was a very sound approach. For a short while, I should like to consider what is the role of the Army in the "cold" war in which we are most unfortunately engaged, what it has to contend with, and why it has been constructed in the way it has been.
It does not do any harm from time to time to remind ourselves of what the British Army might be up against in Europe should a war break out. We sometimes forget that the Russians have 175 front-line divisions and 40 antiaircraft and artillery divisions. We are also inclined to overlook the 60 to 70 divisions which the satellite States have under arms, which are a very powerful addition. The support of all these armies by 20,000 aircraft makes them a tremendously formidable proposition, particularly in view of the fact that the Russians are better armed now than they were in 1945.
In 1945, after the war, we in the West demobilised to less than 30 per cent. of our 1945 strength and the Russians to only 60 per cent. of theirs. In Moscow it is boasted that the Red Army has maintained the hold of Russia over the satellite countries. We know the dismal story of Czechoslovakia and the attempt to push us out of Berlin at the time of the Berlin blockade. I should like to remind the House of something said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) last year, which I thought was an extremely important point. He said:
His Majesty's Government are alive to the potential threat to Yugoslavia from the swollen armed forces of the satellites which has been emphasised by hostile Soviet and satellite propaganda."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 731.]
He went on to give, I think very justifiably and correctly, a guarantee to Yugoslavia

from this country. But that guarantee to Yugoslavia cannot be implemented if we do not maintain our Army at the size put down in the present Army Estimates. Apart from Europe, there has been a tremendous Communist adventure in Korea, and we cannot be sure that the Communist adventure is not a plan to draw our troops from Europe, and that there will not be further pressures in Asia in order to pull more troops away.
The part of the British Army in all this is not only to provide the best part of a division in Korea, not only to provide troops to fight Communist terrorists in Malaya, not only to cope with the situation in the Middle East—a sitution which has left us without one active division to act as a strategic reserve in this country—not only to provide for garrisons in many other places, but also to give effective assistance to the defence of Europe, which is probably the most important role it may have to undertake.
The Russians, we know, have got 26 divisions in Germany and nearby, 22 of which are armoured. The West has got only 18 to 20 divisions in Western Europe with which it can meet those 26 Russian divisions. It is fairly certain that the Russians could still get to the Channel within a few weeks without even having to reinforce those 26 divisions beforehand, without having to give us the valuable warning which those reinforcements moving up would give us before an attack was launched. By the end of this year we shall be strong enough to make them give us that valuable advance warning. The next stage is to be strong enough to hold up an initial Russian attack long enough to mobilise our armies and factories in Western Europe, and to receive aid from America before it is too late.
Although the Russians and the satellites have got such large armies under arms, transport and other difficulties make it unlikely, in my view, that a Communist attack could be launched with more than 80 to 100 divisions. Russian divisions are much smaller than ours, but to offset that, one must also remember that the Russians do not believe in the administrative services which we give to our troops. They do not have postal units and various conditions which Western troops demand, and, I think,


rightly demand. Therefore they have very little tail.
An initial attack by 80 to 100 Russian divisions could be held by some 50 to 60 divisions in Western Europe. In my view, the second stage of preparedness must be reached by such time as the Russians are likely to have a stockpile of atom bombs. It is undoubtedly the fact that we have the atom bomb and they have not, which figures so largely in the schemes of the Kremlin. They may well calculate that when they have a stockpile of atom bombs, one stockpile will cancel out the other, and at that point the conventional weapons and army become supreme. We must have enough on the ground and in the air to hold up a Russian attack.
As well as these 50 to 60 divisions of the defending army, there must be large reinforcements to come forward should war break out and the initial attack be held. The British Army, it is intended, would provide at least 12 divisions promptly to act as reinforcements and the Territorial divisions are the ones which will be used for this purpose. These Territorial divisions are at the basis of all our military planning. If the view becomes generally accepted that the danger of war has receded to the extent that the re-armament element of the arms programme can be virtually abandoned, then the whole of that basis would disappear, as I will seek to show in a minute.
I believe that the Government have been neglecting their duty for electioneering purposes over the last few months, because they have refused to give us any reasons at all why we must retain these large armaments. They have been so busy playing politics with our national defence. [Interruption.] Anybody who has listened to the Prime Minister's last two speeches in this House must have been absolutely convinced that his sole purpose was to try to build up the view that the danger of war had receded, because he hoped to make trouble amongst members of the Opposition. That was the sole reason for his doing so. Otherwise, I presume that the Estimates would have been cut a great deal more.
We must ask ourselves, in what way has the danger of war receded? It has

receded because the Russians have seen that the West is determined to resist aggression through their re-armament programmes. If we accept the course now urged upon us from some quarters, they will cease to think we are so determined and the danger of war will be increased again. We shall not be in a position to meet that danger then.
The Army Estimates would have been much larger, or substantially larger, if the re-armament programme, planned last year by the Labour Government, had been kept going at the target speed which was originally planned. We do not complain of the cuts which have been made in these Estimates, because obviously the military risks have to be balanced with the serious economic situation in the country. The Government were bound to have regard to that, and to take perhaps a little risk in the military field. This has been possible because the re-armament programme itself has had such an effect in raising the morale of the West and in making the Russians realise we are determined to meet aggression. But it is a risk, although it is a risk which the Labour Government would undoubtedly have taken had we still been in office.
There is a suggestion that there should be a cut of £250 million all-told in production and research in the defence programme. I want to examine how such a cut would affect the Army. I cannot imagine anybody would suggest allocating the cut in such a way as to make it fall primarily, largely, or even very much on the Royal Air Force, because it is in that field that we have been comparatively weakest and we have pitifully few aircraft to match against the 20,000 of the Russians.
The amount allocated for aircraft this year is £111 million, an increase of £30 million over last year. Supposing that £30 million were taken off, we still have to dispose of £220 million out of the suggested cut of £250 million. The total increase in the Navy Estimates on shipbuilding and arms is only £60 million. That would still leave £160 million to be found from the Army on the assumption that we take off all increases. It was not suggested that there should be less rearmament than last year. Within the £250 million cut upon production and research alone £160 million would have to


come from the Army if only the increases of this year over last year were taken off the Navy and Air Force.
When one examines Vote 7 of the Army Estimates one sees that out of the net £216 million there is an increase of £81 million over last year, but all the items are not for armaments. Even under the heading of "stores," clothing accounts for £40 million, an increase of nearly £20 million over last year. Nobody would suggest that that item should be cut.
Next comes general stores at £33 million. This covers items such as barrack room accommodation, stores and so forth. Nobody would suggest that our soldiers should be housed inadequately. Then there is a medical stores item of £1,500,000, which nobody would want to cut.
The main item is "Warlike stores," which covers the tanks, the guns, the ammunition, the transport and the supply vehicles of the Army. Only £156 million of the Army Estimates which we are asked to cut will go on providing tanks, guns and all the other weapons of war. If we are to allocate the cuts in such a way as not to expend more this year on the Navy and the Air Force than we did last year, we shall still have to try to take £160 million from production and research in the Army. That would clearly be absurd, because there would be no tanks or guns in the Army next year, and nobody would seriously suggest that.
But one can look at the Estimates to see if anything can be cut out of the large total, because one should do it if one can. First of all, I think it is forgotten that the size of the Reserve Army, on which we depend for our ultimate safety, is growing rapidly. In 1950 the Supplementary Reserve and other Reserves amounted to only 204,000 men, in 1951 the figure was 382,000, and in 1952 it rises to 695,000 men. All these men have to be armed, clothed and equipped.
There is one item in this year's figures which the Labour Government would not have included, and that is the 170,000 men of the Home Guard. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man), could not claim that he would not have put the Home Guard in, because last year in the debate on the Army Estimates

he advocated the formation of a Home Guard in peacetime when he said:
….this suggestion for a nucleus of the Home Guard is something which, however unpleasant it may be, must be seriously and objectively considered.
He was then interrupted by the present Prime Minister who asked him, "In peacetime?" My hon. Friend replied:
Yes, now, in peacetime."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 734.]
However, that did not prevent my hon. Friend from vigorously opposing the formation of a Home Guard when the Bill came before the House, nor from voting against it.
However, we can leave the Home Guard out of it for a moment and there is still an increase this year in the Reserve force of 140,000 men. Why is this? It is largely because this is the second year in which National Service men are completing their two-year service with the active Army and going on to do their three and a half years' compulsory service with the Territorial Army. This is an inevitable increase and will take place again next year.
There are some people in this House who fought vigorously for conscription when the National Service Act came before the House. This scheme was an integral part of that Act, and anybody who supported the Act must support the creation of this Reserve Army, because this is how it came about. But we cannot have the Reserve Army left unclothed, unequipped and unarmed, which is what will happen if any substantial cuts are made in the Army Estimates this year.
Again, this is the second year of the re-armament programme. Another thing that is forgotten is that the item for production and research in the Army Estimates cannot now be cut much further without causing havoc in industry, because the orders were placed last year and production lines in many instances have been laid down. For example, two tank factories have been tooled up to produce tanks and are now doing so. The same applies to the other vehicles and the other items in all three Services. If these were all suddenly cut off, all we should have would be half made tanks, half made Army vehicles—which would not be very suitable for export—and the men employed in those industries would be rendered unemployed whilst they were


being switched back to the export industries. So the remedy advocated would not make the economic situation any better, it would make it worse.
As I have said, there has already been a large cut in the Army Estimates on production and research. It may be that the present plans in the Army Estimates cannot be fulfilled completely but to make a savage cut on them, as has been suggested, would be absolute lunacy at the present stage because it would mean that we should be leaving our troops unarmed and it would not even help in the balance of payments. Since one obviously cannot apply this suggested £250 million cut to production and research, it would mean that in order to try to make the cut it would have to be made in the actual numbers of men in the Navy, Air Force and Army.
For the Army this would be disastrous. It would mean that the British Division in Korea would undoubtedly have to be withdrawn, with absolutely disastrous effect on any influence we may have with the Americans in regard to their policy in Korea since, if we have no troops there at all, we have obviously no influence. We should have to withdraw most of our troops from Malaya and, if we lost Malaya, the balance of payments situation would be irreparably jeopardised. So that would not be very helpful economically.
It is no good having men and a great Reserve Army scheme, as we have, if we are to deny them the food, clothing, arms and equipment necessary to carry out their functions. The total Army Estimates for 1950 were £300 million, for 1951 they had gone up to £418 million and this year they are £521 million. Having regard to the vastly increased size of the Reserve Army, to the tremendous increases in prices, to the fact that much of the production element is due to the replacement of vehicles and weapons which have been in use since 1945 and must be replaced if our soldiers are not to have obsolete arms in their hands, I do not think that the increase is excessive. To cut those Estimates by more than a few millions in the coming year would be to destroy the entire foundation of the British Army and I do not think there could be found many in the House to accept such a proposition.
For those reasons, we give our general approval to the Army Estimates as presented by the Government, and to the intention implicit in them that the Government will try to provide as far as possible the arms and equipment contained in the production element. It may be that there will have to be some short-fall even so, but we cannot believe that the short-fall will be anything of a very tremendous character, nor in my view should it be.

9.40 p.m.

Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan: I will not attempt to follow the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) into all the details of his contradictory speech, with part of which I agree entirely and with part of which I entirely disagree. His general reproof to his right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) we have all noted, and I think he is right; but I think he was wrong on one thing.
If I may say so, being a great deal older and, therefore, coming under the heading of "Colonel Blimp," I say that if the hon. Member thinks that the rifle with which the British Infantry is armed today is the same as it had in South Africa, he needs to think again. The only thing that is the same about it is the calibre: 303. As a weapon, it is entirely different. It is not fair that it should go out from the House of Commons from an ex-Minister to the country, that our infantry today is armed with the same weapon as our troops had in South Africa. If the hon. Member thinks that over, I think he will agree.
The first important thing we all have to remember is the fact that this country is at war. It has always been said that if we had a Labour Government we would never have a war; and of course, almost as soon as the Labour Government came to power, we went to war, but it was never called war. It was always called a police operation or something else. The fact is that this country is at war and has been for a very long time. There is a war in Korea, the same war in Malaya, and the same war in Egypt and in Indo-China. All this is the same war, and let us never forget it. It is not a party political matter—it is a tragic fact.
I want to examine two points only on the Estimates, and on them one could go very wide. The first is the question of the call up. The call up, we all realise,


is necessary, but I ask my right hon. Friend whether he is satisfied that the effect of the call up upon food production—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: I always have the support of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) whether it be Welsh or Watch; we are together in that "Black" is the operative word.
Is it really sensible, I ask my right hon. Friend, that we should at this time call up the agricultural worker? I should be the last—and nobody in the House would deny me that—to try to prevent people from being called up to serve their country. But is it worth while, from the point of labour, expenditure and everything else, to call up workers on the land for a job which, we know perfectly well, they will never perform in war-time?
The first line of defence is food—we cannot get away from that. Without food we find that the finest army is useless.

Mr. Paget: Why are the Government running down stocks?

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: I am not talking about the stockpile; I am talking about the calling up of agricultural workers. I do not wish it to be thought for a moment that the agricultural community are one whit behind anybody else in their desire to serve their country—far from it; but this is a matter of hard common sense. Is it worth while to call up people for jobs which, we know, they will not have in war-time? Would it not be more sensible—I say this with great respect—to call up the young men of the agricultural committee—I am sorry the agricultural community? [Laughter.] I would call up the agricultural committees if I thought there were enough young men upon them. Would it not be better if these young men were passed on to the Home Guard to do the job which they could do usefully, as they did in the last war? Would not that be more sensible so that they could guarantee the food supply? Food is the front line of defence in this country and we cannot get away from that fact. I hope my right hon. Friend will give this matter further consideration.
In connection with the call up there is the question of the three-year Regular engagement, which has had a very considerable effect in Scotland among young agricultural workers. The terms are attractive but the effect will be that when they have done their three years in the Regular Army and their years on the Reserve they will probably never return to agriculture again. Is that sense in these days when we are so desperately dependent on our farms for our food and when every year we will become more dependent, and not less? I leave that matter for the consideration of my right hon. Friend, and I hope he will give us a satisfactory answer.
Under Vote 8 we are dealing with work, buildings and land. There is the repayment of interest charges under the Armed Forces (Housing Loans) Act, 1949, which was announced, I think, a couple of years ago as being a great contribution, first, to housing production in this country and second, to the provision of married quarters. I wish to ask how many married quarters have been provided under this Act. The figure is £190,000 for repayment and interest—what does that represent in actual married quarters provided and so desperately needed in all garrison towns at home or abroad? It would be of interest to the country to know.
Also under Vote 8 is the question of lands. The War Office either rents or owns very large areas of land in Great Britain. We realise that the War Office must have this land for the purpose of training, but we also realise that in this little island there is a very limited area of land available and that food is the first line of defence.
While accepting the fact that we must have tank ranges and ranges for all types of training, are we certain that it is land that can best be spared and that it is the land least capable of food production which is being used for this purpose? Secondly, are we sure that where certain areas are taken by the War Office, quite rightly no doubt, they are being used for the best benefit of food production when they are not being used for training.
The question of aerodromes does not enter into this debate but it provides a typical example of what can and what cannot be done. There are great areas which cannot be used for food production.


Steps should be taken to see they do not produce weeds and dirt which can fly over the countryside due to the War Office not using properly land which must be used for training. I hope my right hon. Friend will look into this matter because food production is the front line of defence in any country, and in this tiny island of ours, with our chances of getting food from overseas getting less and less every year, this matter of food becomes of greater and greater importance. I am sure the War Office can lead the way, if it will, on these matters affecting food production.

9.50 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I do not propose to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) on the rather narrow point with which he has been dealing. Nor do I propose to take part in the private argument between my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) and my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman).
I would add my word of praise to the delightful way in which the Estimates were introduced by the right hon. Gentleman. I felt something of the pleasure one always feels in witnessing the success of an old colleague, because in these Service matters the bonds which have united back benchers over the last six years have always been stronger than the division of party.
I wish to deal with a rather broad aspect of defence generally. The success of military preparation is generally proportionate to one's capacity to guess what will be most needed next time and, to generalise, the next time always turns out to be much more different from the last time than anybody expected. I would ask whether we are really preparing the sort of Army which will win next time.
There has been, in the history of military equipment, a rhythm between elaboration and weight on the one hand and simplicity and lightness on the other. That rhythm is to be found in the military history of the Assyrians, of the Greeks, of Macedonia, of Rome and of medieval chivalry. Then there was the great divide when fire power changed everything. But the cycle started again and the formations of Turenne and Marlborough bear a strange resemblance to those of the Greek

States. With Napoleon we saw the return of the phalanx and with Wellington the legion of the line. Now we are witnessing the return of the armoured warrior.
Each weapon in military history was improved and elaborated until it became a burden which neither the civil nor military economy could bear. All through history that has been so. And each in turn, each elaborated, over-heavy weapon has succumbed to simplicity, generally a simple infantry weapon which enabled many men to fight the few that handled the over-elaborate and over-expensive equipment.
The history of armoured cavalry is particularly interesting. I spent last Saturday in the Tower of London studying that history and observing all the developments. It began with the light cavalry of the Huns which defeated the Legions. They were mounted on tough Siberian ponies and armoured in lacquered leather. The steel-tipped arrow was the answer to lacquered armour and so the early Middle Ages developed chain mail.
Chain mail could not keep out the lance, so, at the cost of another increase in cost and weight, plate armour that turned the point of the lance came in, and was developed and elaborated, first for men and then for horses. No longer was there the wiry pony, but the ponderous shire horse was evolved to carry the knight. Every one of these developments was necessary. It was no use having a second-best knight. The coat of mail could beat the coat of leather and the coat of plate could beat the coat of mail. The fully-armoured knight could beat anything then on earth. But he had become too cumbersome and expensive. The function of the soldier had ceased to be fighting—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: On a point of order. Are we discussing the war estimates of William the Conqueror, or what?

Mr. Speaker: I think the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) was advancing, cautiously but steadily, towards the present age.

Mr. Paget: Mr. Speaker, you have put it precisely. I should like to point out how all this has happened before. We


might learn lessons from history. Military history, in its trends tends to repeat itself.
The function of the medieval soldier had ceased to be to fight. He had become the servitor of the knight, engaged on the supply and maintenance of the knight. Are we not seeing the same thing today?
The morale of the common soldier was destroyed because his fighting power was too obviously inferior to that of the men with the equipment. The stage was reached when only knights fought, and the maintenance of an adequate supply of knights became greater than the civilian economy could bear. That was the history of the Middle Ages. At Agincourt only knights fought—perhaps one-twentieth of the French Army. The French probably had an overall superiority of two to one, but the British Army, all of whom fought, had a superiority of eight to one in fighting effectiveness.
The knights succumbed to a simplification of equipment that enabled the many to fight the few. The English long-bow, the Welsh billhook and the Swiss halberd—simple infantry weapons—defeated the cumbersome knights. That is the history of the Middle Ages.

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: On a point of order. Can we have some information as to about what time we shall get to the Battle of Waterloo?

Mr. Speaker: I must confess that I have been sharing the hopes of the hon. Member. I ask the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), without more ado, to come into the present time.

Mr. Paget: If I had been allowed one more sentence I should have got to Korea. I was about to suggest that the same story which one saw when there were armoured men before has happened again in Korea. It seems to me to be of some importance. The purpose of mechanisation is to enable the maximum fire power to be applied at the vital place.

Sir Edward Boyle: Before the hon. and learned Gentleman completes his historical survey, surely he ought to mention Hannibal's elephants and the Battle of Zama, which provide a good illustration of his point.

Mr. Paget: There are many examples of this nature. I was merely indicating that if one followed the trends of history one saw that we were facing the same sort of situation where an arm has become so elaborate and heavy that neither military nor civilian economy can any longer bear it and where it becomes defeated by a simple infantry weapon. It has happened very often before. We look as though we have mechanised to the point at which there are very few people left to fight.
I have some figures from the Revue Militaire d' Information of July last, which is a report of high French officers who examined the American organisation. What they reported was that the U.S. divisional slice is 60,000. A division is 18,705. Of that division the fighting infantry number 1,159 and, if we bring in the immediate support of the artillery and the tank crews, we get another 1,050 fighting men. That works out in case of the American Army as about one man in 30 fighting.
That is worse than the French at Agincourt. I have not been able to get precisely comparable figures for our Army. I think we are rather better than the Americans—perhaps about one in 20. Is that right?

Mr. Head: The hon. and learned Gentleman asks me, but it depends to some extent how far back one takes the slice. If one takes it right back into the factories and includes the civilian workers engaged in the production of weapons of war—

Mr. Paget: No, in uniform.

Mr. Head: I should not like to say categorically, but I think it is more than one in 20.

Mr. Paget: Let us compare it with the Russian situation. There, we have a slice of 16,000, a division of 11,000, containing 5,000 fighting infantry and 1,200 tank crews and guns. As against the American figure, where one in 30 fights, in the Russian Army, where they concentrate on simpler weapons, we get one in three fighting, and, in the Chinese Army, the proportion is probably higher still.
These are formidable figures to be up against. The Americans so far have not been outnumbered in Korea. After the truce, if it were to be broken, and we


hope it will not be, it may be different, but, so far, they have not been outnumbered. The hordes of Chinese which were constantly reported were really fictions of the imagination, alibis urgently needed by the American commanders. Indeed, reporters on the spot where the hordes were reported had to inquire how many hordes went to a platoon.
Intelligence reports, now that we have been able to examine the situation, indicate that the defenders of the Pusan bridgehead always outnumbered those who were attacking, and that the army that fell back from the Yalu River in pretty serious rout had been beaten by numerically inferior forces which had retained the use of their legs.
The United Nations have enjoyed enormous superiority of personnel, practically unchallenged control of the air and sea, and if we include the air and naval personnel, considerable numbers, and, so far, play is about even in midfield. It is not very encouraging.
What are the lessons? First, that elaboration of weapons leads to a stretching of services and supplies by geometrical progression, since every addition made to the tail involves another addition to service the first addition. It is like the servants in a great house. The more there are, and the more are needed, because the new one is occupied in waiting on the others.
So it is in the Army. The suppliers of the suppliers now far exceed the suppliers of the fighting men. The numbers of transport and communication troops blocking the roads and destroying mobility has made dispersal on lines of communication almost impossible, and I shudder to think what would happen to the supply line of an American or even of an English division—

Mr. F. A. Burden: On a point of order. Are we discussing the Army Estimates or a strategic view developed from the Wars of the Roses?

Mr. Speaker: I think that what the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying is relevant to the Army Estimates.

Mr. Paget: I do not know quite how it is that, whenever I get up, the hon. Gentleman opposite always seems to wish to interrupt me with an irrelevant point of order.
I was saying that I shudder to think what would happen to an American divisional supply line or even to a British divisional supply line, if it had to face an enemy disposing of 12,000 front-line aircraft. We must find an organisation that enables a vastly higher proportion to fight, making possible a great dispersal of the supply lines. That means a very radical change in organisation. One cannot get that by tinkering with the existing organisation.
The second lesson of Korea is that the function of the machine in war is to enable men to fight. It is not a substitute for fighting. In Korea, excessive reliance on the machine has been destructive of morale. Troops have been road-bound; troops have been refusing to leave their vehicles, and it has often been impossible to get a company to attack a hill position without a preparation by heavy bombers. I am referring to the Americans. I think our troops have done a good deal better. Most of these remarks are directed mainly to the Americans.

Mr. Speaker: I think at this point the hon. and learned Gentleman and I must part company. We are discussing our own Army Estimates, and I do not think they should be made the occasion for criticism of the Army of another Power. If the hon. and learned Gentleman can confine himself to showing how the lessons should modify in some way our Army Estimates, well and good. I must ask him to try to restrict his remarks in the way I have suggested.

Mr. Paget: Normally one has to look at the latest war and see its lessons. The war in Korea is largely an American-Chinese war. I am trying to seek its lesson.

Mr. Speaker: When we parted company was when the hon. and learned Gentleman began to talk about the American Army. If he would give us some lessons from the experience of our own troops in Korea, I think it would be perfectly in order.

Mr. Paget: I will link that up with what I am saying. The lesson in Korea—perhaps it is a general lesson—is that there is certainly no substitute for discipline in action. That most certainly has to be stressed.
I will now turn to some concrete suggestions. The first is that since only a small proportion of our Army fights, we must build up the morale of our fighters, for everything depends on their performance. We are—and I said this last year, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State then agreed with me—a Gideon Army, but we are still organised as though we were a mass Army.
The fighting, which after all is the object of the whole exercise, is left to about one-twentieth. But that one-twentieth is not the chosen; it is the residue. The platoon commander delivers the war effort of about 1,000 men, 500 armed and another 500 in the factories, and he is rated by the community as being worth about one-third of a National Health dentist.
The rifleman requires about as much support and service as the medieval knight, but the medieval knight did at least have to win his spurs, while the qualification for the rifleman is generally the negative one of not having enough brains to get into R.E.M.E. This should be changed. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider having a fighting rating in the Army similar to the Royal Air Force wings. This rank should be introduced with an appropriate badge. The trained and qualified fighter who delivers the fire-power of a fighting division should be made to feel he is a select man, not a left-over man, because that feeling will raise his morale.
He should have special pay and privileges because of his responsibility to deliver the power of the Army. He is entitled to as much glamour as an aircrew in the R.A.F. After all, there are fewer men in the Army today who fight than there were ever air crews in the R.A.F. at the end of the war. They are a select band, and we must realise that they are a select band. The pride of individual regiments must be developed, and I am delighted to hear that cross-postings in fighting formations is to be discouraged.
We must also have better officers. They may be good now but we want better still. I was delighted to hear that the right hon. Gentleman is to create a military Dartmouth with entry at 16 years of age. I think it will be an admirable source of officers. Commissioning through the ranks has given us some good officers, and some not so good. Experience in the ranks is more valuable when

an officer mentality has been inculcated first; otherwise service in the ranks sometimes leaves a ranker mentality from which it is not easy to emerge when a man becomes an officer. To draw all officers from the ranks leaves insufficient N.C.O.s of adequate quality. One wants a Dartmouth entry as well as entry from the ranks if one is to have the quality of officer the Army requires. We also want a higher proportion of fighting men. We need far more highly trained light infantry and by that I mean infantry that fights really light. They should carry very little ammunition. When one is moving one uses little ammunition. In the last war the average ammunition expended by an attacking force was less than 10 rounds a man. When one is defending one uses a lot, but then it is generally possible to get it up.
Attacking troops should carry light ammunition and also light rations. It is far better for troops to be occasionally hungry than that they should be tired all the time through being overburdened. Light infantry require a light weapon and light ammunition, and that is why we regard the new rifle as of first importance. When I was in Paris I put this question to General Eisenhower and I have his permission to repeat what he said. In his view standardisation was often being overdone and he had no objection at all to the British having their own rifle. I would say that in a modern supply organisation different ammunition for different divisions makes very little difference, and indeed the value of standardisation above divisional level is somewhat over-rated.
Staff and command still need to be cut down. Organisation in Jives with a small division of 7,000 or 8,000, for which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply was such an enthusiast, requires careful consideration. It provides handier formations and cuts down the staff. It makes for greater mobility and for more men fighting and should be considered seriously.
Supply and transport must be reduced still further. I believe a requisitioning organisation for rations and supply ought to be set up in Germany. This would enable troops to move using local supplies instead of having to carry everything around with them. I should like to see exercises in which formations


bought their requirements of food and petrol to see how they got along without having a supply column. Pray heaven that we do not have a war, but if we have a war we shall be operating in friendly country which will not have been scorched. If our troops are to be mobile and are not to have these desperately vulnerable supply columns they should have the opportunity of learning to live off the country.
We are at a point in history at which the elaboration of the machine has become so excessive that drastic reform is essential. May I refer the right hon. Gentleman to something which he said in this debate last year. Addressing my right hon. Friend, he said:
I would urge the right hon. Gentleman to institute a really searching inquiry into this question. … I entreat him not to leave it too late. Some of us have given lots of tips in the past, and they have not been bad tips, but if I may say so, the Government have never had the full value of putting their money on them because they have left it so late that the odds have shortened and the subsequent benefit has been much smaller."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 818.]
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will pay attention now to his own words. He is in a difficult position. No Army ever reforms itself. Reform always has to be imposed on an unwilling Army by a strong Minister. That has been the history of every Army reform. The position of the right hon. Gentleman is particularly difficult. When a civilian Minister goes to the War Office he meets his staff on equal terms; they are all men at the top of their professions. But the right hon. Gentleman, with the background of the junior staff officer, has a difficult job to maintain his position.
I do not want to put this in any way offensively, but the position of the office boy who is promoted suddenly to be managing director is not altogether a happy one. To succeed he will require quite exceptional qualities. He may very well have them. I hope, and I rather believe, he has. So far he seems to have done very well.
I would urge him to appoint a committee similar to the Esher Committee, under civilian chairmanship, to consider the whole question of reform in the Army organisation. That committee should consider not only our own experience

but German experience, because the Germans produced a pretty good Army. I suggest that if the advice and experience of General Wertphal who was chief of staff to Kesselring and Rommel, could be obtained, it would be invaluable.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is he in gaol?

Mr. Paget: No, he is not in gaol. I regard military reform as very important because in the light of Korean experience our Army must either reform or be defeated. We have reached the watershed in military evolution. We have got to get a new organisation, because the organisation built up on heavier and more elaborate lines than the last war is going to be defeated next time by the lighter forces where far more men are enabled to fight, unless we find the answer in advance.

10.18 p.m.

Mr. Ian Harvey: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) forsook the traditions of the Silent Service to which he has belonged, to address us on these Army Estimates with such eloquence that it is an encouragement to many of us associated with the Army to intervene next year on the Navy Estimates. All of us on this side of the House appreciated his early reference to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War in opening this debate.
The Secretary of State has added a new incentive to the Regular soldier. Not only does he carry along with him the field marshal's baton, but he can now strap on himself the portfolio of a Cabinet Minister. I should like to take up the mild criticism of my right hon. Friend which was made by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton. It seemed to me no bad thing that the office boy should be promoted to managing director; in fact, it is not a principle that has so far been criticised from the other side of the House. I think it is a great tribute to my right hon. Friend that he has already been so successful in office.
This military debate has, so far, been particularly non-militant, apart from the speech of the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt). I am sorry that he has left his place, because I had one or two remarks to address to him; but I think I will leave them unsaid in view of his


absence. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, no!"] Oh, yes! I never kick people when they are not here. My right hon. Friend will no doubt deal with him when he comes to sum up this debate.
In his speech the hon. Member for Aston did deal with an aspect of this debate to which I think we must pay considerable attention. He dealt with the view that war might be less likely to occur now than it was last year. I agree with him, as I disagree wholeheartedly with the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), that that is no reason why we should in any way reduce our vigilance in the matter of our Armed Forces.
At the same time, I think we must pay very considerable attention to the thesis which was clearly outlined in the defence debate, and which has underlined some of the problems of hon. Members on the other side of the House, that if our economy and our defence preparations are overstrained we do leave ourselves open to inroads by the very forces against which we are attempting to defend ourselves.
I think my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for War, has to face up to that problem in the future development of the Army. I believe that we have to ensure that in our Army we do in fact get that to which he himself referred earlier, namely, value for money. In order to do that, I submit that there are three qualities which have to be brought out in our modern Army: first, mobility; second, fire power, and third, efficiency. Only if that is done can we get the maximum power per man to make up for the lack of numbers from which we must inevitably suffer in dealing with the opposition which confronts us.
One thing that worries me in looking through these Estimates—and it has worried me very much in listening to discussions on Army matters in the past—is the absence from our deliberations of the question of mobility by air. I am very much concerned that many of the lessons in that direction which we learned at the end of the last war are in danger of being unlearned, because we have not the equipment with which to carry out those operations.
I ask my right hon. Friend to tell us something about his intentions not so

much with regard to paratroops as to the carrying of infantry into battle by air. I think that is of extreme importance in the future, and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton was very right in underlining in his speech the necessity to look ahead and not to fight the next war on the same basis as the last.
I also agreed very much with what the hon. and learned Member had to say about the mobility of formations in future activity. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend, from his very considerable experience, already has that matter in mind, and may have something to say upon it later this evening.
Turning to the subject of fire power, I should like to deal with the very important question referred to earlier during the debate on the Amendment by the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tam-worth (Mr. Snow), namely, the question of Anti-Aircraft Command. I suggest that we must be very careful in our planning for the future of Anti-Aircraft Command. In the memorandum which accompanies these Estimates some considerable detail is given about the works services involved, and I question most sincerely whether the anti-aircraft measures which are now being taken are likely to be effective against the type of missiles which will be aimed against us.
I should like to recall for a moment my own experience in the last war when for a very long period we tended to expect attack by aircraft flying at the same height and at the same speed. It was a terrible surprise when the aircraft did not fly in at the same height or at the same speed.
I also recall an unfortunate experience which occurred when a very high ranking officer, as he subsequently became—in fact, he has just relinquished the directorship of the Territorial Army—was the brigade major of the formation in which I was serving. He was responsible for issuing an intelligence report in the first days of the war which read, concerning aircraft, "They may fly high or they may fly low," to which I sent the impertinent question, "What happens if they fly in between?"—and that is one of the reasons why, unlike so many hon. and gallant Members on this side of the House, I did not become a brigadier.
Let me refer once again to the specific problem of the type of attack and the


nature of the weapons which will be used in that attack, which dictate the siting of the anti-aircraft weapons. During the debate on the Amendment we had a little discussion about the possibility of using what I might call self-defence methods, and using those working in factories to run out to the gun sites to defend themselves against imminent attack. I am of the opinion that that form of operation is impossible, and will be still more impossible under the conditions which are likely to prevail when the guns will have to be sited, as I believe, too far away for people to be able to get at them instantly.
But I am concerned at the large amount of money which it is obviously planned, and planned as a priority, to spend upon works services for Anti-Aircraft Command. Although I appreciate very much the argument of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), that risks must be taken with forward planning—a point I wish to deal with in a moment—I think that that is the sort of risk it might be very foolish to take in view of the knowledge we have of the potential problem.
Although I do not wish to introduce a militant atmosphere into the debate, must say I think that one of the very unfortunate legacies left to my right hon. Friend is the radar legacy in Anti-Aircraft Command, which has been deplorable over the last few years. We have been far too dependent upon equipment issued during the war for which there were no spares, and over the past seven years the whole situation with respect to radar has become very nearly chaotic.
I am glad to have assurances both tonight and in the Memorandum that this matter is receiving attention, but I had a feeling—it was confirmed by conversations at S.H.A.P.E. when the hon. Gentleman, the hon. and learned Member for Northampton was there—that the most effective way of defending this country against the type of weapon and equipment envisaged is offensive defence, to be so strong in the R.A.F. as to prevent the weapons being dispatched. That is a higher priority in many ways than some of the preparations at present being made.

Mr. Bellenger: Is it the point that Anti-Aircraft Command should be re-

duced and that there should be more concentration put on the R.A.F.?

Mr. Harvey: Yes. We have discussed today the 280 rifle, and I frankly say that my sympathies are with the expressions of view that have, in fact, come from the other side and to some extent from our own. I do not believe that the case has been properly sustained for the scrapping—as it would seem now—of the 280 rifle, because it was clearly made out in the last debate when we discussed this matter that to develop any weapon properly one must have user experience, a period of trial and error, and one must have time. If we are never going to get it because we are waiting for standardisation, then we shall never get any "forrarder" with any form of equipment at any time.
I know exactly what the right hon. Gentleman's problems are; they are very personal ones. I hope he will bring influence to bear in a very high quarter to see that at least some units are equipped with this weapon. I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, that we should specialise, and the airborne forces seem to be the type of force that could be equipped without particular difficulty with the 280 rifle.

Mr. Wigg: Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that we should have two calibres of rifle in the Army at the same time?

Mr. Harvey: Yes, I am. If that cannot be accepted, then a great deal of strength is lent to the argument that we should not introduce the rifle. Either we have to accept uniformity and the older rifle or a period in which we should have two calibres. Frankly, I disagree that there is all that supply problem, and I hope the matter will be pursued with courage and determination. As a gunner, I have taken pride in noting that this rifle was presented to the infantry by a gunner.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West, spoke about the anti-tank weapon. It is a fact that a peace-loving nation is bound to put more stress upon defensive weapons at the opening of any campaign. We saw in the last war that both antiaircraft and anti-tank weapons declined as the threats they were designed to meet declined. But at the beginning of a campaign it is imperative that these weapons should be very effective.
We have heard nothing about antitank weapons, and we should hear something. We have heard a little about the up-gunning of tanks, and we should be assured that the "anti" weapons, which are so much more important in the early stage of a conflict, are progressing as strongly as the other weapons to which attention has been drawn.
The third quality to which I wish to refer to is efficiency. I should like to take this opportunity—and I think hon. Members on both sides of the House who were with me will join with me—of expressing appreciation of the efforts that were made by the Army of the Rhine to look after our delegation and show us everything that was to be seen. As I was one who went both last year and the year before, I think it only right to place on record my recognition of the considerable progress in the standard of training achieved by the British Army of the Rhine over that year.
That was particular encouraging because it showed development by the junior commanders. The improvements were very largely in such matters as road discipline and communications, matters in which the influence of the junior commander really counts. When one sees the junior commander showing increasing efficiency, it is a very hopeful outlook for the future. I would commend to my right hon. Friend—it really needs no commendation because he has shown he is aware of it—that it is on the high grade efficiency of our Army that our future success depends.

Brigadier Peto: Would my hon. Friend agree with me that one direction in which the Army of the Rhine is not as efficient as it was last year is in anti-aircraft defence?

Mr. Harvey: I am in full agreement with that point, but again I say to my hon. Friend that there was more antiaircraft practice this year, the result of representations made from this side of the House.
I believe that it is necessary that we should concentrate upon the quality of our units, and in that connection there is no army in the world which can rival our Guards or our gunners. We must concentrate on the more original and vital types of units such as the S.A.S., about which something has been heard this

evening, the airborne troops and the Commandos.
Much has been said this evening about training, which is the basis of efficiency, and I do not want to continue with that matter in view of all that has been said. I hope my right hon. Friend will give some instruction about the use of films as instructional instruments, and that he will discourage the habit by some units of holding long and boring lectures after lunch, which is a period when no one pays the slightest attention.
I should like for one moment to turn to the organisation of our Army, which is covered in the Estimates, and first of all to the centre of that Army, the regulars. Early in this debate the right hon. Member for Dundee, West, discussed the question of officers, and I found myself in very strong agreement with what he said. It is the attitude of mind with which we are concerned, and I hope my right hon. Friend, in pursuing the most excellent proposal made about the boys' battalions, will consider the designation and see that the word "officer" is brought into it.
The argument that the problem arises at the level of the W.O. and senior N.C.O. is not entirely sound. I think it begins with the junior N.C.O., because when a man has got to the rank of senior N.C.O. and W.O. there are economic reasons why becoming an officer is not so attractive. If we are to persevere with the democratic principles of our Army, I agree entirely that what the hon. and learned Member for Northampton has referred to requires to be radically reformed.

Mr. Paget: Is not the proposal that there should be one school for the primary school boy, the main object of which shall be to produce the N.C.O., and another school for the 16-year-old, secondary school boy, the primary object of which shall be to produce the officer? There are to be two levels.

Mr. Harvey: I am much obliged to the hon. and learned Member for clarifying that. It makes the case stronger.
I ask my right hon. Friend to pay a little attention to one or two problems which have not been referred to during the debate, with regard to Regular soldiers. What about the re-settlement


problems, and particularly housing, to which my right hon. Friend has referred in his Memorandum? What is the position of the Regular soldier who comes out of the Army and wants a house?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Mr. Harvey: Yes—even out of the Black Watch. What is the position of the widow of a Regular soldier who has been occupying Army quarters. My right hon. Friend has to fight a stronger battle than did his predecessor with the Minister of Housing and Local Government, and that Minister must give a stronger directive than did his predecessor to local authorities to see that men who have served in the Forces are not penalised as a result when their names come up before local authorities for consideration for housing.
I do not ask for priority of any kind. I merely ask that they shall be given a fair and a square deal, because they will not go into the Forces if they believe that when they come out they—or, if they are killed, their relatives—will not get proper housing.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I am very interested in this, but perhaps I happen to be lucky in my local authority as far as Service men are concerned. Are there, in fact, local authorities who do not give priority points to ex-Service men on their lists, and do they still make residential qualification a necessity? Subject to this, I agree with everything my hon. Friend says.

Mr. Harvey: Of course, that is so, and I shall give examples to my right hon. Friend if he requires them, but probably he knows about this problem as well as I do.
The question of the Territorial Army has been discussed in some detail. It is extremely important that we should recognise that the Territorial Army today plays a vital part in enabling the Regular Army to expand at speed. The closer the Territorial Army can be linked with the Regular Army, the better.
We have all asked in the past, and I ask again tonight, that the Secretary of State for War should pay attention to the vital question of adjutants for Territorial Army units. I am quite satisfied

that in order to get full efficiency, to achieve the link between the Territorial Army and the Regular Army which is essential, we must have as adjutants of Territorial Army units young officers from the Regular Army who will be told quite clearly that if they make a success of their adjutancy, their futures will be improved. I know that the supply of Regular soldiers at present makes that difficult but at the same time, if we are to have an efficient machinery for the expansion of the Territorial Army, that is a most important move.
Reference has been made by another of my hon. Friends to the question of the N.C.O.s who are going out of the Territorial Army. I believe that they will continue to go out. There is, therefore, a potential weakness if they are not replaced. It is imperative that the Territorial Army should bring this matter to the attention of the National Service man in order to encourage him to enlist in the Territorial Army to carry on his extremely important duties. I think that we must continue with our publicity to try to get back as many of the men as we can to fill the role of N.C.O.s.
I now turn to the Z scheme. I think we all should like a little more guidance about it from my right hon. Friend. When first discussed, it was agreed to be necessary as a mobilisation exercise, and in order to create the impression of teams within the Army. We do not, however, want to go on with the mobilisation exercise year after year, and I submit, too, that the teams are being filled up by the natural development of our present system.
I would ask if the Minister intends to continue the scheme for any considerable length of time because it is in the nature of an imposition which should not be continued longer than is absolutely necessary. We gave the fullest support to the Home Guard Bill when it was introduced, and I feel that the Home Guard would be more effective if more closely correlated with the Territorial Army organisation. That organisation is not yet strong enough. Finally, on this matter of organisation, I would refer to the supply of staff officers. Steps, I know, have been taken and are being taken, for recruiting voluntary staff officers with experience in the last war for refresher training; but the staff officer is of no use


unless he has experience in the field from time to time, and I hope that a more effective scheme for recruiting them may be made in order that we shall be able to meet the expansion of the Regular Army if that becomes necessary. If they are not made available, we shall have the position where a commanding officer is told to look round, and he will find the person least necessary to him; and then both the staff and the unit will subsequently suffer.
I have endeavoured to cover some of the main essentials upon which our new national Army should be based, and if we are to have an Army which is capable of playing its part, we must ensure that those qualities which produce maximum power per man are present in our system of training and organisation, and as a result of the equipment we provide for it. Further, we have to ensure that the new national Army shall be one entity, not divided into many parts, and that this organisation shall have its full part in our society and in an economy satisfactorily attuned to it.

10.54 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I find myself in agreement with much that was said by the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey), but before I have finished, I shall say some things with which I do not expect he will agree.
I was extremely interested today to hear from the Secretary of State why the Conservative Party has dropped the demand it has made ever since 1946 for the establishment of a colonial army. Last week, during discussion on the defence White Paper, I pointed out that in the first debate on defence after the war the influential voices of the present Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer cried out for the use of colonial manpower to aid the build-up of our post-war army.
Today the Secretary of State comes down and without a blush admits that the Tory Party had been wrong. Of course, he cannot get away with the story he gave the House this afternoon, that he has now discovered that there is a shortage of what he called "middle piece" officers and "middle piece" N.C.O.s. In the debate in the House of 16th March last year, when some of his

hon. Friends put down a Motion criticising the then Government for not making better use of colonial manpower, my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) made the point the Secretary of State made this afternoon, that we could use the available officer and N.C. material to much greater advantage.
I remind the right hon. Gentleman that, in the course of the winding-up speech in that debate, his hon. Friend, the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Low), who is the present Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, said:
Of course, we are short of British officers and N.C.O.s, and the right hon. Gentleman's Under-Secretary in the Army Estimates de bate pointed out that since there is that shortage it might be wise today to use available officers and N.C.O.s for British Forces rather than for Colonial Forces.
Then his hon. Friend said this:
We do not take that view."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 2061–2.]
In other words, the Tory Party knew the facts, took an opposite point of view, and, as I submit, in order to gain a party political advantage—

Mr. Head: indicated dissent.

Mr. Wigg: What other excuse is there?

Mr. Head: I was only going to say that the hon. Gentleman is going a little far. One does not really win an election on using N.C.O.s for either this or that in the Army.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman knows that his party sought to win the General Election by using every stick they could, including the rise in prices and the misuse of manpower, and he and his friends even exploited our defence needs. They used every stick which came to hand. They blamed every difficulty, including the weather, on to the Labour Government. That was the policy followed by the right hon. Gentleman himself and his hon. Friends.
Of course, one chicken has come home to roost today, and that is the colonial army. We are not to have a colonial army now, or should I say, we are not going to see this vast reservoir of colonial manpower used as a substitute for the Indian Army, about which we were told


so consistently for six years, in debate after debate on defence and the Army Estimates, and even during the whole day's debate on this subject on 16th March last year. The right hon. Gentleman comes down, in his mincing fashion and has not the grace—

Brigadier Peto: On a point of order. May I call attention to the fact there are only nine hon. Members of the Opposition, besides the hon. Member who is speaking on that side of the House?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris): That is not a point of order.

Mr. Wigg: That is obviously not a point of order, and I am not going to be put off my stroke by such a silly intervention. The right hon. Gentleman, on this point, has been found out, and his Party have been found guilty, of exploiting the defence need of the country for political purposes.
I now want to indulge in a little simple arithmetic and, if I am wrong, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will correct me. He said this evening that he had managed to save 752 War Office staff. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), asked where they had gone, the right hon. Gentleman said they had gone into the fighting Services.

Mr. Head: As the hon. Gentleman invited me to catch him up if he was wrong, I will do so and point out I said nothing of the kind. I said a very considerable proportion of the 750 out of the War Office staff was civil servants. I never said anything about them going into the fighting Services. I think the hon. Gentleman is confusing it with the 10,000 men we are saving out of the intake.

Mr. Wigg: The 10,000 men the right hon. Gentleman had saved from sending to static and general operational headquarters in Europe—where have they gone?

Mr. Head: As we are going in for accuracy, I had better interrupt the hon. Member again, if I may. I said that the operational headquarters was still under examination and that they were not included in the 10,000.

Mr. Wigg: When the right hon. Gentleman replies, will he tell the House where he got his 10,000 from? I seek this information because it is a policy run by the Conservative Party ever since 1946 that the Army has an enormous waste in the tail that could be saved. I do not for a moment accept the right hon. Gentleman's statement when he talks glibly about saving 10,000 men. I do not believe that he has transferred this number of men from the tail to the infantry. I am far too old a soldier for that.
If he saved or hopes to save from headquarters staff, what he is saving are R.A.S.C. clerks, and they are certainly not going to provide his newly-formed seven battalions. We know that at the present time these are skeleton battalions, and it seems to me a very odd way of saving manpower when almost every unit the right hon. Gentleman has is under strength.
Whether it is 750 or 10,000, will the right hon. Gentleman tell us the arms of the Service from which these men are saved—is it R.A.S.C., R.E.M.E., or R.A.O.C.? Will he break them down in terms of ranks? He could do that quite easily. Are they privates, corporals, warrant officers or officers? We certainly do not want vague assurances that the right hon. Gentleman has managed to provide a great saving. We want specific information which can be checked.
A year ago the right hon. Gentleman made a great story out of a simple sum. He took the total strength shown in Vote A and divided it by 20,000—that being, according to him, the size of a division—and then he said "If we only have 10 divisions, where are the rest?" I want to ask him this: if we only have 11 divisons now, as a result of his special new policy, known only to the Conservative Party, how many divisions are we going to have when the right hon. Gentleman introduces the Army Estimates—if he does—one year from now?
We want to know how much is coming out of the tail and how much is going into the teeth—and we do not want false teeth. We want the truth, and we shall hold him to it one year from now. We do not want assurances in terms of vague numbers, we want specific statements. After all, the right hon. Gentleman himself made strong point of this last year and in previous debates, so I ask him to


state how many divisions we shall have on 1st April, 1953.
There is another thing I should like to ask. In the Army Estimates debate a year ago he took a section of the War Office and told us that its staff in March, 1951, as 259, and in 1938 it was 70. Of course, again, he had something to say about this vast increase. What is the comparable figure today, and what will the figures be in the next Estimates, after the Head reforms, a year hence?
The right hon. Gentleman told us in 1951, that the 5th Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division of B.A.O.R. had 14 officers, and he thought that was terrible. He has been in office four months—surely he could have done something about the establishment of the 5th Infantry Brigade. How many officers are serving with that formation now?

Mr. Head: In a way the hon. Gentleman is wasting some of his own time because had he listened to the debate he would have heard quite plainly that at the present time General Harding is carrying out most urgent experiments with operation headquarters in order to reduce the numbers. He has already achieved good results, and I told the House that those results would soon become universal throughout the Army.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman ought not to come down here and hide behind General Harding. He is the Secretary of State for War and must take the responsibility. A year ago he complained about the strength of the 5th Infantry Brigade in B.A.O.R. The responsibility for that establishment is now his. If it was too much then, what is the figure going to be a year hence?
A year ago the right hon. Gentleman also gave us some really secret information. He said:
At one command headquarters I have a personal friend, a major general, General Staff—no names, no pack drill—and he has a B.G.S. (Operations), B.G.S. (A. and Q.), General Staff Officer Class 1 (Operations) G.S.O.1 (Training), G.S.O. 1 (A. and G.S.O.1 Q.) Then there is the G.S.O. 2 level and the G.S.O. 3 level. Quite a family tree."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 817.]
Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us, not the name of his friend or of the formation, but to what he has reduced this establishment, and to what it will be reduced in one year's time?

Mr. Head: I would remind the hon. Gentleman that his right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) was claiming that all that had been done by himself.

Mr. Wigg: I am concerned with the right hon. Gentleman. I have waited a long time to ask him this question, and I hope I shall not have to wait so long for an answer.
I want now to deal with another subject, the question of the new formation, the boys' battalion which is to be established on 15th April. I must say I was shocked when I heard this. I did not think that even the right hon. Gentleman would go quite as far as this. Clearly what he is doing is setting about organising the Army on the basis that the other ranks should come from circles to which I belong and that the officers should come from his class. If I am wrong, he can very soon dispose of the matter.
First, I want to ask him how many officers of the Brigade of Guards at the present time have served on Regular engagement. Are there any? If not, why not? Will he also tell us how many "other ranks" on Regular engagement have obtained combatant commissions, other than quartermaster commissions, since the end of the war?
Whatever the figure may be, can he tell the House whether the number will remain the same or whether under his administration it will be increased during the coming and following years? I put this proposal to establish this N.C.O. training unit in exactly the same category as the right hon. Gentleman's proposal to establish corporals' messes in Guards units in London districts, because, quite clearly, this proposal is not so innocent as it seems.
I know, and many of my hon. Friends know, what the game is. It means that the select few whose parents are wealthy enough or aristocratic enough to have influence will never mix with the common herd when they arrive at the Guards' depots. They will be shifted into a separate barrack room, they will get a stripe on their arm, and without going through the formalities which lowly mortals have to go through, they will end up in the grade where they can get a commission.
That is the way the thing works. It strikes me as extremely odd that a party which believes in leadership should send its spokesman to the House to defend the action of establishing a junior N.C.O.s' mess by saying that it is to maintain discipline. I belong to an older school. Perhaps it is a good job that that older school has passed. I was told that discipline meant learning to do the thing you did not want to do at the moment you did not want to do it. One had a pretty thin time if one did not accept that. I also learned that the badges of rank on the shoulders and the stripes on the arm were not the sources of authority, but only the symbols of it. If one could not command men in one's shirt sleeves one could not do it at all.
Now the Brigade of Guards has reached the point where its junior N.C.O.s have to be segregated to avoid interference with their qualities of leadership. The standard of training in the Brigade of Guards has produced the best N.C.O.s and troops in the world. It has also produced the worst officers, junior officers particularly. I say definitely that this system of social segregation, of carefully hand-picking the selected few will not end in the Brigade, of Guards. Its influence will extend beyond it.
If this policy could be confined to the Brigade of Guards, one might make one's protest and then let the matter go. But it permeates the Army. The Secretary of State is in fact pushing this policy, for in future we are to have special schools—a kind of "Brave New World" in khaki—in which people are to be conditioned to become N.C.O.s and warrant officers. This is not fair or just.
The Secretary of State this afternoon was careful to work out what he regarded as incentives and touched on some of the dis-incentives which affect Regular Army recruiting. I believe that this kind of think has as much influence in checking young men from entering the Army as have the rates of pay. I feel great responsibility because not long ago I encouraged two young members of my family to join the Regular Army. If I had a son thinking of joining the Regular Army or beginning to develop that view, I would hesitate to encourage him because I know that unless he belongs to the

select few, and has the social background, at the end of the day he will be lucky to have three stripes on his arm. And in the new Tory Army a man will be 29 years of age before he becomes a sergeant and corporals will be 24 before they attain their rank; whereas if a young man, irrespective of brain power, has a rich enough father, or has chosen his parents well, he can have two pips on his shoulder before he is 20. I do not think that is right. The Secretary of State ought to think again about the proposal to form this special establishment for N.C.O.s and warrant officers.

Lord John Hope: May I tell the hon. Gentleman one figure apropos what he said about the Brigade of Guards? During the war, on establishment there was one officer to every 20 men; killed, one officer to every 10 men.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman ought not to introduce that kind of argument to the problems we are trying to solve.—[Interruption]—I say again that the hon. Gentleman ought not to introduce that kind of argument, because it has nothing to do with the matter.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: Has the hon. Gentleman forgotten he had the effrontery to say that the Brigade of Guards produced the worst type of officer of any regiment? It was a most offensive remark to have made. I did not have the privilege of serving in the Brigade of Guards myself, but my father did, and he was killed in the First World War. If the hon. Member would take the trouble to go and look at the War Memorial by the Horse Guards Parade, he would learn something.

Mr. Wigg: Hon. Gentlemen should not really be so thin-skinned.—[Interruption.]—I am not. I joined the Regular Army because I could not get a job. From the moment I joined no one asked me where I wanted to go or what regiment I wanted to serve in. When I went back into the Army the same thing occurred—I was put into the unit thought best for me.
Ever since I have been in this House, hon. Gentlemen have thrown in my face that at the end of my service I served in the Army Education Corps. I do not mind. I am proud that I started in the barrack room, having left school at 14. and rose to become a colonel in the


Army Education Corps. Why hon. Gentlemen opposite should go out of their way to remind me of this fact defeats me unless, of course, they imagine that to remind me that I served in the Army Education Corps is an insult. If that is so, why should they object to what I have to say to them? They really should not be so thin-skinned. In the barrack room we learned to take it as well as give it.

Mr. Nigel Fisher: The hon. Gentleman started this argument. No one else said anything about the Army Education Corps. He has been extremely insulting about the Brigade of Guards. Has he any experience or proof of his statements? Has he fought alongside them in war?

Mr. Wigg: What I have said I have stated after very careful consideration. I have seen these units.

Mr. Fisher: In war-time?

Mr. Wigg: I served for a great number of years and during this time I was attached to Guards' units. I am discussing a system of training which, on the one hand, turns out first-class warrant officers, N.C.O.s and soldiers—the best in the world. On the other hand, when I have looked at junior officers, and seen the interior economy of the Brigade of Guards, I have been shocked. If hon. Gentlemen did not know about this, it is time they did.
This point of view is shared throughout the country and the Army. [Interruption.] I am sorry hon. Gentlemen do not like it. The way to improve things is to start giving commissions in the Brigade of Guards to the many first-class N.C.O.s there. If I have upset the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher), I would say to him that it is very important that it should be said.
I once made a study of the age of commanding officers in the Army. I discovered that the average age of commanding officers in the Brigade of Guards was 39, in the cavalry 40, the artillery 42, and the infantry 52. That meant that within a given period of time all senior ranks would be held by Guardsmen, cavalrymen, or artillerymen, with the poor old infantrymen right at the end of the queue. After a period of time, if something is not done about

the selection of officer material in all branches, we shall return to the situation where leadership in the Army is not determined by efficiency but by the wealth and social standing of the parents of officers.

Mr. Fisher: Does the hon. Gentleman think the Brigade of Guards is not efficient?

Mr. Wigg: It certainly has its moments. I say again that the N.C.O.s are nearly always good. All I am appealing for is that the Secretary of State should recognise this, and realise that the introduction of a system whereby the officers all come from one group and the N.C.O.s all come from another is bad for the Army, for the Brigade of Guards, and for the nation.

Mr. Peter Legh: If the hon. Gentleman has finished paying all the most gratuitous insults he can to the Brigade of Guards, may I assure him that the Brigade of Guards is not afraid of any sniping, whether it comes from Her Majesty's enemies or Her Majesty's Opposition?

Mr. Wigg: I am sure I may be excused from answering that tommy-rot. The hon. Gentleman has only just walked into the House.

Mr. Legh: I have been sitting here for at least two hours.

Mr. Wigg: For the last two hours the hon. Gentleman has kept quiet. He should continue to do so. The right hon. Gentleman made the point that selection for boys serving in the boys' battalion would be from two streams. He suggested- that those at 16-plus who had the school certificate would become eligible for a commission. He is not up-to-date in his facts. In the Army there are half a dozen apprentice schools. How many of the boys who have been through these schools, many of whom are up to school certificate standard, have got commissions?

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is so inaccurate. I never mentioned the school certificate with regard to this, and I purposely did not do so.

Mr. Wigg: I thought when the right hon. Gentleman answered my hon. and


learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) he stated there were to be two streams. I was a little surprised when my hon. and learned Friend said there were to be two streams, and I thought the right hon. Gentleman agreed with that. Are we to take it, then, that a boy who has the certificate, who is obviously of fairly high mental calibre, is to be given no opportunity of a commission? If that is so, a young man thinking of the Army as a career, who has stayed at a secondary school and got his certificate, is to become mere fodder for the barrack square.
The right hon. Gentleman had better have another think about this. He had also better think again about his proposal to older soldiers to enlist for 22 years. There is something good behind the idea, but there ought to be no worsening of a man's position if he accepts the proposal. In the old days he could reengage after 12 years for 21 years. When the soldier had got in 12 years' service he could ask for his discharge by giving a few days' notice, and he took an immediate discharge free of cost.
The right hon. Gentleman's proposal is 22 years, and the soldier can opt out at the end of every three-year period. Surely the right hon. Gentleman ought to remember that from 12 years on a soldier can now leave, and that, therefore, he would be well advised to take his multiples of three from the first year up to 12 years, and then leave the Regulations as they now stand.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Whom does my hon. Friend think that we shall be fighting in 22 years' time? Shall we have gone full circle and be, fighting the Americans?

Mr. Wigg: My hon. Friend misunderstands if he thinks the Army exists only to fight. There has been far too much talk today in terms of a third world war. It would be well if my hon. Friend and other hon. Members remembered that the prime function of the British Army has been a policing function. Its presence in carefully selected spots ensures the maintenance of law and order.
Indeed, one of the great difficulties of any Secretary of State for War, in his handling of administration, is that he has a current role to carry out while he has

at the back of his mind the need for an organisation on which a speedy mobilisation could be framed to undertake the major role if war on the grand scale came. But certainly one cannot plan, and it would be wrong to plan, the British Army exclusively in terms of the possibility of a third world war.
It would be a bad day if we become so obsessed with the building up of reserves, mobilisation schemes, and commitments in Europe that we forget the current commitment of maintaining law and order over vast areas of the world. The Secretary of State, perhaps by his habit of mind and background, may be inclined to slip into the same trap as my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and think only in terms of vast mobilisation schemes and the like.
It is a point constantly in my mind that in our early debates on manpower and the length of service many hon. Gentlemen regarded it as rank heresy that National Service men should be used to fulfil current commitments. It shows how much the world situation has worsened and how far opinion in this House has slipped that we now accept as normal that the National Service man should be used in the Middle East. Malaya, and Hongkong.
The objective of the Secretary of State, in the interests of efficiency and economy, should be to build up his Regular content as fast as he can to obviate the necessity for sending the National Service man east of the line we talked about in our early National Service debates—the line from Berlin to Malta. if we could reach that situation, it would be a valuable addition to efficiency and the saving would be enormous. Last week the Prime Minister, in the defence debate, said that there were never fewer than 30,000 men in the pipeline. If the Secretary of State for War is looking to save something on the tail, a rich seam on which he can work is to see if he can find means of lessening the number of men in transit to or from overseas stations.
I hope we shall see the day when we can contemplate the reduction of the length of National Service from two years to 18 months and then to an even shorter period. I am not sure that the intolerable


burden of two years of compulsory military service for the young men of these islands is something that can continue indefinitely. One of the things we have to face up to—I made this point last week and I am making it again today—is that public opinion in this country is not going to accept indefiniately National Service which is longer than in Commonwealth countries and in the N.A.T.O. countries.
I see that American Congress in its wisdom has rejected compulsory National Service. We cannot expect our own countrymen to shoulder this obligation for an indefinite period. Obviously it would be highly irresponsible to suggest a possibility of a reduction in that National Service, let alone its abolition, with conditions as they are today, but that is not going to be the condition of things for all time, and it is the job of the Secretary of State to show economies in the use of manpower by which can be secured that greater efficiency about which hon. Members have talked today.

11.27 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Gough: It is not my intention to follow the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) very far, because there is nothing to follow. Indeed, I feel that the connection his speech had with the subject we are debating is that, like war, it is entirely destructive and a complete waste of time.
It is my intention to address the House for a short time on the subject of an arm of the Service in which I served and of which I have some experience. It is a arm of the Service to which very little reference has been made in the debate this evening except from my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey), to whom I am indebted for what he said. I refer to the airborne troops, and I should like to confine my remarks to two headings, the use of airborne troops by potential enemy, and the use of airborne troops by ourselves.
Earlier in the debate the noble Lord the Member for Pentlands (Lord John Hope) said a great deal about the Home Guard, and I agree with every word. The Home Guard is our only hope of warding off the danger of a sudden attack by airborne troops, and it seems to me that the danger is imminent. It is absolutely essential that something should be

done without any delay to train the Home Guard for those responsibilities.
I can speak in a sense with experience of this subject. I had the honour to serve in one of the airborne operations which has since become quite famous. We were told before we embarked that we might meet a formation consisting of a school of S.S. N.C.O.s of a strength of about 900. It was my rather doubtful privilege to run head-on into that formation, and I shall never forget the bang which they gave us. I discovered afterwards that only the day before they had been studying a tactical exercise on how to defend Arnhem against airborne troops.
I mention that because I would suggest to my right hon. Friend that he might consider creating, perhaps, a corps of voluntary instructors from our own veterans from airborne formations during the war. He would find a lot of ex-airborne officers and senior N.C.O.s who would come forward and would be prepared to give the benefit of their own experience the other way round to those who will be responsible on the ground in the Home Guard for defending us against similar attacks.
There are one or two points which may not be known but which, I think, should be known. I was a little disquieted on hearing from the Front Bench that the Home Guard will not be over-mobile, because it is in the first 20 minutes that an airborne soldier is extremely vulnerable. It is, therefore, essential that he should be attacked as soon as possible.
The second point—this has been mentioned in the House—is that it is quite easy and possible within each Home Guard sector to plan out any possible dropping zones or landing zones for gliders or parachutists. Consequently, it is just as possible for each Home Guard unit to have its own drill in order to come into operation as soon as it possibly can if that emergency arises.
In regard to mobility, I cannot help but feel that the danger of parachute operations is very largely in the agricultural areas. In those areas there are many farmers with Land-Rovers and that type of thing, and a little local ingenuity might easily be able to form, perhaps, a Commando spearhead of the younger members of the Home Guard unit to


create that mobility and sense of urgency which is essential if an airborne operation is to be nipped in the bud.
It is not my intention to speak for very long, and therefore I turn now to the other side: our own airborne troops. I have mentioned this before, and I make no apology for mentioning it again. We are terribly weak—dangerously weak—in having only one Regular parachute brigade. I had hoped to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, when we were discussing training, because from my experience it is virtually impossible to train on a formation basis at as low as brigade level.
I know the difficulties in regard to aircraft, but these men are specially recruited volunteers for a somewhat unusual job. It is vital, in order to maintain their morale, that they should have ample opportunity of practising, not only jumping by parachute, but jumping in large formations. It is not sufficient to say that we have balloons and that these men can jump from them. Jumping from a balloon, on the one hand, is a completely different sensation, and a completely different thing altogether, from jumping, with full equipment and kit, in a "stick" from a moving aircraft.
I most strongly suggest to my right hon. Friend that every possible effort should be made, first, to increase the establishment from one parachute brigade to one Regular airborne division; and second, to try to build up, even if we have temporarily to borrow either from our Allies or from one of the Dominions, sufficient aircraft in order not only for the men individually to be able to carry out regular parachute training, but also to be able to carry out regular training operations on a battalion, and, indeed, on a brigade, level, and perhaps, once a year, even on a divisional level.
In order to build up a balanced force, I am convinced that we must have at least one Regular division in this country as a strategic reserve; and I cannot think of a better strategic reserve than an airborne division. I do hope that the Secretary of State will give us some encouragement on this matter by saying that, in the fairly near future, we shall be able to regain our strength in that direction.

11.36 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I have listened with great interest to the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Gough) who has just asked for more airborne regiments, for if we are going to fight a war such as the American paper, "Collier's Weekly" describes in its celebrated "war edition," then, of course, we shall inevitably have to meet a very large number of these parachute troops.
I have here a copy of that paper, which describes a preview of the war which is to begin in 1952 and last for eight years. Here is a very vivid picture of that very military operation which the hon. Gentleman has described. This is a description by the American writer Lowell Thomas, telling how a parachute regiment lands in the Ural mountains; the title of the article is "I Saw Them Shot into the Urals," and I think that if we are to parachute troops into all the strategic centres of Russia, then we shall certainly need a far greater number of airborne troops than we now have in the whole of the Territorial Army.
I listened with a great deal of pleasure to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) and the Secretary of State for War can inform the Prime Minister tomorrow that there is now a unity between the Black Watch and the "Black Welsh." I entirely endorse the belief which the hon. and gallant Member may have gained about the calling up of agricultural workers. He stressed, quite rightly, that our first line should be food production, and when the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire and the hon., but less gallant, Member for South Ayrshire agree upon a certain policy, that should be sufficient for that policy to commend itself to the House.
I am sure the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel), and all Scottish Members, will agree that it is absolutely essential in the interests of more food production that we should halt the call-up of agricultural workers for the Army. This is not a party matter at all. I have here a paper which covers the agricultural activities of Scotland—the "Scottish Farmer"—and a whole page in the current issue is devoted to complaints, mainly of Conservative hon. Members, against the call-up of men for


soldiering from the agricultural industry at a time when we are urging on the farmers the need for more food production. What common sense is there in giving the farmers a subsidy to increase food production one day, while the very next day we call up the workers who alone can make that subsidy effective?
I represent a very large agricultural constituency, and I have had some complaints during the week-end about the stupidity of this particular call-up. I have one case, which I have presented, not to the Secretary of State for War, but to the Minister of Labour and National Service, who appears to be the main person responsible. This is a case of a farmer living in a remote part of South Ayrshire. He has only three people on two large farms, extending to over 2,000 acres.
One young person, who is a shepherd and whose labour is absolutely essential for the lambing season, which has been made especially more difficult by the fact we have had a very severe winter in Scotland, has been called-up for military service. When the question arose in the House, I said that the Minister of Labour's wolves were now after the shepherd. I believe this is a stupidly shortsighted policy, and I entirely agree, for once in my life, with the unanswerable argument the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Perth and East Perthshire has used.
I ask the Secretary of State for War, irrespective of party, whether he will not give some consideration to reviewing this call-up of agricultural workers, which is going to hinder the task of food production, which is so badly needed. I know the answer will be given that there is only a comparatively small number of these people; only 10,000 in the whole of agricultural Britain. But these 10,000 might be key men.
They might, for example, be a village blacksmith, whose task it is to repair the tractor. If the tractor—[Interruption.] Oh, no, he is not exempt. I have had to fight these cases in my own constituency. The Minister of Labour is acting like a Gestapo in Scotland, going around the various farms and to some blacksmiths' shops and asking one blacksmith if he can undertake another blacksmith's work as he wants to call up the young son of the blacksmith for military service.
If they take away the key men, they very much hamper agricultural production. I urge the Secretary of State to listen very carefully to the arguments which have been put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire, and to give us some satisfactory assurance. In this copy of the "Scottish Farmer," which I have here, there are complaints from the Isle of Shetland right down to Devonshire. Hon. Members for agricultural constituencies, who are usually Conservatives, are making their protests at Question time, and I hope the result will be an end of this ridiculous combing-out of one of our most essential industries.
Again, I listened with interest and with agreement to the speech made by an hon. Gentleman who talked about calling up workers engaged on housing. Here, I know, the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire will part company from me when I say that if one is to exempt the agricultural worker, one has also to exempt the building trade worker who is employed on building the agricultural workers' cottages. One must carry this argument to its logical conclusion, but I will not develop it any further.
What I do suggest is that in this catalogue of achievement, which the Secretary of State for War advanced so proudly, about increasing the numbers of the Regular Army, what he is doing is denuding other equally essential industries and transferring their manpower somewhere else. Naturally that is his job, but in doing so he may take a very short-sighted view and, while building up his military force, he may be destroying the economic foundation upon which the prosperity of this country depends.
The Secretary of State for War referred in his speech to this quarter of the House as, I believe, the tail of the Labour Party. I do not agree with him about that. I think it is the head of the Labour Party. I think it is the thinking department of the Labour Party, but I wish to point out that on the other side of the House, too, there has been expressed the point of view which we are frequently expressing in, this quarter of the House these days. We know where the tail of the Labour Party is, and we know where the "head" of the Conservative Party is, and the "head" of the Conservative Party, before he was elevated to become Secretary of


State for War, wrote a very interesting pamphlet called "The Pattern of Peace."
It is a jolly good pamphlet, and I agree with a great deal in it, but when hon. Members opposite have read it with the care with which I have read it, they will come to the conclusion that the author of it is the potential Bevan of the Conservative Party. There may be a split in the Conservative Party. The Secretary of State for War might be expelled from his party the day after I am from mine. The arguments that the right hon. Gentleman used in this pamphlet have a direct bearing upon the argument he used in introducing these Estimates today—and here is the quotation:
The current rearmament programme is certain to bring economic difficulties, especially to Britain and Europe. There are already signs of growing inflation. Unless by great caution and American restraint and generosity this trend can be averted it might eventually cripple our rearmament effort and even undermine the internal resistance to Communism.
Of course, that is the argument of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). Members opposite have a cuckoo in their nest, and if that argument was right—and it was written only last year—I suggest it is equally right today. The sum total of the right hon. Gentleman's efforts in building up this gigantic Army will be to cripple the economic life of this country, and that applies especially not only to manpower for the Army, but labour power for the armaments industry.
I have already mentioned, at Question time today, how the cost of the Centurion tank is increasing. In 1945 the price of a tank was £10,000. The Centurion tank went up to £35,000 and is now £38,000. Since those figures were given to the Select Committee on Estimates, the cost has gone up still further because of the increase of the price of steel which has been sanctioned by the Minister of Supply.
If we are to have elaborate tanks of this kind, we are going to absorb enormous amounts of labour power in that part of the armaments industry at a time when there is a struggle and competition for manpower not only for the Army but for other branches of the armaments industry. So we shall get a bottleneck, because this country has only a limited amount of manpower. That has been

indicated by some of the arguments we have heard from the benches opposite during this debate.
One hon. Member opposite actually suggested that we should comb out the stockbrokers. That is probably the explanation of the new appointment—the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. The suggestion to call up the stockbrokers is really a far more subversive suggestion than any that ever emanated from Ebbw Vale. Look at the gloomy faces opposite due to that suggestion. That is enough to destroy the Conservative Party; to split it from top to bottom. What is to happen if hon. and gallant Members opposite cannot sell their brewery shares because the stockbrokers have been called up?

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Ask the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger).

Mr. Hughes: What about the shares of the whisky companies? One hon. Gentleman opposite is a director of a whisky company and director of three other companies. Has he—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is getting very wide of the Army Estimates.

Mr. Hughes: I agree, Sir. I was attracted by the argument advanced, and I was only pointing out the devastating effect it would have on the morale of the Conservative Party if the suggestion were carried out and the stockbrokers were commandeered for National Service.
But it is not only in tanks that our expenditure is mounting so enormously. In every branch of the re-armament programme the same inflationary policy is going on. Take the one-ton lorry. According to the report given by the Minister to the Select Committee, the one-ton lorry cost £340 in 1945. In 1951, the combat lorry cost £1,520. It now costs £1,750. In other words, a one-ton lorry costs five times more today than it did seven years ago.
Costs are mounting astronomically for every type of material or implement used in the Army. The inevitable result will be that we shall have a huge increase in the arms programme which will be inflationary and will lead, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to the industrial conditions which will encourage Communism in this country.
I also want to say a few words about manpower. We see displayed all over the country today the recruiting poster which says, "You Are Somebody in the Army Today." [An HON. MEMBER: That was always so."] If that was always so, why is it necessary to spend an enormous amount of money assuring the public it is so?

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Because of the Socialist propaganda years ago.

Mr. Hughes: The hon. and gallant Gentleman says it is because of the Socialist propaganda years ago. All I can say is that I have never heard of it, but it seems to have been extremely efficient.
This recruiting campaign is having the same disorganising effect upon the national life as I pointed out at the beginning of my speech. By elaborating the call-up for the Regular Army and drawing more and more men into this net, we are taking them from industries which are not only essential to the national life but also to war production. One can read in the Report of the Select Committee on Estimates of shortage of labour in all kinds of industries needed for the war machine.
I maintain that we are approaching an industrial crisis, and that the manpower of the country is insufficient for the gigantic plans outlined by the Secretary of State for War. If we go on year after year taking manpower from the production of consumer goods, we only drive down the standard of life and create the conditions which will result in Communism in Western Europe.
In yesterday's "Observer" we were told by Mr. Chester Wilmot, who has now become one of our most expert writers on military affairs, that the 50 divisions in N.A.T.O., are a phantom, and as a result of our extraordinary military activity we are apparently creating a phantom army in Western Germany and having practically no Army in Britain.
The old argument for the Army was that it was needed to defend the country, and that the soldiers were defending their homes. But now soldiers from Scotland may be in Hong Kong, Korea, or Western Germany, but not near the place which they are supposed to be defending. If war comes upon this country suddenly,

one may find the soldier in some distant part of the world while his home and wife and children are being bombed. We have reached something like a reductio ad absurdum where military organisation is concerned. The Army has ceased to be what it used to be, and no one knows exactly the purpose it serves.
As one who opposed the defence of Korea at its very inception, I want the House to think about what has been achieved there. We still have our soldiers there, and the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) objected to their being brought home. We have had a speech from the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) drawing attention to certain military lessons to be learned from Korea.
The main lesson is that Korea has been complete futility. It has demonstrated the futility of modern war before the eyes of the world. If I were asked whether I would want this country to be liberated à la Korea, or whether Western Europe, Germany or France would want to be liberated as we have liberated Korea, the reply is in the negative.
I should not survive long under Communism, because I am a political freethinker. If we went into another war, we would probably have Communism on top of the war because the result of a modern war, especially in Western Europe, when Europe has been atom bombed, would bring such a state of devastation and destruction, in which human society would only just manage to exist for a time, that some kind of totalitarism would be bound to follow. I believe the result would be the worst type of military Communism. There is as much common sense in these days in pacifism as in any other "ism".
One hon. Member referred to the fact that in America they have no universal military service. That is rather significant. Last week the House of Representatives discussed this question, and turned it down. The result is that in the Western armies the great bulk of the manpower is evidently to be supplied by the nations of Western Europe, and these armies are not coming from Germany. It will be noted that in Germany there is now the strongest opposition to any re-armament of Germany at all, coming not from the Communists—

Mr. Speaker: I do ask the hon. Gentleman to come closer to the Estimates. He is now raising points on foreign policy and the like, which cannot be brought within the confines of the Estimates before us.

Mr. Hughes: I submit that our contribution to Western defence and the Western armies to be organised in N.A.T.O. has some relation to the contribution that is likely to come from other nations. All that I shall say, in passing, is that if we are not to have the support of the German people, or the French, then we shall have to produce a huge army which cannot be supplied from the manpower in this country.
In all those circumstances, to be asked in the Estimates to budget for nearly £500 million is to be asked to agree to a gross waste of national money. Never was so much being spent for so little. I believe with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale—although he does not go quite so far as I do on these matters—that we will have to reduce our ideas about the piling up of huge armaments. As the months and years go by, there will be a growing realisation among the people that those of us who have asked for a realistic view, and have argued that to build up the military strength of the country to the proposed level will ruin our economy, are right, and that what we are asked to approve is a foolish and short-sighted policy which is likely to lead the country to disaster, unless it is reversed.

12.4 a.m.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: I know I shall be forgiven if I do not follow the hon. Gentleman the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). In fact I found great difficulty in doing so.
Last year, and the year before, I raised the question of officers having to pay Purchase Tax on their battledress while on active operations. This, I understand, has been rescinded. I now want to draw the Secretary of State's attention to the fact that officers still have to pay Purchase Tax and departmental expenses on battledress in this country and other theatres, except where there are active operations. That seems to me wrong, because battledress is utility

clothing. I argued this with the former Minister of Defence, who agreed that battledress was utility clothing and had a lot of sympathy with the point. But then the former Secretary of State for War pointed out that the miner had to pay Purchase Tax on his working clothes and the Minister of Defence lost interest. But the miner has not to look smart at the bottom of the pit, and can wear any old thing he can lay his hands on.
Battledress is the officer's main dress. The battledress blouse costs £1 19s. and the trousers £1 19s. 6d. There is 10 per cent. added for departmental charges, making 7s. 10½d., and another 33⅓ per cent. is added to that, making a total additional charge of £1 16s. 8d., which is tax. If you happen to be outsize, like myself, and have to buy the cloth you pay 10s. 9d. a yard, add 10 per cent. departmental charges, and then 66⅔ per cent., and the cloth costs 18s. 7d. a yard.
Moss Bros., or any tailor of that description, will charge £11 5s. for making up, so the total cost is about £15. That makes a very expensive suit. The Secretary of State will say that the cost of battledress and Purchase Tax is allowed for in officers' allowances, but I do not think there is anything like £15 allowed for an outsize officer, and I hope he will use his influence to try and have battledress classified as utility clothing.
My next point is about the N.A.A.F.I. I have spoken to my right hon. Friend about the N.A.A.F.I. in Korea. Many of my constituents grumble because they have to pay a great deal on postage to send parcels of chocolates, cigarettes, cakes and the like to their sons out there. The air freight on these parcels is very heavy. The Secretary of State has promised me an answer on Thursday, so I will not press him now, about my idea of depositing money with any N.A.A.F.I. in England, or the headquarters at Ruxley Towers, and getting chocolates, cigarettes or whatever it may be that a mother, wife or fiancée wishes to order, delivered to the soldier in the field. I understand there are administrative difficulties, but I do not feel they are insurmountable. This would save an immense amount of air freight or postal orders being sent to Korea, and the men would get the goods rather than receive a postal order. That


was an idea mentioned last year for solving the difficulty.
I want to touch briefly on pensions. The disability pension for soldiers has not risen comparably with the cost of living, and something must be done. We have been promised that all pensions are being looked into, and I hope that of all people those who have disability pensions will be fairly considered.
I draw hon. Members' attention to the question of widows' pensions. For a long time I fought with the former Under-Secretary a case of a widow whom he admitted was entitled to pension but who allowed two years to elapse before she discovered her entitlement. I thought it wrong that she should be deprived of the pension for that period and I threatened to raise the matter in the House.
Fortunately we had an election and I put the same question to the new Secretary of State. Within a few weeks he paid the widow £90, or two years' back pay, and he gave me an assurance that in future, whenever a serving or retired soldier or officer died, his widow would be informed that if she was in need she was allowed to claim a pension. For many years I have felt that should be done, and I am glad the new Secretary of State has decided that that will be the future procedure.
Another pension problem that must be examined concerns officers and men who retired under the 1919 Warrant—I declare my interest and say that I do not come in that category. Pensions then were subject to the up and down movement of the cost of living, and when the position became favourable to the Treasury, i.e. at it lowest, they stabilised the pension. There was another cut in 1931 and many of these cuts have not been restored.
I had a letter the other day from the officer who was my second in command when I was a second lieutenant. He retired as major on a pension of £400 a year in 1925 or 1926, and he has received that sum ever since. At that time it was a reasonable pension, perhaps, and he could do quite well on it, but it is not much in 1952 after six years of Socialism. [Interruption.] I know hon. Gentlemen do not like being reminded of that, but we have all

suffered, including themselves. We shall put things right for them if they wait, but it cannot be done in six months.
We have had an excellent debate, but I feel sorry that the late Secretary of State for War should have attacked the new Secretary of State. He had no ground for attack tonight, and he was very vulnerable himself. If he had stayed in the Chamber, there are one or or two things I would have asked him.

12.14 a.m.

Mr. A. C. Manuel: We have to take a little further the question of calling up men in key positions in agriculture and those especially in small family businesses throughout Scotland. I am rather enamoured of the unity of Scottish Members on this question. I imagine that the Scottish Tory Members are being increasingly pressed by their constituents, because they represent mainly rural areas, for the safeguarding of agriculture by the retention of agricultural workers. I do not know that they would show the same enthusiasm if it were certain types of industrial workers for whom we were seeking exemption from National Service, but we welcome their assistance in these cases.
I hope the Secretary of State for War is going to show recognition of the difficult position in which Scotland finds itself in this matter. The manpower position is difficult, and in the Memorandum to the Estimates, the Minister has this to say in paragraph 19:
National Servicemen.—During the year ending 31st March, 1952, the number of national servicemen available to the Services was increased by restricting deferments of agricultural workers, and slight modifications in current medical standards.
I should like to know what that means. What reduction in standards have there been? We want to know what safeguards there are, and how much the standard has dropped to enable the intake of these men to take place.
The paragraph continues:
In spite of these measures, the Army share of this year's national service age group would be insufficient. Unless measures were taken to increase the size of the national service pool, it might not be possible to maintain the Army at its present strength. It has, therefore, been decided to have five national service registrations instead of the usual four in the coming year, and this will increase the allotment to the Army by nearly 30,000 men.


The Secretary of State for War should bear in mind that as a country we are voting many millions of pounds for agriculture in the interests of food production. Because so many of our smaller farms are being depleted of their labour force through National Service, it is unlikely that there will be that food production from these holdings that we once hoped for and of which they are capable, given the necessary labour.
I am all for subsidies for agriculture. We should be most careful to do everything we can to encourage food production in this country, but if we are pouring those millions into agriculture we ought to see that the position of the farmers is safeguarded in the matter of their labour force so that the nation will get an adequate return for the spending of this public money.
The type of case to which my attention is being drawn is causing me much concern. My constituents are constantly writing to me on this subject of the call up of men for National Service, and there were two such letters in my postbag this morning. The first case concerned a farm which was being worked by a woman and her son and daughter.
The son was being called up for National Service, and the mother tells me that that will leave her only her daughter and a young boy to work this holding. Last year this farm provided more than 15,000 gallons of milk as well as other food. She says if the lad goes she can do nothing else than allow the farm to go to grass for she will not have the labour to reap the crops. She will also have to reduce the herd for the same reason.
Are we to allow that sort of thing to happen? I have sent the letter on to the Ministry of Labour and National Service, and I am hoping some action will be taken. I have also asked the Joint Under-Secretary of State who is responsible for agriculture in Scotland to take an interest in this type of case and to safeguard Scottish interests.
My second case today concerns another farmer, who has only his son and another young lad working on the farm. The son has been called up for National Service. The farmer has a hernia and a spinal condition which does not allow him to

do heavy manual work. Consequently, he is threatening to reduce his herd and to take 20 acres out of crop this year. I hope that this kind of thing will not be perpetuated and that this stream of letters will not be necessary as far as agriculture is concerned.
It has always been understood amongst Scottish Members that where there were only two employees on a farm, they would not be taken away; that these farms would be safeguarded and their men would not be taken for National Service. It appears that this sort of unwritten rule is now to be forgotten and that the Minister of Labour and National Service is to call up these men.
I appeal to the Minister to give an answer. Is destruction to face these small farms, which run from 100 to 200 acres, with their valuable Ayrshire dairy herds for the production of tuberculin tested milk? A vast amount of money has been spent on farms in Ayrshire, which is world famous for its shorthorn cattle.
There is another type of case with which I am also concerned: that of the small family contractor, who writes to me from my constituency. Several weeks ago two cases came to my notice which directly concerned agriculture. The two families operate threshing mills for gathering crops and doing threshing from farm to farm. Previously, they have had no safeguard for deferment because it was said that they were not operating at one farm; because they were going from one farm to another with their threshing mills, they were not classified as agricultural workers.
But surely, if there were no threshing mills and we were not getting the crop threshed and the grain and cereals secured there would be no use in planning the crop at all. Therefore, if any agreement on deferment is arrived at, it should embrace that type of threshing mill worker, who travels from farm to farm.
My last case is of a housing contractor in my constituency, who has a small family business in the borough of Irvine. This man, who is 35 years of age, served throughout the last war. His appeal has been rejected, and he is to be taken in July for Z Reserve training. He has 20 housing contracts. He has no one whom he can put in charge of these jobs, which


cover an area from my constituency to the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes).
He is employed by various burgh councils and by the county council. He says that for the 15 days he is away he will have to shut down his business and to lay off more than 40 tradesmen. He cannot get anyone else to look after his work. I have sent his letter to the appropriate Minister. I hope that this kind of family business will be safeguarded and that we will not be brought to a position where housing is held up simply because of a short period of Z Reserve training.
Housing is important enough to justify not having a break even for 15 days and the laying off of a number of tradesmen for that period. In addition, there is the threat of destruction to a business which has been very painfully built up since the end of the war in 1945.
These are the main cases of which I have heard in recent weeks, and the position appears to be getting more serious. I put in a plea for small farms operating with a minimum of staff, with the whole family in active participation. Where a member of that family is taken away, such a case should be looked at with the most careful consideration before Scotland has her food production destroyed as, apparently. it is to be destroyed in the coming season.

12.31 a.m.

Mr. Fitzroy Maclean: I will not follow the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel) in the interesting and, I agree, most important subject with which he was dealing, but I should like to refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). The House is always hearing about his long and distinguished military career, but during it, I imagine, he did not see a Guards' battalion in action; because, if he had, he would not have so low an opinion of them as he apparently has.
So far as the granting of commissions is concerned, I can tell him that I served as a private for some time in a line regiment, and I saw no signs of segregation of potential candidates for commissions. We were all treated in the same way, whether going in for commissions or not, and after six years of Socialist Govern-

ment it seems surprising that there should have been such far-reaching changes such as he suggests.
But what I wish to speak about is a branch of warfare which is apt to become overlooked in a debate of this kind, but which is very important indeed in any future conflict, and that is small-scale raiding and irregular operations, including guerilla warfare. Those go hand in hand together, and should be considered together.
Few people foresaw the important part which operations of that kind were to play in the last war, for, in the clash of modern armies, it was thought there would be no scope for the small unit, or even individuals operating on their own. But, as things turned out, small bodies of troops, and even individuals, behind the enemy lines played a most important part in most of the theatres of that war. Indeed, one of the important lessons of the last war was that modern armies and large weapons, for all their destructive powers, are in themselves highly vulnerable to well-planned and well-executed attacks.
Then there is another aspect. The effectiveness of the small-scale raider, or the guerilla, has been much increased of recent years by the technical improvements which we have achieved. Thanks to jeeps, and aeroplanes, and so on, the individual raider has become more mobile, his fire-power has been increased, he has better explosives, and, thanks to small wireless sets, his communications have been revolutionised.
All that applied in the last war and will apply in the next to an even greater extent, although I am with the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) in hoping that there will not be a future war. But we have to consider what might happen if there was. On present form, it is all too likely that, in the early stages of any conflict between East and West, the Russians would succeed in over-running large areas of Europe and Asia. But once they had done that, they would find themselves in a military position which would not be altogether easy. Their lines of communication would be perilously extended. They would be subject to heavy air attack. The morale of their troops might not be too good and I think we can say that the local popula-


tion would certainly be bitterly hostile to them. In fact, they might have considerable difficulty in holding down the areas they occupied.
That, as it happens, is an ideal situation, both for the small-scale raider and for the local resistance movement. One would have an enemy strategically on the offensive but tactically on the defensive. That is just what one wants for operations of this kind. One would have plenty of targets, such as lines of communication, airfields, dumps, military installations of one kind and another, and, the best target of all, the morale of the enemy's troops. Finally, one would have a friendly population because one can count on the population of any country occupied by the Russians being friendly to us.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Would not this apply if Western nations invaded Russia? Would not they meet a hostile population? Would not the lines of communication be liable to attack?

Mr. Maclean: Yes, but I am not certain that would apply because there is a difference in regimé between Russia and the Western countries. If we were to occupy areas of Russia, I do not feel convinced that the local population would necessarily be hostile.

Mr. Hughes: Mr. Hughes rose—

Mr. Maclean: The important thing to remember is that we are not going to invade Russia. It is much more likely that if Russia does not invade us, there will not be a war. I do not know what makes the hon. Gentleman think we are—

Mr. Hughes: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Here is a preview of the war on Russia, in which Russia is to be occupied by Allied troops. This is the American strategy, in which Russia is to be invaded and occupied.

Mr. Maclean: It is a very late hour and I do not want to speak for very long. I do not think the hon. Gentleman should take American picture magazines quite as seriously as all that.
I want to deal with a small point, which is not controversial but which is technical. Let us envisage a war in which Russia attacks, which most hon.

Gentlemen on both sides of the House agree is much more likely than a situation the other way round. I consider in that event, unpleasant as it would be in every other way, that it would offer a situation which would be ideally suited for small-scale raiding operations of the kind carried out in the last war, much the same as happened in the case of the Germans, after they had occupied large areas of Europe.
What can be done in this way was shown in the Western Desert, in the jungles of South-East Asia, in the Balkans, and in Western Europe. But, what also emerged from the last war was that much more could have been done if we had prepared ourselves for this kind of warfare in advance. It is not enough just to collect a few adventurous characters at the last moment and send them out to try their luck. It is a method which may succeed up to a point, but it is a method which is apt to be very wasteful indeed.
Irregular operations, like most other military operations, need long and careful preparation and in the first place the right men are needed. It is sometimes said that small-scale raiding can equally well be carried out by detachments from larger, less specialised formations. I do not agree. To my mind, not only is a far higher degree of specialisation needed, but a special type of man is required for operations of this kind.
Some men are happier when they go into action as part of a larger unit or formation, and others prefer to go in on their own or with half a dozen others. It is the latter type that is needed for the kind of operations I have in mind.
Secondly, men have to be specially trained; they have to be physically fit and have specialised technical knowledge on such matters as demolition and so on. Then there is equipment. By the end of the last war, troops engaged in operations of this kind were provided with a wide range of special weapons—special explosives, special rations, special wireless sets. But in the early stages those of us engaged in this kind of work had to rely very largely on improvisations, and to improvise with things like parachute equipment and high explosives is not always very agreeable.
Finally, there is the whole question of base organisation. If one is operating


behind the enemy lines nothing is more important than to know that you can count absolutely upon one's rear link or base organisation. Nothing is more discouraging than the knowledge that one may be let down, and especially if one is exhausted, hungry, and harrassed by the enemy that is apt to be the last straw.
Whether we are dealing with British troops carrying out these raids or operating in support of national resistance movements, it is equally important that there should be a base organisation that can provide reliable communication, adequate intelligence and a proper supply system. But none of these are things that can be improvised or hurriedly got together in a few months. If we leave it to the last moment we shall waste valuable material, valuable lives and valuable opportunities.
If we are going to make the best of our opportunities in the event of war, we must have properly trained, properly selected and properly equipped cadres which, I think, should come from all three Services, because there can be no clearer instance of combined operations than operations of this kind.
What preparations are in fact being made? I am glad to see that provision is made in the Estimates for the retention of the Special Air Service Regiment, which had such a fine record of operation in the field of small-scale raiding in the last war. But, as far as I know—and I hope, when the Secretary of State replies, he will enlighten me if I am wrong, the Special Air Service Regiment consists at the moment of a single Territorial battalion that is not quite up to strength. That battalion happens to be a first-rate Territorial unit. That is not enough.
Small-scale raiding is a very important job for which, I am sure, there will be very great scope in any future war. It is also not a very safe job. There is apt to be a high rate of wastage, and I say that one Territorial battalion is nothing like enough. I think there should be other S.A.S. battalions and that they should include at least one Regular battalion. I do not think we can do all the training needed for this sort of operations in a fortnight once a year or in an hour or two's training once a week. Those who undertake that training give up as much of their time as they possibly can, but in my opinion it is still not enough

I think we must have strong Regular cadres who can give their whole time to working out in theory and in practice the very complicated technical and other problems involved in this sort of warfare. The same applies to the sort of organisation which is needed if we are to give proper support to resistance movements behind the enemy lines. There must be adequate preparation in advance.
Today we are spending vast sums on defence. The preparations for which I ask are not primarily a question of money. The results produced are out of all proportion to the outlay. Hon. Members will perhaps understand better what I mean when I say that in the Western Desert one of my brother officers in the Special Air Service Regiment, drawing, I think, at the time a captain's pay, destroyed with his own hands and with a certain amount of high explosive in the space of 12 months no fewer than 100 enemy aircraft on the ground. That, I think, was a very good return indeed for the money spent.
What is needed is not so much money as forethought, ingenuity and hard work. We must learn to develop and improve on the experience of the last war while there is still time. I will not ask my hon. Friend to go into great details when he replies to the debate, but I will ask him to give an assurance that sufficient thought has been given to this question, and that preparations are now being made on an adequate scale. In a previous incarnation during the last war he showed himself a very good friend of all of us engaged in operations of this kind. I hope that in his present exalted position he will continue the good work.
As a country, we have never lacked the qualities of enterprise and initiative that are needed for this kind of work. I am sure there will always be plenty of volunteers, but it would indeed be a pity if when the need arose we were hampered through lack of adequate preparation in advance.

12.44 a.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: We have had a long debate, though not. I notice, as long as the Silent Service had last week. It has been a debate in which hon. Members from both sides of the House have contributed from a very wide fund of specialised knowledge on


military matters. I think we all listened with very great interest to the speech by the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Maclean) as one example of the wealth of specialised knowledge there is in this House.
Reference has been made in this and earlier debates to the possibility that the danger of war may have receded in recent years or months. I am bound to say that I think we should be unwise to attempt in any way to base policy on speculations as to the exact number of clouds there may be in the international sky in any particular week or month.
I do not put that forward as being pessimistic, because if I do not take the view that the danger has receded so much as some hon. Members feel, neither did I take the view some time ago that the danger was as grave as some feared. In my judgment, the situation is one which requires all the time neither despair nor carelessness, but a steady vigilance. I would ask the House to consider what is the best contribution the Army can make to that steady vigilance which, I believe, is one of the best measures which can be taken to avert the danger of war.
I believe that the Army has in the first place to be capable of, at the best, defeating, or at least, containing, the various local aggressions which we describe, rather inappropriately, I think, as the cold war. Anyone who considers what might have happened if any one of these local aggressions had been successful from the aggressor's point of view, will agree that world war would have been brought nearer.
In addition to that task, which I think the hon. Gentleman said falls on the three Services and particularly heavily upon the Army, the Army also must be prepared to make the notable contribution of resisting the first showing of any assault which might come if we move from the cold war into a more general and serious conflict. The Army will then have to consider how to bring into the military effort the whole resources of the nation by calling up the Reserves which are part of our present Army system.
So, the international situation today makes a great demand upon the Army. If that demand is to be met, we must have an Army which has an adequate

Regular content, and which makes good use both of its Regular and National Service manpower, and which is well and adequately equipped.
I should like to say a few words upon each of these aspects. With regard to manpower, we have the problem of attracting a sufficient number of people to become Regular soldiers. I think we shall agree that the recruiting figures which the right hon. Gentleman gave in his opening speech are encouraging but we do not yet know how far they may not be simply an anticipation of recruiting which might ordinarily have occurred, but perhaps occurred a few months later.
It has not been uncommon in the history of the Army that this, that, or the other, expedient has been tried to encourage recruiting. They may have produced promising results, but after a year or two, it may be realised that all that has been done has been to get a number of men into the Army more quickly than would otherwise have been the case, and that a permanent rise in the number of people in the country who are willing to take up the Army as a career has not been made. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether something cannot be done to increase that proportion of the nation which is prepared to look to the Army as a possible career.
For example, many working class families have military traditions as long and distinguished as the military traditions of the greatest families. But all too often, I think, in families of the kind I am describing, it has been assumed that the height of ambition is that the son shall follow the father's footsteps and become a regimental sergeant major.
There was a time in the history of our country when it was quite natural that that should be so. But with the social structure and the ideas we have in society at present, if we want to get an increasing number of families to look to the Army as a possible source of employment for their members we have to be able to say that there is for men coming from any family in the land the opportunity of rising not only to the highest non-commissioned rank but to the highest commissioned rank to which their ability can take them.
That is why the earlier topic in the debate, on the selection of officers, was


one of great importance to anyone interested in the question of recruiting, because it is one of the ways in which we can make not merely a temporary increase in the number of people who become Regular soldiers, but a permanent extension of the section of the country who is prepared to think of doing so. As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, part of this problem of recruiting is due to the fact that there is a very large section of people who never think of themselves, or anyone connected with them, taking up the profession of arms, and it is that we want to deal with.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), did suggest that very often the decision whether a man should become an officer on the one hand, or a warrant officer or N.C.O. on the other, is made at far too early a stage in his career. I am inclined to agree with him on that point. There ought to be further consideration of the possibility of drawing from the ranks of men who have had experience as warrant officers and N.C.O.s as a potential source of supply of commissioned officers. I doubt we make sufficient use of the very great experience, knowledge, and common sense that is stored up in the mind and personality of a senior N.C.O. or warrant officer.
On the question of the boys' battalion which is to be formed, I must ask the right hon. Gentleman to be rather more precise about this. In the official statement it is laid down that its purpose is to provide warrant officers and N.C.O.s. In referring to it in his speech, the right hon. Gentleman added that there would also be a possibility of commissioned officers coming from this institution. But that did appear to be added very much as an afterthought. It was not mentioned at all in the first official description of this institution.
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman, in the light of what has been said, will consider giving this possibility of drawing commissioned officers from such an institution much more than an afterthought, and indeed possibly revising whatever it was he had in mind for this battalion. He did also mention, but not in any detail, another school to be created, from which commissioned officers were to be recruited. It is clear from what was said later in the debate that he had not been able to tell the

House all what he had in mind, and it would be helpful if in his reply he would tell us rather more fully what he had in mind.
I believe, too, that if he is to get a wider selection of officers he ought to look more closely at the status of the Army apprentice schools. They do extremely valuable work, but if one goes round them the general drabness of atmosphere does not suggest an institution playing as important a part in the life of the Army as the apprentice schools ought to do.
Once one gets behind the superficial appearance and observes the quality of the instruction one gets a much more favourable opinion. I do not think they have either the buildings or the equipment or status or regard in the eyes of the War Office that they deserve. They are one of the sources from which a larger number of commissioned officers might with advantage be drawn.
With regard to the technique of selecting officers, during the war the War Office selection board was developed, and it was a great advance on anything previously known. But it is important that we do not regard that technique as the last word. There is an elaborate apparatus of tests, interviews, group tasks and so on, and they serve some purpose in revealing the qualities required of a commissioned officer, but there is no reason to suppose that further experiment and research may not discover improved methods. If we allow the methods now in use to become stereotyped, and possibly carried through with less spirit and life at each repetition, gradually the great merits which this technique has conferred on the Army may dry up.
Another factor which the right hon. Gentleman should look at is how far it is possible for a young man coming from a poor home to meet the expenses of becoming a commissioned officer. I put a question to him a little while ago and received certain answers. Not long after I received a letter from someone with considerable military experience, in which he wrote to me:
Although I am a Tory, in this instance you are quite right. Ask the Secretary of State for War how many officers in"—
and he names certain regiments—
do not have a private income.
I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to realise that this is a serious matter and


that he must not dismiss it as one merely of prejudice. It is undoubtedly true that there are certain regiments where, whatever be the intentions of the War Office, it is a practical impossibility for a poor person to obtain commissioned rank, and that is made very clear to him if he has any idea of so doing. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree that this is not desirable, but it does happen and it ought to be remedied.

Mr. Ian Harvey: In view of the accusations being made, can we have the names?

Mr. Stewart: I do not think that would be desirable. I am prepared to discuss this with the Secretary of State privately, which I think would be more appropriate. I assure him that if he can get some of his hon. Friends in a confidential mood he will get confirmation of what I am saying. It is unwise to suggest that this does not exist.

Mr. Maclean: The hon. Gentleman says this needs looking into. He and his friends were in power for six years. Did they not look into this, and all the other matters he is raising?

Mr. Stewart: Surely the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that the late Government left the administration of the Army in such a condition that no improvements can be made? A great many things need to be done. What one finds when one deals with a matter like this is that it is not something that can be uprooted with a single pull. It needs, as a great many Army matters do, a continuous determination over a period of years to get right. If the right hon. Gentleman is really interested, he will not attempt to dismiss a matter like this as a mere party quibble.
Another question that will concern the problem of increasing the number of people who are prepared to look upon the Army as a career is the general tone of Army life. We want the conditions under which a young man will live in the Army to be such as a self-respecting young man will be prepared to undergo. Everyone agrees that Army life has to be one of rigour and strict discipline, but it is remarkably easy for that to degenerate, if care is not shown, into a sort of unnecessary brutishness, of which, from time to time, one has evidence.
We had such evidence only a little while ago in certain happenings at Catterick Camp and I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman is making a thorough inquiry into that kind of incident, which is liable to occur if there are N.C.O.s who really do not know how to give instruction properly.
The whole House listened with great interest to the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle, Central (Mr. Short), about the importance of improving the instructional technique in the Army. The Army has a valuable fund of knowledge about methods of instruction and if we look into those units where the job is done best we find that it is being done extremely well indeed. It provides a model that many civilian instructional establishments could follow with great advantage.
But, as so often in Army matters, it is a question of getting a good quality spread universally over the whole administration of the Army, and the right hon. Gentleman would be more usefully employed trying to raise the general level of instructional ability among junior N.C.O.s than by providing them with separate messes. Indeed, I could not follow the argument he advanced a little while ago on that matter he seemed to suggest that the less a private soldier saw of a N.C.O., the more likely he would be to respect him.
I would commend to him in this connection the words of Lawrence of Arabia—I paraphrase—where he says that one of the things he learned from the men among whom he lived was that he who was to exercise authority must be prepared to live as his men lived and eat as they ate, and yet somehow show by his character that he was the one to follow.
Now I turn to the uses that the Army may make of its manpower when it has it. First, I was pleased to hear the Under-Secretary defending the functions of the Royal Army Educational Corps, in the light of certain comments made during the debate. Perhaps I need add nothing beyond this—invariably, the need for a corps of this kind has been discovered by experience and anyone who, in an excess of zeal to comb out the tail, destroys or seriously hampers its work only finds, at a somewhat later stage, that


it has to be re-created with a good deal of inconvenience and loss of efficiency.
On the use of manpower, I question whether the best use is always made of the time and energy of junior officers. It varies enormously from one unit to another, but I was reading recently in the magazine of a famous school that has contributed many men to the Army a series of accounts of young men doing their National Service. I was startled to find that, so far as they did complain, their chief complaint was of boredom and not having enough to do.
I was even more startled to find—contrary to my first impression—that this complaint came not from men in the ranks but from men who had received National Service commissions. There is a tendency sometimes in commanding officers not to delegate sufficiently and to leave these young men in circumstances where they cannot get anything like as much out of the Army as they would like.
On the question of the use of manpower, I would beg the right hon. Gentleman not to suppose that he can solve this question once and for all by applying the findings of the committee whose work was started under the late Government. This question of avoiding waste of manpower in the Army is something that could not be solved by a single turn of the key. It is something which needs constant vigilance if we are to get any results.
It is very easy, when one starts off with some new scheme to save time and manpower, to imagine that one can solve the whole problem, and then, through lack of continuous pressure, find that the problem is there again in a few years' time in quite as large a form as it originally was. For example, we have been told repeatedly that bodies such as schools, depots and static establishments generally are to have operational roles.
That is a sound and desirable thing, but what may very well happen, unless the greatest care is exercised, is that in a year or 18 months the so-called military training and operational role becomes a piece of perfunctory drill carried through for the sole purpose of satisfying the authorities that it has been carried through. If the right hon. Gentleman

wants to get the best out of this innovation, he will have to exercise great care to see that it does not become a perfunctory piece of routine which can avail of nothing in any army in any country.
While I am speaking of manpower I should like to add a word on colonial manpower. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out quite correctly that one of the greatest difficulties in making more use of colonial troops is the demand that it makes on our own supply of officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.s. I believe that in time it will be the colonial peoples themselves who will wish to meet that deficiency. I do not wish to be unrealistic about the matter, and I realise that what I envisage is some generations ahead, but when the right hon. Gentleman is considering the greater use of colonial manpower he ought to get into closer touch with his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
If he is thinking of some Colony, he ought to have regard to social and educational development in that Colony, and to what extent he can expect to draw N.C.O.s, warrant officers and officers from the indigenous people. The arrangement whereby the colonial troops are for the most part officered and led by people not their fellow countrymen is something which cannot be permanent if this Commonwealth of ours is to be a permanent institution.
Just a word about equipment. First of all, there has been much argument about the 280 rifle. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman realises the very great importance of reaching the right decision on this matter. I am not going to suggest that he is being under any kind of pressure, but I would invite him to consider what has been said on both sides of the House, and to realise that not a single substantial argument has been advanced against the adoption of this rifle. Possibly he has something more to tell us on the matter, and I hope he will answer the particular question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West.
This is a matter of very great concern, and it is of such first-class importance that the right hon. Gentleman should study it absolutely objectively and reach what, on the best evidence available, appears to be the right solution. Unless some totally new evidence can be put before us,


the whole weight of such evidence as we have today is in favour of the adoption of this rifle by the British Army with such speed as the technical exigencies of production permit.
I have only one other comment to make on equipment. I notice the considerable increase that there is to be in the number of vehicles provided for the Army. I take it that the right hon. Gentleman realises how expensive they are likely to be in time and in manpower for their proper maintenance. To ensure that the vehicles remain fit for use is a constant problem if a quite inordinate amount of time is not to be occupied on their maintenance.
The Minister will be well advised to consider very carefully the organisation of those units in the Army which deal with the storage and care of vehicles and to see that whatever mechanical means exist of securing that vehicles are adequately maintained are used with as little manpower as possible.
If, then, we can get an Army to which we can attract a larger proportion of the population than at present gives any serious consideration to the idea of taking up this profession; if we can get an Army in which the manpower, Regular and National Service, is well used, and an Army which is as well equipped as the industrial power and wealth of the country permits, that Army has to carry out the operational commitments to which I referred earlier under the title of defeating, or, at least, containing, local aggressions.
At present, we are still having to use young National Service men in Korea and in Malaya, and the right hon. Gentleman has given no indication so far of any major change in policy on this point. Indeed, I should not have expected him to do so. But I am bound to say—and this, I think, will be my only seriously contentious remark—that during the last Parliament my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West, and I were subjected by some hon. Members opposite, whom I do not see in their places now, to the most violent and bitter attacks because young National Service men were being used in the Malayan and Korean theatres. It is a piece of the most cynical callousness that some of the hon.

Gentlemen who were most forward in that attack have not said a word about the subject tonight and that many of them are actually not here.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: In their absence, may I say just that it was not a question of their being used in Malaya, but of the amount of training they had before they went there and, when they arrived, before they went into the jungle. That is the matter which was under discussion.

Mr. Stewart: It was not only a question of the amount of training. Very violent attacks were made by some hon. Members for their being sent there at all.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: No.

Mr. Stewart: It was my duty to sit there and to listen to the attacks, and the hon. and gallant Member did not by any means hear all that was said. What is remarkable is that neither the question of the presence of these young men in the theatre, nor that of their training, has been raised tonight.
Human nature being what it is, we can all concede the point that an hon. Member, to whatever party he belongs, will press a point more vigorously against a Government with whose politics he does not agree than against a Government of his own party. But the discrepancy we have now between the extreme bitterness of the attacks upon this point against the previous Government, and the complete silence, the complete dropping of any interest in the question, the moment there is a change of Government, is something which will oblige us to be unable to take very seriously what any of those hon. Gentlemen says in future.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: Brigadier Terence Clarke (Portsmouth, West) rose—

Mr. Stewart: If I may say so, I never take very seriously anything that the hon. and gallant Member says.

Brigadier Clarke: May I say something serious? Does the hon. Gentleman think that we could have changed all this in the last few months, even had we wanted to? Is that what he is suggesting?

Mr. Stewart: I suggest that, since the hon. and gallant Member professed such an interest in the matter before, he might have preserved that interest after a change of Government.
Apart from these operational commitments, the Army has to concern itself with the home defence of this country and, in that connection, reference has been made to the Home Guard. I hope that if this project is further developed, the right hon. Gentleman will not allow himself to be deceived by quantity at the expense of quality; that is, people calling themselves members of the Home Guard and going through the motions of military procedure which is of no value to the defence of this country. It would be far better to have a small number of units doing something really efficiently rather than a lot of people trying to look like a Home Guard.
In this, and the other functions which the Army has to perform, it is said that we wish the Government good luck in its task. Indeed, we do, but, at the same time, the instrument which the right hon. Gentleman proposes to use and which he, and other hon. Members have spoken of so highly, the British Army, is an instrument forged by a policy produced since the end of the war. I stress that because it is suggested that the late Government had got completely the wrong end of the stick and that there was some other policy waiting to solve all our military problems and headaches.
But what has been said to-night from the other side of the House, and what is in these Estimates, shows quite clearly that that is just not so. Whatever criticisms were made of the late Government on matters of administration, the general approach to this problem is fully accepted by the present Government and is one which it will continue to use. The Minister has had a good inheritance to take over; he has great and formidable problems, and we have pressed on him a number of topics, but we do earnestly wish him success in the task of providing the Army with the administration to which the quality of the men so rightly entitles them.

Brigadier Clarke: Since the hon. Member has taken nothing which I have said very seriously, that would account for many stupid answers I have received. May I ask if he will admit that less than

two-and-a-half years ago, had the Ack-ack Reserve been called up, there was not a uniform to put its men into, and that that is why we have £20 million more for clothing this year? Further, were not uniforms in emergency manufactured in Germany last year? If that is good Socialist administration, I should like to hear what he thinks.

1.19 a.m.

Mr. Head: I think that I can say without any fear of contradiction that this has been a long debate. I must confess that the last speech seemed to be more reminiscent of somebody who knew something of the Army and was thirsting to get into the War Office in order to do something about things, and not one who had been for the last six years in the Government and doing something about it. I thank the hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) for his good wishes to myself, but, despite his kind thoughts, I cannot resist saying that the British Army as we know it has not been forged into shape in the last six years.
I do not want, and I have tried not to, to bring party politics into this, but I would remind the hon. Gentleman that we sat on the Opposition benches and we watched National Service changed from 18 months back to a year, up to 18 months again, and then up to two years. We saw an ex-Minister of Defence, who is now in another place, change his mind when the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), got up behind him and said, "Boo." We saw the Regular Army wasting away through men going out because of a failure to put up the pay in time.
For the Opposition to suggest that they created the present British Army is rubbish. What they did, by never making-up their minds and by vacillating, was to ensure that the Army we have today is not half as good as it would have been had they made up their minds. I do not want to go on with this controversial matter, but there were some things we saw when we were in Opposition which stick in our guts; and talking about sticking, I think we have stuck more in this Debate to the Army than was done the other day to the Navy during the Debate on the Estimates.
I want to go through as rapidly as I can, the various points raised in the debate. It has cropped up, again and


again, in this debate, and it is an anomaly, that I, as Secretary of State, should have been so constantly accused of discrimination against those in the lower classes or income groups, or whatever word anybody wishes to use, when, despite six years of hon. Gentlemen opposite, it falls to my lot to say I have a project for commissions for officers in the Army from the grammar and secondary schools. Yet, throughout the whole of the debate, I have been subjected to the idea that I am going to build up the Brigade of Guards and shut out any officer who is not the son of a millionaire.
It really is rubbish. It has not been settled yet, but I think I shall get a chance for the boys from grammar and secondary schools to get a commission. The Opposition have had a long time to do it and have done nothing, so why blame me for class distinction? I am the last person who is guilty of that.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), asked me several questions of a specific nature, which I will try to answer. He asked particularly, and, if I may so, it was a very relevant question, about anti-tank weapons, the importance of which he and I are fully aware. He may not know it, but there is a new range of anti-tank weapon coming off in the current year. It will be in the hands of troops by the end of the year, and it is a very good weapon indeed.
This question of the rifle was asked by the right hon. Gentleman and many hon. Members. The hour is late, but I will try and put it as briefly as I can. Nobody on either side of the House would argue, for one moment, that the 280 rifle was not the best rifle in Europe or the world today. That is beyond dispute, but the point is this. If we said we would make the rifle and we were not interested in what other people did—it is true that the Belgians might make it—we should then be committed in four, five or six years' time, to a rifle in which we would be fighting a war, perhaps in Europe, and we should be entirely dependent on our own manufacture, not only of rifles but of ammunition.
During that period of the next five or six years, which is the danger period, we should constantly have too few to com-

plete the equipment of the Army, two types of ammunition, and not have, what is termed, a big pool. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, who has immense experience, is right in this: be sure that one has a big reserve of rifles and be sure that one's ammunition supply is secure.
Can any hon. Member say, in the event of war, if all our ammunition comes from factories in this country, that is a secure source of its supply? If it did not come from this country, where else would it come from? I believe that to be an immensely important argument in this particular respect. I share his interest in this matter, and I can assure him that I am doing everything possible to ensure that we have enough of them.
The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) made a most helpful speech, based on a great deal of experience, and I can assure him and other hon. Members that we will study the suggestion he put forward. I know the hon. and gallant Member made them as one who had a great deal of practical experience in the Territorial Army. I hope he will approach me if he thinks I am making any bad mistakes in that respect.
The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), after having compared the ex-Minister of Defence with "high-up" generals, stated that he thought I really belonged to the A Branch. I do not wish to engage in retaliation, but I might almost reply that he belongs to the X Branch. But he did make a very interesting speech, and so he should with his experience. He asked me particularly about building married quarters.
The figures are these: since the scheme was introduced we have built 1,430 for the Regular Army, 712 for the permanent staff of the Territorial Army, and there have been hirings for 3,343. These are the figures of the achievement in that building so far. [An HON. MEMBER: "At home or overseas?"] That is entirely at home. The hon. Member also referred to local recruitment for anti-aircraft. I think he is quite right in some respects. For heavy anti-aircraft I think it is difficult, but for light anti-aircraft I think it is a very sensible suggestion, and we are well aware of the useful purpose that can be served by factory units manning such defences.
The hon. and gallant Member for Devon, North (Brigadier Peto), stated that our propaganda could be improved. I think it could. He also stated there were too many Regulars on the staff. I think there are. The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons)—a private Member, in a sense—who made an interesting speech, told me, incidentally, that he was recruited in Birmingham. I have no time for stories, but I have always enjoyed the one about the regimental sergeant major inspecting recruits on the first day. He said to one, "Where do you come from?" The recruit replied, "Birmingham," and the R.S.M. said, "I'll give you Birmingham." That sort of thing no longer occurs in the Army today. The hon. Member expressed anxiety that if we had a major-general to inspect recruiting he would build up a staff. I can assure him that is not the case.

Mr. Simmons: My anxiety was that he would have no staff to use the information he collected, and that the appointment would, therefore, be useless.

Mr. Head: The project has only just started, but we have in mind that he should go round and look at the organisation from a commonsense point of view, write a report, and that executive action should be taken on his report. The hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Baker White) particularly asked me about the Special Air Service Regiment, and so did the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Maclean). I have, as the latter knows, a great sympathy for this type of unit. It is in existence today, and I believe that in a future war, which is less and less a linear and more and more a war of points, that type of unit is of great importance, and I can assure him I have the matter in mind.
Of course, in both that and the question of airborne formations raised by the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Gough), it is no good having large Forces capable of dropping here, there and everywhere unless one can match them with the necessary supply of transport aircraft. That, as hon. Members will know, presents a considerable problem.
The hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) made a rather waspish speech, and I could not help saying that he was

well qualified for dialectics. Nor could I help thinking that had not the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition appointed him to his job when he did, he might well have been writing some very controversial articles in the "Tribune." However, that is not so, and the hon. Gentleman had a good deal of criticism to make of me personally. That is only fair, but I could not help feeling that some of his criticisms were so partisan that had the late Lord Haldane been sitting in my place he would have called the hon. Member an old fogey in the mood that he was in today. Therefore, quite frankly, my impression of the hon. Gentleman's speech was that I personally had done very badly, but that it had been exceeded by the bestiality of the hon. Member for Coventry, East.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) asked me about agriculture, and so did the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes), who always makes a contribution to our debates. I do not want to shirk this question, but I think the hon. Members who asked it know full well that this is a matter which belongs to the Ministry of Labour. I am sure that their speeches will be fully reported to their constituencies, but the answer must come from the Ministry of Labour.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire also asked me about training areas and food. We have finished the Army farming scheme, and I do not think that fact will at any rate decrease the amount of food in the country, and may increase it. The amount of agricultural land held by the Army is, I agree, considerable, but the vast majority of it is let out to farmers, and strict instructions are given regarding the killing of weeds and ensuring that thistles do not grow on Army land.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), who is an amphibious contributor to these debates, made, if I may say so, once we got past Agincourt, a most interesting speech. I was most interested in his recommendations and his points about those men in the Army who fight. I think there is something in that, and I am also aware


of his figures about the tail. I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman will not take offence if I say that once one starts working out proportions of tail, one can make them do practically anything. One to 20 is his figure. I could produce figures which would make them anything from one to four or from one to 34 with quite good conclusive evidence.
I can see that the hon. and learned Gentleman is getting restive, but the point I am at is this. He says we shall never cure this without a fundamental and radical alteration of the whole set-up. But until we have the fundamental and radical solution, the best thing one can do is to comb as hard as possible, and that is what I can assure the hon. and learned Gentleman we are engaged in doing now, despite that fact that I was well aware that he was a little apprehensive that the promoted office boy would be too nervous of the generals and field-marshals to have really much say in the matter.

Mr. Paget: I agree that one can make "tail" mean anything one likes. But we have the Russian figures, we have the American figures, and the British figures. Should not they be on the same basis?

Mr. Head: I have some Russian figures, though I have not got them on me. I am quite prepared to show them to the hon. and learned Gentleman, with the permission of my Department—if they are not too secret—and on comparison of the fully mobile Russian divisions with our own infantry divisions it is surprising that the number of vehicles to men is not so wide as one might think. But the hour is late, and I think that on the whole we might continue this, as we sometimes do, in the smoking room.
The hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) mentioned again the question of mobility by air. I could not agree with him more, but aircraft is the deciding factor. The hon. Member also made some remarks about anti-aircraft artillery. As an anti-aircraft gunner he knows more about that than I do. I am aware that anti-aircraft artillery in war, with high-flying, fast aircraft may not hit a great many, but he would be a bold man in my position who did away with the guns. Those who have read

books about the last war will know that bomber pilots did not like anti-aircraft fire. Anti-aircraft fire prevented their flying straight and kept them high. Until we get the guided missile I do not think we can harden our hearts and make that saving.
The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) made a speech which, I must confess, I thought was very unpleasant. If I thought that what he said was typical of the British Army I would resign tonight. But I do not think it is. I do not propose to answer his speech at great length. With regard to his remarks about the officers of the Brigade of Guards, my answer is that I think the best treatment I can suggest for him is that he should repeat these remarks to the N.C.O.s of the Brigade of Guards and see what happens to him.
The hon. Member for Ayrshire, South, I think I have largely answered on his agricultural points. He made some other interesting observations which will no doubt be studied in the War Office. But I think that on the whole I have answered his main point. The hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) asked about N.A.A.F.I., parcels, and said that he did not want an answer before Thursday. I was about to give him an answer today, and will give it to him now. The answer is, "Yes". I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman is happy, for he made a constructive suggestion and we have implemented it.
The hon. Member for Fulham, East, who wound up the debate for the Opposition, made a number of wise remarks about Regular recruiting, and then spent a good deal of time on this question of the selection of officers and the necessity for a private income, and so forth. I would like to say that hon. Members have rather a bee in their bonnets about this question of class prejudice in the Army.
I had a long talk the other day with a general who was on the selection board. He gave me a long description of the various types of candidates who come up. He said that some of the best types of officer candidates who come up were the sons of quartermasters, warrant officers, and senior N.C.O.s of the Regular Army, and he said he welcomed them with open


arms. That does not altogether agree with the attitude the hon. Gentleman takes. This general had been operating during the tenure of his appointment at the War Office. Officers are not riddled with class consciousness.
Officers hate the dud rich man just as much as anyone else, and admire the good man whatever his birth, but in my experience I have never seen any kind of class consciousness in this way. I see the hon. Gentleman opposite grinning. When I was at Sandhurst we had a number of Y cadets. They were N.C.O.s. If he likes to get in touch with any of them they will tell him there was no sign of prejudice. I do not know whether it is done for political reasons, but to work up this class prejudice is a mistake. It does not exist. There are endless cases where men fitted for a commission become officers, but the hon. Gentleman showed his lack of understanding when he asked why it was that not more senior N.C.O.s and warrant officers were turned into officers.
The answer is that that is the worst stage at which to turn a man into an officer. Anyone with Army experience knows that to turn a man who has been a warrant officer or senior N.C.O. for a large part of his career into an officer is a naturally difficult task because the two jobs are fundamentally different. It is nothing to do with class prejudice. One is a supervisor, the other has to enforce discipline, and has to take a different attitude to the men. The time to get them is when they are young and not when they are warrant officers.
I have given the House the undertaking that we will look into all the remarks of hon. Gentlemen. I thank them for their speeches. Many of the suggestions will be most useful, and I regret that I have spoken five minutes longer than I had intended.

Mr. Manuel: Will the right hon. Gentleman deal with my point about the modification of medical standards for National Service men?

Mr. Head: There has been some modification of medical standards for certain sections of the Army for National Service men.
Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Mr. HOPKIN MORRIS in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1952–53

VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 555,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953.

1.44 a.m.

Mr. Wigg: I should like the Secretary of State for War to reply to some of the questions I put to him earlier. I asked him specific questions about the number of officers in the Brigade of Guards who had held regular commissions. Would he answer that question or, if he cannot, give an assurance that he will do so if I put a Question on the Order Paper?
Would he also be good enough to tell me how many divisions he anticipates we shall have this day twelvemonth, and would he also inform the House of the present establishment of the 5th Brigade? I should have thought on these points, as he himself pressed for information on some of them last year, that he would be in a position to inform us.

Mr. Head: All the officers in the Brigade of Guards hold regular commissions.

Mr. Wigg: I said Regular engagements. How many officers have served on Regular engagements; that is to say, started by service in the ranks?

Mr. Head: It is obvious that nobody, even if he were clairvoyant, could have that information on him. The hon. Members asks that question to underline his class-conscious attack. I have told him, and he has said I am sheltering behind it, that General Harding, who has had more operational experience than anyone today, is experimenting to see how it works out. If he says that is sheltering, I tell him that I have never heard such rubbish in my life.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman made this point himself a year ago.

Mr. Head: Exactly. It is because I made it a year ago that the experiments are going on.

Mr. Wigg: Will he tell us what he anticipates will be their strength a year from now?

Mr. Head: If 1 could 1 would not tell the hon. Member, because for security reasons it would not be desirable.

Mr. Wigg: A year ago we were subjected to the right hon. Gentleman's arithmetic. He took the total number of Vote A, divided it by 20,000, and said that was the number of divisions we had, and there was a big surplus. All I want to do is to apply the right hon. Gentleman's own wisdom to the problem. We have 11 now. That leaves a bigger surplus than last year. Does he anticipate that this time next year he will have combed the tail so that the 11 will have gone, or that the total will come down and lower Vote A?

Mr. Head: All I can tell the hon. Gentleman is that since he and his friends left the War Office, the fighting strength of the Army has increased by seven battalions.

Mr. Wigg: What we want to know is not the establishment but the strength of these battalions. What is the breakdown? If he cannot answer these questions, and say what is the strength of these battalions and the breakdown of the 10,000, his figures are bogus.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has stated that my figures are bogus. They are not bogus. The seven battalions are now forming, and, therefore, their strength is altering from day to day. If we make a total saving in the Far East, in Germany, Trieste, Austria, and this country, does the hon. Gentleman honestly think that anybody can break down that 10,000 into how many corporals, how many sergeants, how many privates? Every question that the hon. Gentleman has asked me has displayed his crass ignorance about the Army.

Mr. Wigg: If I am ignorant, it is easy to demolish my argument. If the right hon. Gentleman anticipates saving 10,000 men, he cannot get away with the argument that he is transferring them from tail to teeth unless he tells us what

arms they are going to. He knows that these seven battalions are paper battalions. That is another bogus thing he is trying to put across the country. If I am wrong let him tell us what they are. At no single point where his figures can be checked has he given us the material to check them. Yet he had the audacity, after we on this side had taken the lead in pressing for more information, to join in the hue-and-cry last year.
The Committee is being asked to pass Vote A, yet he will not tell us the most elementary thing to enable the House and the country to check what, after all, is said to be a major result of a change of policy. Unless the right hon. Gentleman can give us at least a breakdown of the 10,000 by arms of service and unless he can say categorically that these 10,000 men are not coming from combatant units, then the House must draw its own conclusions.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I wish to raise a matter of vital interest to National Service men not only in Scotland, but in the rest of the country. Last week I put a Question to the right hon. Gentleman which was answered in writing. The Question asked the Secretary of State for War if he was aware that dictatorial methods were being used in some units of Her Majesty's forces to induce National Service men to sign on for extra service, thus making them Regular soldiers with liability to be drafted to Germany, and that if they failed to comply with this threat they would be drafted to serve in the Far East; and if he would issue instructions to commanding officers to end this practice.
This matter arose out of a statement which received great prominence in the Scottish Press, following a statement made by the President of the Lanarkshire branch of the National Farmers' Union, in which he produced a definite case of a soldier and his unit and the full particulars, which he asked to be forwarded to the National Farmers' Union for investigation by the War Office. The person who made this complaint is a prominent Conservative in the county of Lanark: his name is Mr. Robert Pate, of Muirsland, Kirkmuirhill.
This statement has had great publicity in the Scottish Press. It should be fully investigated and some assurance given


that National Service men are not being bullied or threatened to be sent to the Far East if they do not agree to join the Regular Forces. This was the reply I received in writing from the Secretary of State:
No dictatorial methods are in use and no instructions have been issued that they should be used. The hon. Member, however, may have in mind the recent case in which the posting instructions to certain National Service men were altered and their unit, in informing the men of their new postings to a unit going to the Far East, pointed out that they might continue to serve with their own regiment if they were to undertake a re-engagement.
The Secretary of State adds:
I have looked into this case and think that the unit acted in good faith in trying to let the men have all the facts on which to make their choice.
In that final sentence there is a frank admission that in one unit this threat did take place and pressure was brought to bear on the National Service men to join up for three years in this way. When this statement was submitted to the Scottish Command by the "Glasgow Herald" this was the footnote: "Absolute rot" was how Scottish Command described it. "No pressure is brought to bear on any National Service recruit at any time."
But here is an admission by the Secretary of State that it has been done in this particular unit, and I have received as a result of this appearing in the paper at least three letters from different parts of the country, from different units, that pressure is being brought to bear on National Service men to sign up for a three years' period—otherwise, they will be drafted to the Far East.
I want some assurance from the Secretary of State that this pressure will not be used and that National Service men will not be threatened in this way.

Mr. Simmons: On this Vote I want to get some information on the Royal Army Chaplains' Department. I see that it says in the report:
Chaplains are appointed by denominations according to the number of troops of each denomination and are attached to formations and to certain establishments.
I remember that some years ago, in the old Parliament, we had several long debates on the abolition of the compulsory church service, and I was wondering whether the Secretary of State could tell us whether attendances at church ser-

vices in the Army have gone down or have increased since the abolition of compulsory attendance at church.
I should like to know what rank these chaplains hold. Are they commissioned and do they use the officers' mess, or do they associate with the lads downstairs? I think that is important, because if these men are to be the spiritual advisers and guides of the ordinary lads they have got to know what the ordinary lads are doing and understand their lives and outlook.
Why do we get chaplains 1, 2, 3 and 4? There are four different classes of chaplains. Has that to do with length of services or length of sermons or what? Do the Established Church and the Nonconformists share the main offices? I see there is a Chaplain-General and a Deputy Chaplain-General. If the Church of England get the Chaplain-General, do the Nonconformists get the deputy position?
I also observe that the chaplains are appointed according to the number of troops of each denomination. I hope that a little more scrutiny and care is observed than used to be the case in the old days, when a man would say that he was a Primitive Methodist or a Presbyterian. Perhaps the sergeant-major dealing with the matter could not spell either of those words, and he would shout. "Put him down as C. of E." That was to the advantage of the Church of England perhaps, but was hardly fair to the Nonconformists.
I am rather surprised at the value placed upon those who are responsible for the spiritual well-being of the men in the Forces compared with those who are concerned with their physical well-being. Whereas a lieut.-general of the R.A.M.C. gets £3,729 per annum, the Chaplain-General only gets £1,956 a year. The brigadier who looks after the horses, the head of the Veterinary Corps, gets more than a chaplain.
I should also like to know how many unemployed people are carried on Vote A. I see a rather interesting note in the Estimates, which says that field-marshals when unemployed are placed on the half pay list. How many of these unemployed field-marshals are carried on the list of men we are voting for in Vote A. I understand that their salary is £4,191. On half pay, they get just over £2,000.


Yet I find that all the V.C.s between them never have got, and never will get, £2,500 a year. The unemployed field-marshal, therefore, if still on Vote A—that is what I am not sure about; I am seeking information—and who no doubt has another job on the side, gets at half pay more than all the V.C.s who are living in the country put together. The Secretary of State might well look at these matters and let me know about the unemployed field-marshals and whether they are on Vote A.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) asked me about the notice regarding postings. As I said in my letter to him, I am satisfied that the unit sent out that notice in good faith.

Mr. Hughes: Which unit was it?

Mr. Head: I think it was the Queen's Regiment. The hon. Member ought to know—he has a copy of the order.
The position in the unit was this. The men were on leave. Their posting order had come through and they were to be posted to a regiment which in three or four months' time was due to go to Korea. While they were on leave, a notice was sent out from the regiment stating to what regiment they would be posted and the fact that it was bound for Korea.
A third item of information, which is what the hon. Member thinks might amount to coercion, was included that any man who took on a Regular engagement would not be posted. That was nothing to do with the arrangements by the regiment but is an actual practice, that people at the depot who undertake Regular engagements would go to the Queen's Regiment. That fact was stated.
It may be argued that the juxtaposition of the fact that they would go to a regiment that was going to Korea, and the added fact that if they took on a Regular engagement they would go to the Queen's depot where they would be trained, amounted to coercion.
But supposing the officer who had sent out that notice had merely said, "You will be posted to a unit which in three months' time is going to Korea" and had not mentioned the other fact, an

hon. Member might have come to the House and said, "Why was it not pointed out to these men that they have the alternative course of taking a Regular engagement?"
I am aware of the kind of interpretation which may be taken on these things. I said in my speech, and I say again now, that we are going to be, and shall have to be, very careful to see that in the enthusiasm for recruiting men into the Regular Army no undue pressure is brought to bear on the National Service men.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) asked me some somewhat intricate and technical questions. Since church parades in the Army ceased to be compulsory, attendance at them has gone down. The chaplains are selected on a percentage basis of the denominational figures. I think that that is the right way to select them. They are officers, and they use the officers' mess. They give invaluable service to the Army, and I do not think there is anything wrong with them. The service they gave in the war was quite magnificent.
I come now to the much more intricate question about where the half-pay field-marshals feature in the Estimates. In the time available I have not been able to find out, but I guarantee to send to the hon. Member tomorrow a statement as to exactly where the half-pay field-marshals come in the Army Estimates, and I hope that that will content him.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 555,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953.

Resolved,

VOTE 1

£109,800,000, Pay, etc., of the Army.

VOTE 2

£18,200,000, Reserve Forces, Territorial Army, Home Guard and Cadet Forces.

VOTE 5

£29,300,000, Movements.

VOTE 8

£30,500,000, Works, Buildings and Land.

VOTE 10

NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £16,720,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1953.

2.7 a.m.

Mr. Simmons: I should just like to ask for some information about the non-effective services. I am concerned about the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, for when I was Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions this gave me more headaches than anything else. The attitude of mind, and the manner of approach of those for whom I was responsible, was so alien to the spirit existing at the Ministry of Pensions that I was distressed when I had to refer cases to Chelsea under the law relating to the Ministry of Pensions.
I see that the Governorship of the Hospital is bestowed for distinguished services on a field-marshal, or retired general officer, and that on top of his salary, he gets from the Hospital another £500 a year; then there are little letters against the appointment, which I think mean that he gets emoluments as well.
There is a Chaplain, and altogether there are actually 789 officials of one kind or another administering this Hospital. Also, I see there is the Captain of Invalids, £925 a year salary, and they seem to have docked him about £75 a year. But, surely, that really underlines the suspicion I have that this Hospital is carried on by martinets with military minds who do not like these poor old chaps to forget they were once in the Army and have got to remain in it for the rest of their lives.
I should like to hear something about the administration of this Hospital, and even if the Secretary of State cannot tell me to-night, will he make inquiries as to there being some humanising influence brought to bear in this Royal Hospital at Chelsea?
It was the one Charles II founded in response to his debt to Nell Gwyn. My experience of nearly three years at the Ministry of Pensions has taught me what can be done for our disabled Service people if one has the right spirit

and the right idea and how these people respond to the right kind of spirit and treatment. I say this with confidence. I believe that the spirit of the administration of the Ministry of Pensions is being maintained since we came out of office. What can be enjoyed by the pensioner who comes under the Royal Warrant, ought to be enjoyed by the pensioner who is outside that Royal Warrant.

Brigadier R. Medlicott: Before the Secretary of State replies, may I make a comment on the remarks of the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), and, in particular, to his reference to the martinet who is in charge of the Chelsea Hospital? It ought to be put on record that the officer, who is at present in charge of the Hospital, has a record second-to-none throughout the British Army for the deep concern which he has shown in practical form for the true welfare of the soldier, when he is serving and when he has retired.

2.12 a.m.

Mr. Wigg: I have a personal interest in the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, because my mother was left an orphan at the age of 11 years as the result of my grandfather dying a year after completing his 22 years' service and of my grandmother dying, too. When I left the Service, I became an out-patient of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea. When I draw my pension now, the amount of which is not worth drawing because of snags through the Army, it stinks of charity. I would remind the Committee that the provisions of commutation are guided still by the spirit of the 19th century. A Regular soldier, who wants to commute his pension, cannot commute all of it, but has to leave 2s. 0d. a day in case he becomes chargeable to a parish. Of course, an officer can commute his pension without any such reservation.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), however, is wrong when he talks about the number on the establishment of the Royal Hospital as being concerned with the administration, because 470 of the number he mentioned are in-patients. The procedure is a survival from the past whereby a Regular soldier, in receipt of a pension, could go to the Royal Hospital to live in his declining years, in which case he surrendered his claim to his pension and


merely drew pocket money. Those of us who were fortunate to survive that experience draw our pensions in full.
One thing the late Administration did to their very great credit. They realised the atmosphere which governed the administration of pensions by the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, and they took away the administration of post-war disability pensions from the Hospital and placed it under the much more kindly, efficient, and human administration of the Ministry of Pensions. What we are still dealing with is the survival of the past.
I cannot do better than tell a personal story which concerns an hon. Member on the other side of the Committee. I cannot be charged with making a party point on this occasion. The hon. Member had a constituent, who made a claim on the Royal Hospital for a pension and it was turned down. This was 20 years or so ago and, although the poor fellow's health had almost completely gone, he still persisted in trying to establish his claim to a pension.
As it happened, he talked to me about it and I remembered the man and the circumstances in which his disability arose—it was many years ago in an overseas station—and as a result by that evidence established his claim to a pension. Even then it was nearly 30 years late. That is the spirit in which the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, works. It is a survival from the past, and while one cannot blame the Secretary of State for War for this, it is something that needs to be watched closely and if ever the opportunity comes, this institution should be wound up and its premises should be put to a more useful purpose than at present.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) asked me a number of questions about the staff and particularly the running of the Chelsea Hospital. During the short time I have been at the War Office I have not visited the Hospital, but the officer who is now in charge of this institution has a very high reputation. I feel from the hon. Member's remarks that he has never been to Chelsea Hospital. I suggest that the best thing will be for me to arrange for him to go and have a look at it. I think it is unwise to make these rash

observations and although they are unlikely to go outside this Committee, they may do so. It is unfair to make these categorical assertions.

Mr. Simmons: My remarks were not directed against any individuals. I said there was one post, the Captain of the Invalids, which gave me the impression of regimenting invalids to which I objected.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member really cannot judge a hospital by turning up page 162 of the Estimates and looking at names. He might just as well say there is a man whose name is "Kilimanjaro," and that, therefore, he must be a beast. This has no relation to the way in which the Hospital is run. I think there is a lot to be said for retaining old traditional names, provided the administration is up to date.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a sum, not exceeding £16,720,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953.

VOTE 11

ADDITIONAL MARRIED QUARTERS

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953.

Mr. M. Stewart: On page 175 of the Estimates I see that the figure is given for the married quarters to be started during the year under this Vote. I wondered if it is possible for the hon. Gentleman to give an estimate of what will be the number of married quarters completed, whether started this year or not, in the next 12 months.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: Perhaps the hon. Member will permit me to reply on this particular question. I have the figures. The estimated numbers for 1952–53 of permanent married quarters are 1,916, and I may say, in passing, that they are very much higher than they have ever been in the past.

Mr. Emrys: Hughes: Can the hon. Gentleman say how many of those are in Scotland?

Mr. Hutchison: I have not got that, but I will find out.

Mr. Stewart: I am glad to know the figures. I was invariably asked to produce these figures myself, and I thought it

ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1951–52


Resolved,


That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10,000,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952 for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Army Services for the year.


Schedule




Sums not exceeding




Supply Grants
Appropriations in Aid


Vote.

£
£


1. Pay, &amp;c, of the Army

5,960,000
1,140,000


2. Reserve Forces, Territorial Army (to an additional number not exceeding 17,900 all ranks), Home Guard and Cadet Forces

1,480,000
—


3. War Office

140,000
—


4. Civilians

2,280,000
—


5. Movements

8,740,000
—


6. Supplies, &amp;c.

11,690,000
—


7. Stores

Cr 16,570,000
4,000,000


8. Works, Buildings and Lands

Cr 4,430,000
1,560,000


9. Miscellaneous Effective Services

710,000
800,000


11. Additional Married Quarters

—
* - 1,800,000


Total, Army (Supplementary) 1951–52
£
10,000,000
5,700,000


* Deficit.

Chairman to report Resolutions and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Butcher.]

would be interesting to know if the hon. Gentleman had them.

Mr. Hutchison: I took the tip from the hon. Member to look them up.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported this day.

Committee to sit again this day.

Orders of the Day — DIRECTORS, &c., BURDEN OF PROOF BILL

Read a Second time.

Committed to a Standing Committee.

CROWN FILM UNIT

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Oakshott.]

2.22 a.m.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: I want to call the attention of the House to the work of the Crown Film Unit and its future. I propose to do so quite briefly because I hope there will be an opportunity for other hon. Members to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, notably the hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Hollis). But in any event, the point of view I am going to put forward tonight is not a party view, but one widely held among hon. Members of all parties. Indeed, the Financial Secretary has only to refer to the debate on the Cinematograph Film Production (Special Loans) Bill on 28th February to assure himself of that fact.
On that occasion the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter) said that the Crown Film Unit always worked with a minimum of cost and a maximum of intelligence. My hon. Friend the Member for Flint, East (Mrs. White) said that the Unit had probably done more for the prestige of British films than any other single body.
I think it is generally admitted that the Unit has done a remarkable job of work. Even to this day, I suppose, few of us recall the film "London Can Take It" without emotion, and certainly none ought to under-estimate the influence that film had, notably in the United States of America. Films like "Target for Tonight" and "Western Approaches" were as much an unforgettable part of the last war as in the first war were such songs as "Pack up Your Troubles" and "It's a Long Way to Tipperary."
The work of the Crown Film Unit has continued since the war, and I have been looking, as no doubt the Financial Secretary has been looking, at the list of the films on which the Unit has been engaged, and what a pageant of enterprise it is. There is "El Dorado," a film about

British Guiana; "Daybreak in Udi," a film telling this country about the fight against superstition in Nigeria; "Prevention of Cross Infection," a training film for nurses on the care of sick children; "It Need not Happen," a film about road safety, particularly appropriate after the tragedy at Chatham a few weeks ago. Then there is "Family Affair," which was designed to find homes for those children in our institutions who all too often lead a loveless life.
I do not think one can assess the value of films of that kind, although it has been estimated that one film, "Family Affair," was instrumental, by finding foster parents for children, in saving public funds something like £50,000 a year. I want to quote to the House the comments of the "Daily Telegraph" on these films. It said, on 3rd March:
Films like these, by reminding us of things it is pleasanter to forget, make for a better world; they save lives; they remind foreigners that the nobler British traditions, medical and humanitarian, live still. Shown over most of the world, with commentaries in 20 languages, they do invaluable service politically by rebutting hostile propaganda about neglect of our poor at home and exploitation of natives in the Colonies.
It is not for nothing that the Crown Film Unit has been awarded what I think are called Oscars, on two occasions—that is to say, awards of merit of the American Motion Picture Academy. The Crown Film Unit has become a pattern for similar film units in the Dominions, and I saw a letter from America the other day which said that the British might as well sell the pictures from the National Gallery as do away with the Crown Film Unit, because of the important influence it has had in the United States of America.
In those circumstances one would think that only arguments of the most weighty kind could possibly justify abolition of such a unit. But it is not easy to find exactly what these arguments are. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) questioned the Financial Secretary about the savings to be made, on 28th February, the reply was that it was impossible to give any figures at present. The hon. Gentleman added that it is the Government's intention to make a definite reduction in the scale on which Departments make use of films as a medium of publicity.
It has been said that the unit has been costing an average of about £250,000 a year, but even that compares favourably, taking into account the amount of work of film production, with the cost of production at other units in this country. But the figure is a little misleading, because since then there has been a reduction in the expenditure of the Crown Film Unit. It is not possible to say exactly what the figure is today, but I would hazard a guess, and perhaps the hon. Gentleman will correct me if necessary, that it is a very substantial amount lower than the average amount of £250,000.
It is being gradually reduced. Economies have been made, and without the very heavy burden of the big studios at Beaconsfield the cost could be reduced still further. I am informed on good authority that there is no reason why, during the financial year which we are about to start, the expense of the Crown Film Unit should not be reduced even below £100,000. Against that we ought to balance the commercial receipts of the unit. At present, there are between 29 and 30 films in commercial circulation in this country, while others are earning dollars in the United States.
It is apparent from answers given by the Minister during the past few weeks that Government Departments are continuing to make films, but instead of doing this through the Crown Film Unit they are making them through commercial channels. The Ministry of Health and the. General Post Office have announced in the House that this is their intention, and I understand that the Home Office and the Ministry of Agriculture, as well, are proposing to continue to make films in that way. It really does seem a lamentable position to smash up a unit which has proved its worth.
It may well be that instead of these proposals saving the Exchequer money, they may cost money during the next few years. There are other arguments that we cannot assess in material terms. There is the effect of the unit in educating public opinion and in telling the world of the achievements of this country. Other nations are not squeamish of telling the world what they have done. We know from American films that America won the war in Burma and from

Russian films that Russia invented the tractor.
It might be a good thing if, instead of cutting down on this publicity, we did rather more to tell the people of the world what this country and its people have achieved. Many of us in all parts of the House believe that the fight of truth against evil is even more important than the fight of arms against arms. At a time when we are proposing to spend millions of pounds to destroy men's bodies we are haggling over a few thousand pounds to save men's minds.
I do not think it is like the Financial Secretary to take decisions of that kind. I hope that he will be big and admit that the Government made a mistake in announcing this decision. If he does I will promise not to gloat. If it is any comfort to him, perhaps I can remind him that the previous Government made the lamentable decision to cut down oversea broadcasts. As a result of the response of public opinion they reversed the decision. I hope that like his predecessors in office the hon. Gentleman will be big enough to admit a mistake and announce tonight he is in a position to revise the earlier decision.

2.32 a.m.

Mr. Christopher Hollis: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood) has made his case with his customary cogency and I do not propose to go through, in criticism or agreement, the precise merits of the Crown Film Unit. But I hope my hon. Friend will be able to give us as much information as possible on the exact figures of saving that are likely, because on that I am at present extremely uninformed. We all understand that there is a crisis and that economies have to be made; that the economies fall where we do not like them to fall; and that it is not a sufficient argument to say that the economies are small, since all economies are small if we are going to economise at all.
The hon. Member for Rossendale gives the figure of £250,000. I thought the annual expenditure was £225,000. How much of that is really to be saved if we set against it, on the one hand, the receipts from the commercial distribution and, on the other hand, the amount of film making or other publicity that will


have to take place by Government Departments and other interests if the Crown Film Unit is cut out?
There are two forms of Government economy. Sometimes the Government can stop doing something which otherwise would not need to be done at all. On other occasions, the Government stops doing something which will otherwise have to be done by someone else; and there are plenty of occasions where that is desirable. I wonder to what extent the work of the Crown Film Unit would have to be done by other Government Departments or, if not by them, then by some other interests.
My feeling is that little economy will be carried through by closing down the Unit, but a certain amount—probably more—could have been achieved by closing down the work at Beaconsfield and making economies within the Unit, and preserving the Unit. I should be grateful if my hon. Friend would enlighten us more on the figures than has been the case so far.

2.35 a.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter): I do not want to quarrel with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood), or my hon. Friend from Devizes (Mr. Hollis), on the issue of the technical and artistic merits of some, though by no means all, of the films which the Crown Film Unit has produced. I have some sympathy, in replying to an Adjournment debate at this hour of the morning, with "Target for Tonight."
The hon. Member for Rossendale spoilt his case by exaggeration when he started to suggest that, for better or for worse, the Unit was in the same category as the National Gallery. I am not concerned to dispute that if this were a prosperous country, in which there was no particular need for economy, hon. Members might well feel that a unit of this kind was an agreeable ornament of its society. But all hon. Members know the situation with which the country is faced, and which this Government inherited from its predecessors—

Mr. Harold Lever: Nonsense.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman thinks we created the situation which this Government inherited from its predecessor. It is a situation which makes the utmost public economy essential. We are not going to get that if, when any particular economy is put forward, hon. Members talk about haggling over a few thousand pounds. It is easy, if one dons intellectual blinkers and confines one's case solely to one matter, to put up a plausible case for not carrying out the particular economy you are discussing. If hon. Members adopt that attitude any really effective attempt to deal with national expenditure becomes impossible.
I would ask the House, in discussing the merits of this issue, not to get into the mood that one particular economy can be sacrificed easily. In respect of every economy there are hon. Members who are interested in that subject, and who, with the same zeal, persuasive power, and eloquence, as the hon. Member for Rossendale has urged in this case, will urge that that economy be not effected.
The basis of the matter is that the Government have decided, quite apart from the Crown Film Unit, to reduce substantially Government expenditure on films as a whole. That does not spring from any antipathy to that agreeable method of disseminating information. It is based on the fact that the production and distribution of films is a highly expensive way of carrying on information work, and that this is a method of information activity which has to be substantially restricted.
Once we adopt that attitude, the case for maintaining a separate and special unit for the production of Government films becomes very much weaker. If we decide to carry on production on the comparatively large scale undertaken in 1946–47 there is a much stronger case for having a specialised unit to produce films for the Government. If we decide, as a matter of policy and national economy, to reduce substantially—though not completely to eliminate—the production of films, the case for the overheads, organisation costs, accommodation, etc., of a separate film unit, becomes, pro tanto, very much weaker.
That is, in fact, the background against which this particular decision was taken, and that really answers my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes. He pointed out, quite rightly, that economies were of two kinds—one where you dispense with a considerable part of a service, and the other where you transfer expenditure elsewhere. This is in the first of the categories.
If one takes the C.O.I. estimate alone, the provision for films this year shows a reduction of £300,000, compared with the estimate for last year. That is a very substantial figure. Coming to the cost of the Crown Film unit itself, there are a number of facts which may be of interest. Last year, inside the Crown Film Unit, the item of salaries alone came to £78,500. There was a staff of no fewer than 117, 14 of whom were in receipt of salaries in excess of £1,000 a year. The total cost of its operation was in excess of £200,000.
Both hon. Gentlemen referred to the commercial earnings of the unit. I am sorry to say that last year, against a background of production costs in excess of £200,000, the identifiable earnings amount to £3,000 only. There has been, I am sorry to say, a very substantial, absolute, and relative fall—relative as against expenditure on production—in the receipts from the Unit's productions, from £25,000 a year in 1946–47 down to £3,000 in the financial year now coming to a close. Therefore, I do not think that the argument of commercial earnings—of earnings of £3,000 by an expenditure in excess of £200,000will commend itself very strongly to this House.
But the cost factor does not stop there. It is an elementary platitude, for which I apologise, that it is useless to produce films unless they can be displayed. It is a fact that even in the last year for which we have complete figures, 69 per cent. of the films produced by the Unit were not taken and exhibited by any of the commercial companies or any cinema other than Government controlled projectors.
It followed from that that if we were to produce films and to do nothing with them other than putting them in a drawer where no one could see them we had to maintain the system of Government film distribution. That system the

Government decided to abolish. I ask both hon. Gentlemen to appreciate that when we come to the question of costs we are not only concerned with the cost of producing films, but we are equally concerned with the fact that if we produce films we are consequently bound to take the steps necessary to secure that they are exhibited, and that therefore the costs of distribution inevitably come into our calculations.
Let me give some facts about this ancillary activity. The Film Distribution Service had a salary list of £126,000 in the last financial year. It owned 91 vans with mobile projectors, and something in excess of 100 of what I may describe as static or non-mobile projectors. The cost of the service totalled £238,000 in 1951–52.
I do not want to be misleading on this point. The service is not solely confined to the distribution of Crown films, but the point I ask the House to bear in mind is that if we are to retain the Crown Film Unit, as the hon. Member for Rossendale suggests, we would be bound to retain the distribution service.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Surely there will have to be some distribution service for those Departments which intend to go ahead with the use of films for, for example, propaganda purposes for recruiting or, as in the case of the Ministry of Food, for training purposes.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: It may well be that some Departments have their own film projection services. The Ministry of Agriculture and, I think, the Scottish Home Department have them. What is being closed down is the nation-wide system of film distribution through the C.O.I. Of course, the training film service, to which the hon. Member referred, could not, and would not, be used to distribute Crown films, those films which, as I have already pointed out, simply would not be shown at all unless we preserved this central distributive system.
I ask the House, therefore, to appreciate that this is not a case of haggling over a few thousand pounds. This involves items running in all into several hundred thousand pounds. It involves, indeed, infinitely the major part of the reduction of some £600,000 a year which is being effected this year in the Central Office of Information as a whole.
The film distribution service for Crown and other films has taken up a very substantial proportion of the C.O.I.'s staff. It has involved the employment of about half of the 300 people engaged out of London in the regions by the Central Office of Information. Under the circumstances, that half are now able to be dispensed with. Therefore, we are concerned with the central core—the real essence—of the whole economies being effected in the Central Office of Information as a whole, economies involving manpower to the extent of some hundreds of people and money to the figure of some £600,000.
If I may take up again the hon. Member's phrase, that is not "haggling" over a few thousand pounds. That is, even in these days of astronomic millions in national accounts, a not wholly insignificant sum; nor is the manpower involved insignificant. That brings me to my further point. When the hon. Member deplored the loss of the Crown Film Unit, he spoke as if we were about to put into some lethal chamber the very talented people who have produced these films. But, of course, these people will remain and will be available for employment.
I do not think there is anybody who would not say that the British film industry generally, which the Government, through the medium of the Eady plan, inaugurated under their predecessors, are making such strenuous efforts to revive, would not be much the better for a certain infusion of constructive ability, both in direction, in production and in photography.
If these people are of the quality which the hon. Gentleman states them to be, and which I do not dispute; if this industry—and I intend no discourtesy—has no plethora of talent, if one may judge from some of their productions, there is no reason why that quality should not display itself, perhaps, in a sphere whose commercial receipts will exceed £3,000 a year.
The fact that these people are now available for such employment as may be offered in the film industry has been well publicised, since the interest that has been shown in this subject has given nobody in the film world any opportunity of not knowing that they will be available for employment.
The Unit, in its major part, is due to close at the end of this month, at the end of the financial year, although certain ancillary services—such as what is technically called "dubbing," for example—will continue for a few weeks more; and certainly no obstacle will be put in the way of any of the technicians who desire to leave earlier if suitable employment seems to them to come their way.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: rose—

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am sorry—I am up against time.
Therefore, the position is not that this ability is being destroyed. On the contrary, it is still there; it is still available for exercise in a somewhat wider direction than in the past. In those circumstances, I think the House will appreciate that this is a decision which was not taken lightly.
We appreciate that all cuts that have to be imposed have their disadvantages, that when cuts are made even of some of the less essential aspects of Government expenditure, something inevitably is lost. The hon. Member will not dispute that. But, equally, the hon. Member has not made out any case for suggesting that the Crown Film Unit comes in the category of essential services which the nation, at a time of the greatest difficulty, can afford. It really is essential, therefore, that this economy shall be maintained, that the decision which has been given shall stand, and that action shall be taken along the lines which I have described.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Eight Minutes to Three o'Clock a.m.